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Actuated by these sentiments our ancestors arrayed themselves against 
the government in one huge and compact mass. All ranks, all parties, 
all Protestant sects, made up that vast Phalanx. In the van were the 
Lords Spiritual and Temporal, Then came the landed gentry and the 
clergy; both the Universities, all the Inns of Court, merchants, shop­
keepers, farmers, the porters who plied in the streets of the great towns, 
the peasants who ploughed the fields. The league against the King in­
cluded the very foremast men who manned his ships, the very sentinels 
who guarded his palace. The names of Whig and Tory were for a 
moment forgotten. The old Exclusionist took the old Abhorrer by the 
hand. Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Independents, Baptists, forgot their 
long feuds, and remembered only their common Protestantism and their 
common danger . . . .  The coalition of 1688 was produced, and could 
be produced, only by tyranny which approached to insanity, and by dan­
ger which threatened at once all the great institutions of the country.
Macaulay on the Fall of 
James II1
I. I n t r o d u c t io n  
The aborted proceeding to impeach Richard Nixon has stimulated 
debate about the appropriateness of the impeachment process as a 
check upon the arbitrary use of presidential power. Impeachment has 
been criticized as a cumbersome, agonizingly slow, and unjustifiably ex­
pensive way for Congress to express its will, extracting a cost in an 
abraded electorate suffering further with duties of government unmet
1. I T .  Macaulay, The History of England from  th e  Accession o f  James II 
803-04 (1906).
while Congress and the presidency are consumed with their offensive 
and defensive roles in the process. Termination of the impeachment 
proceeding without an admission of moral guilt (only “errors of judg­
ment”) or a finding of legal responsibility is a disquieting denouement 
for the Watergate tragedy. Further, such proceedings could not ade­
quately resolve whether a President who resigns when faced with 
certain removal should be allowed extensive federal retirement benefits 
or if a resigning President should have immunity from prosecution for 
criminal acts committed while in office—now a mooted question as to 
federal prosecution because of President Ford’s pardon.
Congressman Henry Reuss has proposed in response to this crisis 
the adoption of a modified form of responsible government to be ac­
complished by a constitutional amendment which would permit the 
removal of the President by a three-fifths vote of no confidence by the 
members of each House of Congress.2 A new President and Vice­
President would be chosen in a special election held following such a 
vote. Under such a system, a President could be removed simply upon 
the basis of a strongly felt difference on policy or for an error in judg­
ment, rather than upon conviction of the commission of treason, bribery, 
or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The President would enjoy 
office at the sufferance of Congress.
It is suggested, however, that when considered within the para­
meters of our present system of government, the process of impeach­
ment, even if it culminates in presidential resignation, has served as an 
effective deterrent to the arbitrary abuse of presidential power. A  
radical change in the law of presidential removal is not called for by 
the Nixon resignation.
Of course, impeachment is cumbersome, heavy artillery in the 
arsenal of democratic government, not designed to go after a mouse—  
a rat on occasion perhaps, but never a mouse. Other procedures are 
available for lesser game, including a vote of censure.
Nor is it meant to be quick. Within a governmental system of 
checks and balances in which the President possesses an electoral man­
date equal to and independent of Congress, it would violate an expres­
sion of the people’s will to accomplish his removal from office before 
not only Congress but also the people recognize by a substantial 
majority that legitimacy had departed, the mandate finished.3 Of
2. H. Joint Res. No. 903, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1111 (1974). See also Havighurst, 
Doing Away with Presidential Impeachment: The Advantages of Parliamentary Gov- 
eminent, 1974 Ariz. L. Rev. 223.
3. The term “legitimacy” is not used here in the legalistic sense of the 
acquisition of power by formally orthodox or proper means. Rather, it is
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course, the efficiency of that process depends upon the speed with 
which evidence can be produced. Thus, where immediate presidential 
compliance with congressional fact-finding incident to an impeachment 
inquiry would appropriately shorten the process, categorical refusal to 
comply with congressional subpoenas should be considered an impeach­
able offense, since toleration of such failure would destroy the impeach­
ment provision.
In the sense that the process was designed ultimately to protect 
the country against corruption and the abuse of power by removing 
rather than punishing the offender, impeachment works; this is appre­
ciated particularly when it is understood that resignation is not “extra- 
legal,”4 apart from the process, but rather is an historically often-used 
and a constitutionally mandated5 part of the system. The framers 
demanded the preservation of separate criminal proceedings, to ac­
complish punishment, as the price paid for the removal of English crim­
inal sanctions from the process of impeachment.6
Finally, rejection of the parliamentary mode does not necessarily 
suggest a qualitative judgment in favor of a governmental system of 
separated branches balanced and checked. It is simply a recognition 
that after 200 years of such governance, the separation of coordinate 
branches is woven into the warp and woof of the community, and is 
not able to be extracted and replaced without rending the whole.
Our purposes, therefore, are twofold: first, to analyze in detail the 
American procedure of impeachment, in the hope that wider know­
ledge of its provisions will render the use of the process more effective 
in constraining executive and judicial power; and second, to offer sug­
gestions for improving the process within the bounds of our historical 
constitutional system. In that which follows, the first three sections 
present an analysis of the procedural law of the impeachment process
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used, as the political scientist or sociologist would use it, to connote a suffi­
cient affinity between the people and the institutions of government, based 
upon the preexistence of a cultural harmony between them, that allegiance 
naturally results without coercion. Firmage, Law and the Indochina War:
A Retrospective View, 1974 U tah L. Rev. 1, 21, reprinted in 4 The Vietnam 
War and International Law (R. Falk ed. 1974).
See also Firmage, The War of National Liberation and the Third World, in Law and 
Civil War in th e  Modern W orld (J. Moore ed. 1974). Lipset has defined legitimacy 
as the capacity of a political system to advance and maintain the belief that existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate for the community. Lipset, Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 69, 86 (1959).
4. Cf. Kurland, Watergate, Impeachment and the Constitution, 45 Miss. L.J. 531, 
579 (1974).
5. U.S. Const, art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
6. See notes 40, 332-34 infra and accompanying text.
as it operates when no objections or defenses extraneous to the im­
peachment process itself are raised by the defendant to impede 
its normal resolution. Later sections discuss the various immunities, 
privileges, rights, and powers which a party defendant to an impeach­
ment proceeding may exercise in an effort to thwart, delay, or reverse 
the course of the congressional impeachment process. The final 
sections treat the effect of resignation upon an attempted impeachment 
and the effect upon the impeachment process of the pardon granted 
Mr. Nixon by President Ford.
Underlying the impeachment powers are four fundamental pre­
cepts which should guide any discussion of the process of presidential 
impeachment particularly, and each recommendation for its improve­
ment and refinement. First, the impeachment power was written into 
the Constitution to protect the principle of separation of powers. Im­
peachment had developed in England as a parliamentary process de­
signed to protect and ultimately to enhance the power of Parliament 
against constitutional abuses and excesses of Tudor and Stuart ministers 
bent upon asserting absolutist power for the Crown against the preroga­
tives of Parliament. By this means, the King’s ministers were brought 
under the rule of law, and executive responsibility to Parliament was 
established.7 Similarly, impeachment procedure was placed in the 
United States Constitution by founding fathers steeped in English law 
and history,8 primarily as a check upon overweening executive power, as 
an “exception to [the] principle”9 of separation of powers in order that 
that very principle might be preserved with governmental branches 
checked and balanced.
Second, as a prophylactic against the usurpation of powers,30
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7. See W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 382 (3d ed. 1922); C. Rob­
erts , The G row th o f Responsible Government in Stxjart England passim (1966). 
It should be noted that the powerful Tudor monarchy was not simply aimed at contain­
ing or diminishing the power of its potential rival, parliament. Equally fundamental in 
explaining the Tudor quest for absolute power was its natural reaction against Lan­
castrian misrule and the consequent baronial anarchy: the collapse of trial by jury, the 
subversion of local government by large landowners, the control of parliamentary elec­
tions by local barons, and the crumbling legal system at Westminster and in the coun­
try. See T. P lucknett, A Concise H istory o f  th e  Common Law 35-38 (5th ed. 
1956).
8. Many of the members of the Convention had studied in England, including nine 
lawyers who had practiced there. R. Berger 87 n.160. Also, the English impeachment 
trial of Warren Hastings was in progress during the Constitutional Convention and was 
referred to in the debates. 2 Records 550.
9. 1 Annals of Cong. 527 (1789) [1789-1824] (remarks of Representative Bou- 
dinot).
10. Roberts noted that impeachment during the seventeenth century was not aimed 
at preventing or punishing private wrongs, nor was it stimulated by party policy differ-
1028 DUKE LA W  JOURNAL [Vol. 1974:1023
impeachment was intended primarily to protect the integrity of gov­
ernment against political offenses. It cannot seriously be questioned 
that impeachment will lie for “great offenses” which arise out of mis­
use of constitutional powers which nevertheless does not constitute a 
criminally indictable offense. James Wilson, perhaps the greatest legal 
mind in the Convention, concluded that
[i]mpeachments . . . come not . . . within the sphere of ordinary juris­
prudence. They are founded on different principles; are governed by 
different maxims, and are directed to different objects: for this reason, 
the trial and punishment of an offense on an impeachment, is no bar 
to a trial and punishment of the same offense at common law.11
Impeachment, Wilson wrote, was “confined to political characters, to 
political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments.”12 
Similarly Chancellor Kent taught that “[i]f . . .  the President will use 
the authority of his station to violate the Constitution or law of the land, 
the House of Representatives will arrest him in his career by resorting 
to the power of impeachment.”13 Thus, the Congress is called upon 
to curtail any abuse of political office through the exercise of its own 
political powers as representatives of the people.14
ences, it was “not the venting of private spleen or party hatreds’* but rather a prophylac­
tic against usurpation of power. C. Roberts, supra note 7, at 32.
11. 1 J. Wilson, Works 452 (1804).
12. 2 id. at 166.
13. 1 J. Kent 289.
14. Firmage, The Law of Presidential Impeachment, 1973 U tah L. Rev. 681. 
George Mason in the Constitutional Convention debated the necessity of having a check 
on the Executive to ensure executive responsibility to the constitutional structure of this 
country.
[S]ome provision should be made for defending the Community [against] the 
incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the Chief Magistrate. The limitation of 
the period of his service . . . was not a sufficient security. He might lose 
his capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his admiration into a 
scheme of peculation or oppression. . . .  In the case of the Executive Mag­
istracy which was to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or cor­
ruption was more within the compass of probable events, and either of them 
might be fatal to the Republic. 1 Records 65-66.
Mason further noted that “attempts to subvert the Constitution” should constitute an im­
peachable offense. Id. at 550. Benjamin Franklin noted that impeachment of the Chief 
Executive was essential to avoid political assassination when the Executive had “ren­
dered himself obnoxious.” Id. at 65. Edmund Randolph also commented on the neces­
sity of impeachment to provide against Executive abuse of power:
The Executive will have great opportunities of abusing power; particularly in 
time of war when the military force, and in some respects the public money 
will be in his hands. Should no regular punishment be provided, it will be ir­
regularly inflicted by tumults and insurrections. Id. at 67.
Messrs. Jones, Bowdoin, and Stillman also asserted in the Massachusetts conven­
tion that presidential impeachment would lie for “abuse of power,” 2 J. E llio t  75, 
81-86, 168-69, as did Francis Corbin in the Virginia convention, 3 id. at 509-11, and 
Iredell in the North Carolina convention, Aid. at 127.
Third, the impeachment power was designed to preserve the basic 
structure of our society. While the impeachment process is funda­
mentally political,15 it was designed to protect the foundation of the 
state itself— not to create a sanction for misjudgment or to settle 
disputes over policy, both appropriately dealt with through the electoral 
process. (To hold otherwise would do violence to that principle which 
undergirds the Constitution— the separation of powers— which the im­
peachment power was designed to preserve.) It was this that Hamil­
ton referred to when he stated that impeachable offenses have “a na­
ture which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, 
as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society it­
self.”16 Mason regarded the purpose of impeachment to be the pre­
vention of “great and dangerous offenses,” resulting from “attempts to 
subvert the Constitution.”17 Iredell, later to become a Justice of the 
Supreme Court, in the North Carolina ratifying convention, stated that 
impeachment would arise from “acts of great injury to the commu­
nity.”18 Madison saw impeachment as a preventive against a president 
perverting “his administration into a scheme of peculation or oppres­
sion”;19 Morris perceived it as a deterrent for bribery.20 In part it was 
this conception of the impeachment proceeding as a political institution 
which made it logical to transfer the forum of the impeachment trial 
from the Supreme Court as provided by an early draft of the Consti­
tution, to the Senate.21
Finally, being a political process, impeachment should not be 
viewed as a duplication of the criminal process.22 The impeachment 
process was designed to be neither a criminal proceeding, nor, in a 
strictly technical sense, a juridical trial. Removal from office cannot 
be viewed as criminal punishment or its equivalent. To hold otherwise 
would be to assume that an office holder was possessed of an indefeas­
ible property interest in the office. Joseph Story spoke of impeach­
ment as “a proceeding purely of a political nature. It is not so much 
designed to punish an offender as to secure the state against gross of­
ficial misdemeanors. It touches neither his person nor his property, 
but simply divests him of his political capacity.”23 This conclusion was
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15. 1 J. Wilson, supra note 11.
16. The Federalist No. 65, at 426 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)
17. 2 Records 550.
18. 4 J. Elliot 113.
19. 2 Records 68-69.
20. Id.
21. 1 id. at 22; 2 id. at 186, 493, 547, 551.
22. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
23. 1 J. S t o r y  § 803, at 586-87.
consistently held by virtually every early commentator on the process of 
impeachment.24 Nevertheless, while the process was shorn of criminal 
sanctions,25 certain aspects of criminal procedure and its linguistic 
trappings were retained from its English origins as a criminal proceed­
ing within Parliament.26
To a large extent, it was this retention of criminal judicial forms 
and practices which has given rise to further questions about what rights 
and immunities a defendant is entitled to raise before an impeachment 
court. Does the scope of executive privilege afford any protection 
whatever in a trial by the Senate? May fourth and fifth amendment 
rights be raised to exclude certain evidence, and who may assert such 
of the arguments which are likely to be relevant based upon the rights? 
Which, if any, of the interloctory or final rulings and judgments of 
the Senate may be subjected to judicial review? While many of these 
questions must wait upon the political moment in which they will arise 
before they can be answered authoritatively, we shall present fundamen­
tal precepts and precedents underpinning the procedural law of im­
peachment.
II. T h e  E n g l is h  P r e c e d e n t s
It has been said that “[t]he ‘crowning achievement’ of the four­
teenth century . . . was to devise impeachments as a procedure for trial 
of the King’s ministers, who were otherwise not reachable.”27 Unlike 
the bill of attainder where persons were sentenced to death without 
any trial and conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, 
impeachment involved both an indictment by the House of Commons 
as a grand jury of the nation and a trial at the bar of the House of
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24. E.g., Edward Rutledge and General C.C. Pinckney considered impeachment 
proper were a President to betray or abuse his public trust. 4 J. E l l io t t  276, 281. 
Mason and Morris recognized gross personal corruption as grounds for impeachment. 2 
Records 68-69.
25. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to re­
moval from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, 
Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall never­
theless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, 
according to Law. U.S. Const, art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
26. Article two, section four provides for removal from office on “conviction of 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Article one, section three, 
clause six gives the Senate “sole Power to try all Impeachments” and later speaks of 
no person being “convicted” without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members pres­
ent; article two, section two, clause one gives the President the “Power to grant Re­
prieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States” but excepts impeachment; 
and article three, section two, clause three states that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except 
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”
27. R. B eroer 26.
Lords. Through the growth of parliamentary impeachment there 
emerged a procedural common law of impeachment which was familiar 
to the framers of the American Constitution and which has substantially 
influenced the proceedings in American impeachment cases to the 
present.
It was the English law of impeachment, as summarized in Thomas 
Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice,28 that was referred to and 
followed, with some modifications, in the American impeachment 
cases. Under English law, the House of Commons, as the “grand 
inquest of the nation,”29 generally conducted ex parte investigations 
against the accused,30 passed resolutions containing a charge of im­
peachable conduct on the part of the accused,31 directed some member 
to impeach the accused by oral accusation at the bar of the House of 
Lords,32 and thereafter appointed managers to present articles of 
impeachment and to act as suitors for penal justice against the 
impeached at the bar of the Lords.33 The House of Lords then issued 
process against the impeached party34 and committed him where 
necessary.35 Subsequently, the Lords acted as judges in the trial 
before their bar.36 The trial before the House of Lords essentially 
followed the criminal procedure found in the courts and applied the 
same rules of evidence37 with the judgment itself controlled by legal
28. Jefferson’s Manual was prepared by Thomas Jefferson for his own guid­
ance as President of the Senate in the years of his Vice-Presidency, from 1797 
to 1801. In 1837 the House, by a rule which still exists, provided that the 
provisions of the Manual should “govern the House in all cases to which they 
are applicable and in which they are not inconsistent with the standing rules 
and orders of the House.” Manual 121 n.a.
29. Manual § 602, at 295. See also 3 H in d s’ §§ 2004, 2026.
30. In the 1852 impeachment proceeding of District Judge Watrous, the issue as to 
the propriety of ex parte investigations was debated and English citations were given 
in support. See 3 H in d s’ § 2496, at 996-97. See also 3 id. § 2326 (In the Peck im­
peachment case the nature of the inquiry preliminary to impeachment was discussed in 
regard to its conformity with English precedents.).
31. Manual § 602, at 295. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2038 (discussing the Blount im­
peachment in which the House, following the precedent of the Hastings trial, passed an 
impeachment resolution without accompanying articles and presented it to the Senate).
32. Manual § 602, at 295. In the Hastings trial, for example, Mr. Burke “went up 
to the House of Lords and impeached him in words . . . .” 3 H in d s’ § 2295, at 647.
33. 3 H in d s’ §§ 2004, 2026; Manual § 602, at 295. For a discussion of the role 
of the managers under English precedent, see 3 H in d s’ §§ 2136-39.
34. Manual § 608, at 297. “Under the parliamentary law, if the party impeached 
at the bar of the Lords does not appear, proclamations are issued giving him a day to 
appear.” 3 H in d s’ § 2116, at 438.
35. Manual § 602, at 296. The House in the Blount impeachment followed English 
precedent and required the sequestration of the respondent from his seat in the Senate. 
3 H in d s’ § 2295, at 646.
36. 3 H in d s’ § 2056, at 378; Manual §§ 615-18, at 301-03.
37. Manual § 619, at 304. See also 3 H in d s’ § 2155, at 485. In the Johnson trial
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precedents.38 An impeachment proceeding was not discontinued by 
the dissolution of Parliament but was resumed by the subsequent 
Parliament.39
Although English precedent has been relied on heavily in the 
American impeachment cases, Congress has the constitutional authority 
to control its procedure without regard to earlier precedent. More­
over, a persuasive argument can be made for substantially modifying 
the English procedure to accommodate special circumstances present 
in American impeachment cases, since one of the marked distinctions 
between English and American impeachments is that the English pro­
ceeding included the imposition of criminal sanctions, while criminal 
penalties are excluded from American proceedings.40 Consequently, 
a relaxation of the strict rules of evidence and procedure used in a 
criminal proceeding is appropriate in American impeachment, which 
is more closely analogous to a civil trial. While Congress has rejected 
efforts toward general reform of its impeachment procedure41— pro­
fessing to retain the English model with its criminal law superstructure 
— it has often modified its procedural rules in individual instances.
III. H o u se  I m p e a c h m e n t  P r o c e d u r e
The Commons, as the grand inquest of the nation, becomes suitors for 
penal justice. . . . The general course is to pass a resolution containing 
a criminal charge against the supposed delinquent, and then to direct 
some member to impeach him by oral accusation, at the bar of the 
House of Lords, in the name of the Commons.42
Sole power of impeachment is conferred upon the House of Re­
presentatives by the Constitution.43 The manner in which impeach-
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the necessity of strictly following the rules of evidence was discussed and the practice 
was continued on the strength of English precedent. 3 id. § 2238, at 565.
38. Manual § 619, at 304. Although it has been urged that impeachment under the 
English law was merely an extension of the criminal law and thus would be appropriate 
only for indictable crimes, this view has been substantially repudiated. See R. B erger 
59-67. Accordingly, the statement that judgments on impeachment were controlled by 
legal precedent refers to the fact that while “English impeachments did not require an 
indictable crime they were nonetheless criminal proceedings because conviction was pun­
ishable by death, imprisonment, or heavy fine.” Id. at 67.
39. 3 H in d s’ § 2005, at 308; Manual § 620, at 305.
40. See, e.g., 3 Hinds’ § 2510, at 1016 (discussion of the Colfax impeachment in 
which the Judiciary Committee concluded that the power of impeachment under the 
Constitution was remedial rather than punitive).
41. Such reforms have been unsuccessfully attempted in the several impeachments. 
See notes 163 & 226 infra.
42. Manual § 602, at 295 (citation omitted).
43. U.S. C o n st , art. I, § 2 (providing that “[T]he House of Representatives . . . 
shall have the sole power of impeachment”).
ments are conducted in the House, however, is not described in the Con­
stitution but instead follows the accretion of procedural precedents 
which are modified from time to time by House resolutions. There 
follows an examination of these precedents as they are found in the 
thirteen impeachments voted by the House,44 with special reference 
to the Nixon proceeding whenever deviation from precedent occurred.
The House has generally followed its English and American prec­
edents, even though the Constitution clearly authorizes it to abandon 
these precedents and to develop new procedures. Nontheless, where 
equitable or public policy considerations have been urged in support 
of a particular change from procedural precedent, the House has been 
amenable to innovative modifications. These changes have led to the 
eventual adoption of specific procedures to guide the impeachment 
process through the House from its earliest initiatory investigations to 
presentment before the Senate.
An impeachment resolution is first presented to the House, and 
if that body sees fit, the matter is referred to the House Judiciary Com­
mittee for investigation. This Committee serves two purposes: it 
recommends to the House whether to vote to impeach, and it drafts 
articles of impeachment to be issued against the accused in the trial 
by the Senate. Following the Committee’s report on the articles of 
impeachment, the full House votes, and if it impeaches, managers are 
selected to present the case at the bar of the Senate. At certain stages 
in this process, questions arise about the necessity of showing probable 
cause, the burden of proof, the right of the accused to be represented, 
and the degree of specificity and publicity which should accompany the 
House’s decisions and formulations of its case against an accused public 
officer.
A. The Initiation of Preliminary Investigations in the House
Impeachment inquiries in the House are initiated by Congress in 
response to accusations made against civil officers.45 Congressmen 
have preferred charges in various ways.46 Individual House members
44. Senator Blount (1797-99); District Judge Pickering (1803-04); Supreme Court 
Justice Chase (1804-05); District Judge Peck (1830-31); District Judge Humphreys 
(1862); President Johnson (1867-68); District Judge Delahay (1873); Secretary of War 
Belknap (1876); District Judge Swayne (1903-05); Circuit Judge Archbald (1912-13); 
District Judge English (1925-26); District Judge Louderback (1932-33); District Judge 
Setter (1933-36).
45. The term “civil officers” includes both officers of the executive branch of gov­
ernment and federal judges. The impeachment precedents that do exist primarily in­
volve the impeachment of federal judges. See note 44 supra.
46. The process of preferring charges has no prescribed formality or technical re-
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have initiated impeachment investigations by preferring charges en­
tirely on their own responsibility, usually reinforced by accusations 
made by others. Investigations have also been stimulated by presiden­
tial messages, accusations contained in memorials,47 and as a result of 
general congressional investigations. Where individual House mem­
bers present impeachment resolutions and propose House investigation 
of alleged misconduct on the part of civil officers, these are presented 
before the House as a question of highest privilege.48 As a question 
of privilege, an impeachment resolution may be presented at any time, 
irrespective of previous action by the House.49 The following examina­
tion of impeachment proceedings demonstrates these various manners 
in which impeachment inquiries originate.
Individual House members often have initiated impeachment in­
quiries on their own responsibility. Generally, such a resolution would 
propose that “[a] committee be appointed to inquire into the official 
conduct of [an accused] . . . and to report their opinion whether the 
said [accused] hath so acted in his [official] capacity as to require the 
interposition of the constitutional power of the House.”50 Thus, it is 
possible for impeachments to begin through an impeachment resolution 
which is adopted in reliance on the recommendation of a single House 
member.51 For example, in the Johnson impeachment, one House 
member proposed as a question of privilege before the House a 
resolution: “That the Committee on the Judiciary be . . . authorized 
to inquire into the official conduct of Andrew Johnson . . . and that 
said committee have power to send for persons and papers and to ad­
minister the customary oath to witnesses.”52 More typically, however, 
impeachment inquiries have been initiated by a proposal of one House 
member reinforced by charges of others. Accordingly, Judge Swayne’s 
impeachment originated in response to a member’s proposal reinforced
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quirements, but rather is a flexible process which may be executed in any number of 
ways by a member of the House.
47. Memorials, for these purposes, include general government documents drawn 
from virtually any other source which provide a congressman with some motive for ini­
tiating accusations of wrongdoing.
48. “Questions of the privilege of the House are brought before the body in the form 
of a resolution.” 6 C a n n o n ’s §§ 661-68, at 283-84. See also id. § 470; 1 J. Story § 
807, at 588.
49. 3 H in d s’ § 2053. It should be noted that while a resolution directly proposing 
impeachment is privileged, a resolution proposing an investigation with a view to im­
peachment is not. 3 id. § 2546.
50. 6 C a n n o n ’s § 468; 3 H in d s’ §§ 2051-52.
51. See, e.g., 80 C o n g . R ec . 404 (1933) (the investigation of Judge Ritter); 3 
H in d s* § 2400 (the investigation of President Andrew Johnson).
52. 3 Hinds’ § 2400, at 824.
by a legislative memorial;53 the Humphreys case was initiated through 
a House member supported by “common fame”;54 and Judge Louder- 
back’s impeachment originated in response to a member’s proposal sup­
ported with a presentation of accusations by a local bar association.55
Three of the earliest impeachments were initiated in response to 
presidental messages charging misconduct on the part of certain indivi­
duals. Senator Blount’s investigation was set in motion by a confiden­
tial message sent to the House by the President.56 The message set 
forth facts and documents which the House, by resolution, referred to 
a special committee for investigation. Similarly, the Pickering im­
peachment inquiry was initiated in response to a message from the 
President which included several complaints from civil officers charging 
the judge with official misconduct.57 Judge Archbald’s impeachment 
investigation originated with a letter sent to the President from a mem­
ber of the Interstate Commerce Commission charging the judge with 
official misconduct. The letter which had been sent to the President 
was requested by the House and transmitted to the Judiciary Commit­
tee for use in its investigation.58
Finally, in the past, not all impeachment investigations have 
been initially directed against actually named or otherwise designated 
individuals. The impeachment of President Johnson was first proposed 
indirectly through a resolution authorizing an investigation into miscon­
duct on the part of civil officers generally.59 Similarly, Secretary of 
War Belknap’s impeachment grew out of an 1876 resolution authoriz­
ing a general investigation of the departments of government.60
B. The Irrelevance of Probable Cause to Impeach Named Individuals
In the Chase impeachment, a debate arose over the sufficiency 
of a single member’s supporting evidence to warrant the initiation of 
a full impeachment investigation. Although it was urged that such an 
investigation should begin only upon a showing of probable cause, the 
House voted in favor of the investigation on the theory that such an 
investigation was to procure evidence and not to establish guilt.61
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53. Id. § 2469, at 949.
54. Id. § 2385, at 805.
55. 6 C a n n o n ’s  § 513, at 709.
56. 3 H in d s’ § 2294.
57. Id. § 2319.
58. 6 Ca n n o n ’s § 498.
59. 3 H in d s’ § 2399. The resolution, however, was not adopted. Id.
60. Id. § 2444.
61. iSee, e.g., 3 Hinds’ § 2342, at 712 (Chase impeachment). See also 1 J. Story 
§ 808, at 588. It was objected that the voting of an inquiry would be equivalent to the
Nevertheless, on other occasions preliminary investigations have been 
initiated by the House only upon review of charges preferred by 
memorial. The impeachment proceeding in the Peck case had its of­
ficial inception in a memorial charging the judge with misconduct in 
office.63 Contrary to the procedure in the Chase impeachment, in 
which the same issue was raised and debated, the full impeachment 
investigation in the Peck case was authorized only after the Judiciary 
Committee had examined the memorial for probable cause.63 Like­
wise, the House voted to investigate the conduct of Judge Delahay only 
after the Judiciary Commitee had examined charges made in a 
memorial.M However, since impeachment resolutions may be sum­
marily accepted or rejected for practical or political reasons without any 
discussion of probable cause, the only ultimate question of probability 
considered on such a vote is whether the investigation will probably 
be worth the Judiciary Committee’s while.65 Nevertheless, once in­
stituted, an impeachment investigation bears the crucial responsibility 
of procuring and preparing evidence which will support a report re­
commending either impeachment or no action.
C. Investigations Preparatory to the Articles of Impeachment
An investigation by the House has been considered to be an es­
sential part of every impeachment to date. The importance of this pre­
liminary investigation to the ultimate effectiveness and fairness of the 
overall procedure cannot be over-emphasized. It is here that charges 
are investigated and facts supporting possible articles of impeachment 
are elicited. Consequently, the power of the investigatory committee 
to secure evidence relevant to its investigation cannot be separated 
from the impeachment power itself.66 Beginning with this preliminary 
stage of the impeachment process, the constitutional principle of sep­
aration of powers is conspicuously held in abeyance while the legis­
lature gathers information necessary to exercise its exclusive constitu­
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expression of an opinion that the House had evidence of the probable guilt of the judge 
and therefore should be entered into only with a satisfactory showing of probable cause. 
In rebuttal it was urged that the inquiry was to procure evidence and thus “[t]he state­
ment of a member in his place, even though hearsay, was sufficient to cause inquiry.” 
3 H in d s’ § 2342, at 713.
62. 3 H in d s’ § 2364.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 2504.
65. See, e.g., 6 C a n n o n ’s  § 469.
66. The House impeachment power may be called into full operation as soon as the 
House acts corporately to initiate an impeachment inquiry or investigation.
tional power to impeach civil officers for possible wrongdoings.67
In the early impeachment cases it was common practice to select 
a special committee to investigate accusations of impeachable offenses 
brought before the House.68 Later, after the Judiciary Committee 
became a standing committee, it generally conducted the investiga­
tion.69 This Committee serves two purposes in the impeachment pro­
cess: first, it investigates evidence bearing upon allegations of miscon­
duct and thereupon recommends whether or not the accused should 
be impeached; second, it has become the practice in the more recent 
impeachments that the Judiciary Committee also drafts articles of im­
peachment to be presented at the bar of the Senate. Incident to its 
investigatory duties, the Committee is generally granted the subpoena 
power of the House to send for “papers, persons and documents” rele­
vant to its inquiry.
In earlier impeachments, these two functions were assigned to two 
separate committees.70 One was a preliminary investigatory committee 
which was responsible for reporting whether or not the House should 
impeach the accused; the other was a committee appointed to secure 
information to be used in the drafting of the articles of impeachment. 
Although these two committees eventually came to exercise equivalent 
fact-finding powers, the responsibilities of the two committees were 
quite distinct. The preliminary investigatory committee was assigned 
only to satisfy itself that some basis justifying an impeachment inquiry 
could be identified,71 and in fairness to the accused it was generally 
found inappropriate to publicly defend the conclusion which the com­
mittee had reached: “In presenting the report . . . the committee
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67. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., 3 Hinds’ § 319 (impeachment of Judge Pickering); id. § 2244 (im­
peachment of Senator Blount); id. § 2342 (impeachment of Justice Chase).
It should be noted that the while the House in most instances has referred impeach­
ment investigations to the Judiciary Committee, it has not always done so. In the John­
son impeachment, for example, the House appointed the Committee on Reconstruction 
to continue the investigation that earlier had been initiated by the Judiciary Committee. 
Id. § 2408.
69. The Judiciary Committee did not come into existence as a standing committee 
until 1813. 6 Ca n n o n ’s § 467.
70. This bifurcation of the impeachment inquiry was the result of a conscious at­
tempt to adhere to English precedent. In an early impeachment, where it was alterna­
tively proposed that the articles of impeachment should be prepared and presented in 
conjunction with the impeachment report, it was urged in rebuttal that
the mode which [was] proposed was the same which was practiced in the case 
of Mr. Hastings. Mr. Burke went up to the House of Lords and impeached 
him in words . . . .  Some time afterwards, the articles of impeachment hav­
ing been drawn, Mr. Burke again went up to the House of Lords and exhibited 
them. 3 H in d s* § 2295, at 647.
71. See. e.g., id. § 2342 (Judge Chase); id. § 2364 (Judge Peck).
deemed it fairest toward the party accused not to report to the House 
their reasons at length for arriving at the conclusion that he ought to 
be impeached.”72 In comparison, the committee assigned to draft the 
articles of impeachment prepared evidence in support of specific 
accusations of the commission of impeachable offenses. Consequently, 
the most extensive investigations in the early impeachments came later 
in the process when the articles were being drafted rather than at the 
preliminary investigation stage.73
Thus, it is understandable that in the earlier impeachments, where 
the body accomplishing the preliminary investigation was charged only 
with recommending whether or not the accused should be impeached, 
that committee’s inquisitorial authority was limited. In the Blount im­
peachment, for example, the investigatory committee was charged by 
the House only to consider the messages and papers which had been 
brought forth by the President and to report on impeachment there­
from;74 then after the committee had recommended impeachment on 
the basis of that limited evidence, the House took additional evidence 
before the body as a whole prior to voting impeachment.75 The pre­
liminary investigation of Judge Pickering was similarly focused on the 
examination of ex parte affidavits transmitted to the House by the 
President.76 In the Chase impeachment, however, the first committee 
was granted broader authority “to send for persons and papers” relevant 
to the impeachment inquiry, and since that time, this broad fact-finding 
power has been delegated routinely to the investigating committee.
The earlier bifurcation of responsibilities, however, proved to be 
impractical in the American experience, since the dual committee 
structure entails an unnecessary duplication of resources.77 Accord­
ingly, beginning with the Archbald impeachment in 1913, whenever 
the Judiciary Committee has reported a resolution favoring impeach­
ment, it has simultaneously submitted prepared articles of impeachment 
supporting that resolution.78 This consolidation of the resolution and
72. Id. § 2365. '
73. The committee appointed to draft articles of impeachment after the House pre­
sentation of the bare impeachment resolution at the bar of the Senate was generally em­
powered to procure all evidence supporting the changes. Thus, in the Blount case, it 
was the committee appointed to draft the articles of impeachment which was granted 
“power to send for persons, papers, and records.” Id. § 2297.
74. Id. § 2294.
75. Id.
76. Id. §2319.
77. The English have not been troubled by this problem, since the last English im­
peachment occurred in the eighteenth century.
78. 6 C a n n o n ’s § 499. The simultaneous reporting of impeachment and articles of 
impeachment was not original to the Archbald case. A similar reporting was proposed
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drafting functions of the investigatory committees is inherently advant­
ageous, for otherwise, under the bifurcated system, the House member­
ship must vote as a whole on the question of taking to the Senate 
articles of impeachment which have not yet been drafted. The only 
apparent virtue of the separated system was to guarantee that extensive 
investigations would not be undertaken without the approval of the full 
House. But as the course of events in the Nixon proceeding now il­
lustrates, no apparent safeguards or legislative prerogatives are lost by 
allowing the Judiciary Committee to proceed in its initial investigations 
under the mantle of the full congressional impeachment powers.
D. The Drafting of Articles of Impeachment
In the Nixon impeachment, the degree of specificity required in 
the language of the articles of impeachment was debated at length by 
the House Judiciary Committee. While a minority urged that due 
process demanded that specific articles be presented, as had always been 
the practice in earlier impeachment cases,79 the majority voted for 
articles drafted in general terms referring only to generic areas of presi­
dential misconduct with the provision that a “list of incidents” would 
be attached to the articles setting forth specific circumstances of mis­
conduct tending to support each general article.80 In effect, the 
Committee resolved that since the President’s counsel could demand 
a bill of particulars at appropriate stages of the proceeding, the past 
practice of specificity could be modified somewhat.
It is suggested that the Committee’s decision to recommend that 
the House vote on general articles satisfied any applicable due process 
requirement and was a proper exercise of the Committee’s func­
tion of recommending to the House that an impeachment trial should 
in any event ensue. Inasmuch as the articles serve to set the standard 
by which relevancy is determined in the Senate trial,81 and given the
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in the impeachment of District Judge Durell in 1873. When Durell resigned, however, 
the impeachment proceedings were discontinued. 3 H in d s’ § 2509.
79. Although the articles in most American impeachments have been drafted to in­
clude specific instances of misconduct, it is commonly recognized that following the 
precedent in England, where the proceedings were strictly criminal, the articles of im­
peachment are distinguishable from the criminal indictment by their “less particularity 
of specification.” 3 H in d s’ § 2117. Story noted that “the articles [of impeachment] 
need not, and indeed do not, pursue the strict form and accuracy of an indictment.” 1 
J. Story § 808, at 588 (footnote omitted).
80. See the “list of incidents” compiled by counsel to the Judiciary Committee to 
uphold the Committee allegations in proposed impeachment Article I against President 
Nixon. H.R. Rep. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
81. The text of the articles of impeachment is, of course, subject to modification 
by the House at any time in the trial, since there is no double jeopardy or res judicata
fact that the President had not complied with congressional subpoenas 
for tapes and documents pertinent to the impeachment investigation, 
the President should not thereby be allowed by his own dereliction to 
narrow the scope of inquiry in a Senate trial. The articles also pro­
vided that there could be included in the list of incidents additional 
information regarding misconduct, thus expediting the administration 
of the impeachment process without jeopardizing the rights of the 
accused to a fair proceeding; all of this, of course, was made necessary 
by Mr. Nixon’s refusal to comply with congressional fact-finding inci­
dent to its impeachment inquiry. To the extent that a President him­
self is responsible for creating the incompleteness of the Committee’s 
investigation, it is unseemly for him to claim that his right to receive 
a fair trial is abridged either by the preliminary vagueness of the 
charges or by any possible over-breadth of the trial in the Senate 
caused by that incompleteness of evidence. Rather, it is within the 
power of the Judiciary Committee, reporting as the preliminary 
investigatory body, to recommend immediate impeachment based upon 
failure to comply with its constitutionally mandated fact-finding in an 
impeachment proceeding, thereby opening the way for further inves­
tigations and the further drafting of specific articles for subsequent 
presentation to the Senate.
The report of the Judiciary Committee has usually been followed 
by the House, but this has not always occurred. For example, in one 
instance the Committee recommended censure, but the House, adopt­
ing the minority report of the Committee, voted to impeach.82 Also, 
in the Johnson impeachment, articles in addition to those prepared and 
recommended by the Judiciary Committee were proposed and adopted 
on the floor of the House.83
E. The Right of the Accused to Appear in the Course of the House
Investigation
Impeachment investigations have traditionally been conducted ex 
parte with the accused having a limited role, if any, in the preliminary 
inquiry. It has gone unquestioned that it is for the House to determine
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effect in an impeachment trial. But as a practical matter, modifications will not be un­
dertaken once the pleadings have been drafted and thus extensive pleadings and negotia­
tions have always been important at the pleading stage of the impeachment proceeding. 
See text accompanying notes 175-89 infra.
82. 6 C a n n o n ’s § 514 (Judge Louderback).
83. In the Johnson impeachment, the House added two articles proposed by the 
newly elected managers in addition to those prepared and recommended by the drafting 
committee. 3 H in d s’ § 2418.
the extent of participation accorded the person under investigation.84 
For these purposes, whatever sixth amendment rights to be represented 
by counsel and to confront one’s accusers an impeached officer may 
have at trial before the Senate, they would not apply before the House, 
since it does not determine if an impeachable offense has been com­
mitted. Neverthelesss, the Judiciary Committee has from time to time 
permitted the accused and his counsel to participate in the investigation 
hearings. Judge Peck cross-examined witnesses, presented a response 
in writing to the charges against him, and addressed the Judiciary 
Committee on his own behalf.85 In permitting that participation, in 
an effort to protect the interests of the accused,88 the Committee 
expressly confined itself to what it characterized as ex parte evidence 
“lest there be no bounds to the inquiry.”87 The effect of the Belknap 
impeachment upon investigatory precedent was to broaden the par­
ticipation of the accused in the preliminary investigation. Belknap was 
allowed to present his own witnesses and was also permitted to cross­
examine adverse witnesses.88 Several other impeachment cases have 
followed the Belknap precedent. Judge Swayne was present in person 
with counsel and was permitted to introduce testimony and argue his 
case before the Committee.89 Judge Delahay,90 Judge Archbald,91 and 
Judge Louderback92 each appeared with counsel before the Judiciary 
Committee and argued his case.
Despite the precedent for allowing a limited role for the accused 
and his counsel during the impeachment inquiry, the House Judiciary 
Committee has continued to characterize its investigation as an ex parte 
proceeding and House procedures do not give the accused a right to 
demand any role in the proceeding. As examples of the extreme to 
which this aspect of the procedure may be pursued, the two investiga­
tions which were conducted preliminary to President Johnson’s im­
peachment were strictly ex parte, with only one member of the House 
not on the Committee being permitted to so much as examine a wit­
ness.93
In the Nixon investigatory proceeding, the accused, through 
counsel, was given a remarkably broad role in the Committee’s hear-
84. Id. § 2501.
85. Id. § 2365.
86. Id. § 2366, at 779.
87. Id.
88. Id. § 2445.
89. Id. § 2470.
90. Id. § 2504.
91. 6 C a n n o n ’s  § 498.
92. Id. § 514.
93. 3 H in d s’ §§ 2403, 2409.
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ings.94 His counsel was permitted oral and written argument, including 
a limited right of cross-examination, the presentation of his own 
witnesses, and the submission of briefs in response to proposed articles 
of impeachment. However, the request of counsel that he be allowed 
an advocate’s role in the deliberative process of the Committee, in ad­
dition to such participation at the faot-finding stage, was denied.
F. The Burden of Proof for the Adoption of the Articles
Another issue raised and debated in the Nixon case was the 
burden of proof required to sustain a vote of impeachment by the 
House. Despite some precedent to the contrary, the view that the 
House, acting analogously to a grand jury throughout, need only as­
certain probable cause to warrant sending the case to trial at the bar 
of the Senate has generally been followed without debate.95 Where it 
has been debated, the following argument has prevailed:
[T]he action of the House was similar to that of a grand jury; that 
while the investigation of the House was not necessarily ex parte, the 
office of the House was not to ascertain whether the party was guilty 
or innocent of the charges preferred against him, but whether the proof 
was sufficient to make the case worthy of a further trial. [A House 
member] called attention to the fact that the trial of the case belonged 
to the Senate under the Constitution and to the Senate alone. If the 
House advanced one step beyond the ascertainment of probable cause 
it was plunged into the trial. The House, in the exercise of its discre­
tion, might examine witnesses on both sides, but there must be a bound­
ary line marking the powers of the House and Senate, and there was 
no line to be observed, except the ascertainment of probable cause. 
Such I understand to have been the views . . . entertained in the case 
of Judge Peck and the case of Judge Chase, of Macclesfield in 1705, 
in the case of Warren Hastings in 1778, and of Lord Melville in 1805.96
In the Nixon case, however, the probable cause burden was re­
jected, apparently not on the basis of precedent or any jurisprudential 
rationale, but rather as a compromise between the lesser standard of 
“probable cause” urged by some and the greater burden of “beyond
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94. Id. § 2403. It should be noted that while in the impeachment trial the strict 
rules of evidence are followed, the hearings conducted before the investigatory committee 
are generally less formal. In the Johnson case, for example, the rules of evidence were 
relaxed at the investigatory stage of the proceeding to allow a fuller investigation: “In 
an investigation before a committee it would be difficult and perhaps impossible to con­
fine the evidence to such as would be deemed admissible before a court of justice.’* Id. 
at 828. For the rules of procedure adopted by the House Judiciary Committee for the 
presentation of evidence concerning charges against President Nixon, see app. A infra.
95. See 3 H in d s’ § 2004.
96. Id. § 2498 (debate in the Watrous investigation).
a reasonable doubt” urged by others. The equitable burden of “clear 
and convincing” evidence was eventually adopted97 over the arguments 
in favor of a yet higher burden made by assistant minority counsel Gar­
rison, who urged that the Committee should recommend impeachment 
only if it was apparent that the Senate would convict and, apart from 
the issue of guilt or innocence, only where the public interest would 
be better served should the President be convicted and removed from 
office.
Certainly, public policy considerations are relevant in an im­
peachment proceeding,98 but not in the way Mr. Garrison has urged. 
Impeachment was designed primarily as a means of protecting the 
Republic rather than punishing a wrongdoer. In the words of the 
Judiciary Committee which participated in the Colfax impeachment, 
the process is remedial rather than punitive.99 It follows that the im- 
paot upon the country of the final resolution of an impeachment pro­
ceeding should be a criterion of the highest order in determining the 
nature of its resolution. This does not mean, however, that impeach­
ment should be used by Congress to sweep from office an unpopular 
President or that impeachment should be voted by the House only if 
conviction is certain to follow. The Constitution provides that before 
a President can be removed from office, his guilt must be established 
in the commission of treason, bribery, or high crimes and misdemean­
ors. No degree of public disenchantment with a particular President, 
no unpopularity of a policy, no mistake in judgment should ever be 
sufficient, without such guilt, to result in impeachment. Thus, public 
policy considerations do not mandate impeachment based upon con­
gressional opinion but rather simply require that the House of Repre­
sentatives bear the double burden of being clear and convincing to both 
the Senate and the American people. If impeachment, conviction, and 
removal are to accomplish a therapeutic effect upon the country, it
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97. In civil cases where the measure of persuasion is by a “preponderance of evi­
dence,” there are a limited number of claims in which the party is required to establish 
a higher burden of persuasion. The measure of “by clear and convincing evidence,” rep­
resents this higher standard commonly used and seems to have had its origins in the 
courts of equity. See Marquis Townshend v. Stangroom, 31 Eng. Rep. 1076, 1078 (Ch. 
1801); Henkle v. Royal Exch. Assurance Co., 27 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1056 (Ch. 1749). 
Equity cases on the degree of proof necessary to establish a claim are collected in C. 
McCormick, Handbook of the  L aw  of  Evidence § 340 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
98. [I]f “broad and comprehensive principles of public policy” are appropri­
ately considered in the profoundly political process of impeachment, then the 
impact upon the nation of the President’s removal or retention is valid consid­
eration, even though such considerations would be inappropriate in a forum 
charged with the normal “judicial function” of deciding guilt or innocence 
without regard for political consequences. Firmage, supra note 14, at 700.
99. 3 H in d s’ § 2510.
is essential that the public be convinced of the President’s guilt in 
the commission of impeachable offenses and thereby be persuaded 
that his removal is in the constitutional interest of the country. 
The citizenry must not only be convinced of this but must also be con­
vinced in bipartisan numbers if impeachment is to be dominantly 
therapeutic rather than divisive. It is not sufficient that Congress only 
be convinced, and it is toward the accomplishment of this harmony 
between the electorate and its representatives that the issue of tele­
vision coverage of impeachment proceedings will be considered.
Comparisons between impeachment proceedings and criminal 
trials, in which only the issue of guilt or innocence is relevant and in 
which no particular public acceptance of an individual verdict is nec­
essary, are therefore inapt.100 It is here, in the necessity of bearing 
a double burden of convincing the people, in addition to the usual 
burden of persuading designated triers of fact and law, that the burden 
of proof for an impeachment proceeding must be defined. It does in­
deed place a huge burden on those advocating impeachment, a burden 
which is qualitatively different from that found in the usual judicial 
proceeding.
G. The Public Eye on the Adoption of the Articles of Impeachment
In the early cases where the voting of impeachment and the 
drafting of the articles were separate functions, the committee drafting 
the articles was under an injunction of secrecy, which was removed only 
at the time the articles were presented before the House.101 Today, 
however, the drafting of the articles of impeachment has taken on a 
more significant role as the first official act to be completed in the im­
peachment process, thereby setting the scope and tone for the entire im­
peachment process to follow.
In the Nixon impeachment proceeding, although the fact-finding 
process of the Judiciary Committee was intended to be secret, the 
Committee, convinced that the nation would be well served with rapid 
public disclosure of congressional impeachment decisions, whatever 
they might be, amended its rules to allow television coverage of its de­
liberations over the particular articles of impeachment. The legitimacy 
of a democratic government must be established in the minds of the 
people;102 thus, if a transfer of presidential power is to be accomplished 
by either removal or resignation in the face of impeachment, the le­
gitimacy of the new administration can only be assured by public rec­
100. Firmage, supra note 14, at 703.
101. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ §§ 2300, 2323.
102. See note 3 supra.
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ognition that the previous mandate has clearly expired. In order for 
this to occur, whatever interests previously were served in the name 
of fairness to the accused by insisting on secrecy in the adoption of the 
articles of impeachment must yield to the public interest when a public 
office, which derives its imprimatur from the public will, is in 
question.103
H. The Committee Report on the Articles of Impeachment
The investigatory committee culminates its hearings by voting on 
recommendations of impeachment. Generally, in the early impeach­
ments, the investigatory committee thereafter reported its conclusions 
to the Committee of the Whole House.104 Where the investigation 
committee recommended impeachment and the Committee of the 
Whole concurred, an impeachment resolution was presented before the 
House for the impeachment vote. In these earliest impeachments 
minority views were not permitted to appear in the committee’s report, 
and any dissent appeared only in the debates.105 Furthermore, as 
noted previously, the committee was charged only with reporting its 
conclusions to the House, and thus it usually excluded any reasons for 
its conclusions in fairness to the accused.106 Later, the Judiciary 
Committee came to report its recommendation directly to the House.107
Beginning with the Johnson impeachment in 1868, majority and 
minority arguments were included in the committee’s report.108 Al­
though in the first attempt to impeach the President, the majority of 
the investigatory committee recommended impeachment, the House 
apparently favored the minority argument and the resolution failed.109 
When the Committee on Reconstruction, after a second investigation, 
recommended impeachment, with no minority argument being filed,110
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103. This is not to imply that no impeachment of a judicial officer should be publi­
cized, but only that mass media coverage of an impeachment of, for example, a Supreme 
Court Justice would have to be justified on some other grounds.
104. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2319 (Pickering); id. § 2343 (Chase); id. § 2365 (Peck). 
In the Blount case, however, the articles were presented directly to the House. Id. § 
2300.
105. Id. § 2343, at 716 (A committee member in debate dissented from the com­
mittee’s report to impeach Justice Chase on the grounds that testimony given had been 
“entirely ex parte.”).
106. Id. § 2365.
107. See, e.g., 6 C a n n o n ’s § 498 (Archbald); id. § 514 (Louderback); 3 H in d s* § 
2385 (Humphreys); id. § 2410 (Johnson); id. § 2445 (Belknap); id. § 2505 (Delahay).
108. 3 H in d s’ § 2403.
109. Id. § 2407.
110. Although several members of the Committee dissented from the majority report, 
they did not present any minority report in support of their views. Id. § 2410, at 847.
the House voted to impeach.111
I. The Vote on the Articles on the Floor of the House
Historically, presentation of the articles on the floor of the House 
has involved issues of both strategy and fairness. In the Blount and 
Pickering cases, the articles were considered collectively, but in the 
Chase impeachment the articles were presented individually both to 
the Committee of the Whole and before the House.112 In that im­
peachment, the House debated whether or not additional articles could 
be proposed at any time; in concluding that they could, the House 
expressly “saved to itself the liberty of exhibiting at any time hereafter 
any further articles of other accusation or impeachment . . . ”113 
There is precedent in other cases for presenting the articles together 
to be adopted without debate,114 and there are instances, such as the 
Swayne impeachment, where a strong minority report and accompany­
ing debate immediately preceded the vote to adopt the articles.115 In 
the Swayne impeachment, the minority dissented from the majority’s 
report of twelve articles on the ground that a “beyond reasonable doubt 
burden had not been met on eleven of the articles.”116 Following House 
amendment of some of the articles, they were presented individually 
and adopted by the House.117
Beginning with the Belknap impeachment the practice of present­
ing the articles first to the Committee of the Whole was dispensed with 
without any question being raised as to the propriety of having the 
articles presented directly to the House by the House Judiciary Com­
mittee.118 In this manner, the power of the Judiciary Committee was 
enhanced, and the discretion of the whole House regarding rules of de­
bate and amendment was correspondingly limited. In the Belknap 
case, the articles were adopted without amendment, a separate vote not 
being demanded on any article.119 In the Johnson case, after the 
articles had been adopted individually, the managers who were elected 
to present the articles at the bar of the Senate proposed two additional 
articles to broaden the charges to include non-indictable offenses.120
111. Id. §2412.
112. Id. § 2344.
113. Id. at 719.
114. See, e.g., id. § 2448 (Belknap).
115. Id. § 2474.
116. Id.
117. Id. The articles may be amended on the floor of the House without being re­
ferred back to committee, as the Pickering proceeding illustrates. Id. § 2324, at 686.
118. Id. § 2448, at 908.
119. Id.
120. Id. § 2418.
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In the Archbald impeachment, the practice of reporting the 
articles of impeachment simultaneously with the impeachment resolu­
tion was initiated. There the report of the Judiciary Committee was 
debated in the House, and the supporting articles of impeachment were 
voted on together with the impeachment resolution.121 Both the 
English and the Louderback impeachments followed the Archbald pat­
tern. In the English case, the House after debate accepted the pro­
cedure that “[i]t is in order to demand a division of the question on 
agreeing to a resolution of impeachment and a separate vote may be 
had on each article.”122 In the Louderback case, the articles adopted 
were those presented as the minority report favoring impeachment.123
J. The Effects of Recesses and Adjournments on the Impeachment
Process
Impeachment proceedings in the United States have followed the 
parliamentary precedent that an impeachment is not terminated or le­
gally interrupted by the dissolution of Parliament.124 Accordingly, the 
House has often continued impeachment investigations from one ses­
sion to another, making use of any former report or testimony already 
taken; similarly there is nothing to prevent a Senate trial initi­
ated in one session of Congress from being continued in the next until 
a verdict is reached.125 The following examination of precedent 
demonstrates the continuity of Congress’ constitutional responsibility of 
impeachment.
From the earliest impeachment, that of Senator Blount, the pre­
cedent has been firmly established that an impeachment is unaffected 
by congressional recesses or adjournments. In that case, Congress re­
cessed between the impeachment of Blount and the framing of the 
articles of impeachment.120 Later the Senate, in its writ of summons, 
fixed Blount’s appearance at the next session of Congress.127 In the 
impeachment of Pickering, the House proceeded even though it was
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121. 6 C a n n o n ’s  § 500.
122. Id. § 545.
123. Id. § 515.
124. 3 H in d s’ §§ 2004-05. _ See also Manual § 620, at 305.
125. In respect to the procedure in the House, see 3 H in d s’ § 2029 (Boarman). The 
Senate has continuing jurisdiction over an impeachment trial and could continue a trial 
between sessions even though some new Senators were present. In several trials, how­
ever, new members were excused from voting on the judgment of impeachment cases 
because they had taken their seats after part of the testimony had been given. See, e.g., 
id. § 2114 (Swayne); id. § 2396 (Humphreys).
126. Id. § 2299.
127. Id. § 2304.
apparent that the impeachment could not be completed within that con­
gressional session.128 Accordingly, the House continued with the 
proceedings, impeaching Pickering and notifying the Senate on the last 
day of the Seventh Congress. Thereafter, at the beginning of the 
Eighth Congress, the House appointed a committee to prepare articles 
of impeachment to continue the proceeding.129 Similarly, the House 
voted the impeachment of Judge Delahay at the end of one Congress, 
intending to present articles of impeachment in the next.130 Congress 
also recessed between the filing of the answer in the Peck impeach­
ment and the managers’ presentation of the replication.131 No reason 
in precedent or public policy would seem to exist for distinguishing 
between presidential impeachment and the impeachment of civil 
officers in regard to this point.132 In the Johnson impeachment, the 
Thirty-ninth Congress expired during the preliminary investigation, 
and in the next Congress, the House directed the Judiciary Committee 
to resume the investigation.133 Later, Congress recessed after receiv­
ing the Committee’s report recommending impeachment, and the sub­
sequent session of the House voted on the report.134 Thus, an im­
peachment proceeding should not be affected by recesses or adjourn­
ments of Congress.
K. The House Selection of Managers
The House has varied both its method for selecting its managers 
and the number of managers selected to present its case at the bar of 
the Senate.135 Managers have been selected by ballot, appointed by 
the House Speaker, and selected by resolution. In the Blount impeach­
ment, eleven managers were elected by ballot following House debate 
which analyzed the comparative roles of the managers and normal 
committees of Congress. The election procedure was wisely adopted 
in the Blount case, contrary to the ordinary practice of having inves­
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128. Id. § 2319.
129. Id. § 2321.
130. Judge Delahay’s resignation prior to the beginning of the next Congress appar­
ently caused the House to discontinue the impeachment. Id. § 2505.
131. Id. § 2375.
132. Cf. Firmage, supra note 14, at 700 (suggesting a different standard of conduct 
for an impeachable offense).
133. 3 H in d s’ § 2401, at 825. The resolution was adopted forthwith, and the con­
gressional session having expired before the completion of the investigation, a member 
of the House proposed as a question of privilege at the beginning of the next session 
that the Judiciary Committee complete the investigation begun earlier,
134. Id. § 2407.
135. 6 C a n n o n ’s § 467,
tigatory committees appointed by the Speaker, due to a recognized 
difference of broader non-partisan responsibility to be fulfilled by those 
selected as managers. Whereas the reports of the investigatory con- 
mittees are not finally binding upon the House, the conduct of the 
managers serves as an ultimate representation of the House, with any 
action taken by them being final. Thus, the managers, by House 
resolution, were elected individually by ballot with each manager re­
quiring a majority to be elected. Following the Blount precedent, 
managers have been elected by ballot in the Pickering,136 Chase,137 
Peck,138 and Johnson cases.139 In the subsequent proceedings, how­
ever, managers were appointed either by resolution140 or by the 
Speaker.141
Excepting the Blount impeachment, where all eleven managers 
were from the Federalist party, the managers have represented both 
parties. Of course, it has always been the practice that the managers, 
as advocates of the House, would reflect the House sentiments142 re­
garding impeachment. Accordingly, managers have always been 
selected from among those who have voted in favor of impeachment. 
The chairman for the managers has been selected by the managers in 
some cases143 and by the House in others.144
Usually, the managers have the responsibility of presenting the 
articles of impeachment against the accused at the bar of the Senate 
and of conducting the case of the House at the Senate trial. In charging 
the managers with the responsibility of conducting the case before the 
Senate, the House normally delegates further fact-finding powers to the 
managers incident to their prosecutorial duties.145
Upon informing the Senate that the House of Representatives 
“will, in due time, exhibit particular articles against [the impeached]
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136. 3 H in d s’ § 2323 (eleven managers elected).
137. Id. § 2345 (seven managers elected).
138. Id. § 2368 (five managers elected).
139. Id. § 2417 (seven managers elected).
140. See, e.g., 6 Ca n n o n ’s § 500 (seven managers appointed by resolution in the 
Archbald impeachment); id. § 514 (five managers appointed in the Louderback im­
peachment); 3 H in d s’ § 2388 (five managers appointed by resolution in the Humphreys 
impeachment); id, § 2448 (seven managers appointed by resolution in the Belknap im­
peachment).
141. See 3 H in d s’ § 2475 (The Speaker of the House in the Swayne impeachment 
appointed seven managers.).
142. See id. § 2448 (Belknap).
143. See id. § 2417 (Johnson).
144. See id. § 2448 (Belknap).
145. See id. § 2419 (Johnson),
and make good the same,”146 the managers demand that the Senate 
“take order for [his] appearance . . .  to answer the said impeach­
ment.”147
IV. Se n a t e  I m p e a c h m e n t  P r o c e d u r e
The Constitution vests in the Senate the sole power of trying all 
impeachments,148 but as to the form and nature of the impeachment 
trial the Constitution is silent except for the following statements. The 
Constitution provides that “[w]hen the President of the United States 
is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be con­
victed without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members pre­
sent.”149 The Constitution further strips from the impeachment 
process the power to impose any criminal sanctions; at the same time, 
it assures that any convicted party shall not be beyond the normal 
operations of the criminal law either during or subsequent to the im­
peachment process.150 Finally, the Constitution provides that the 
President’s power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against 
the United States does not extend to cases of impeachment151 and that 
the right to trial by jury extends to all crimes except cases of impeach­
ment.152 Due to the constitutional silence in regard to all other aspects 
of the impeachment trial, we must turn to an analysis of prior prec­
edents in order to ascertain the working elements of Senate procedure 
in impeachment trials.
A . Does the Senate Sit as a Court?
The selection of criteria by which the appropriateness of any 
aspect of the Senate procedure in an impeachment trial is to be judged 
depends in large part upon whether the proceeding is to be seen as 
being dominantly political or juridical. But either characterization of 
the process is problematic, since many judicial practices are appropri­
ated by the Senate for use in the impeachment trial, which is otherwise 
conducted as a wholly political proceeding. Its adjudicative nature is 
manifest especially in the conduct of the impeachment trial, its rules
146. Id. § 2296.
147. Id.
148. “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” U.S. C o n st . 
art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
149. Id.
150. “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal 
from Office [and] the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict­
ment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment according to Law.” Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
151. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
152. Id. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 2.
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of evidence, the form of judgment, and in the absence of judicial review 
over the impeachment process. On balance, however, American 
precedent reflects the basic understanding that the impeachment 
process is fundamentally political.
In the early impeachment cases, although the Senate described 
itself by rule as a court of impeachment,153 the powers which it invoked 
were described as political powers and privileges. In one case, the issue 
of characterizing the impeachment process arose in argument over the 
assertion that the Senate’s impeachment jurisdiction does not extend 
to an offense which is within the jurisdiction of the common law courts. 
Mr. Bayard, one of the managers in the Blount impeachment, answered 
persuasively that the role of the Senate in impeachment cases is 
political rather than judicial since “no court at common law could give 
judgment of disqualification, and that was the just punishment for the 
offense alleged.”154
It was suggested as early as the Pickering impeachment that the 
Senate had the sole power to regulate forms, substances, and proceed­
ings when acting as a court of impeachment.155 In the Johnson im­
peachment in 1868, the Senate, after substantial debate, decided that 
it sat for impeachment trials as the Senate and not as a court.156 The 
debate appears to have been initiated in response to a resolution to 
drop the words “high court of impeachment” from its Senate rules lest 
the Chief Justice might have a tie-breaking vote on procedural 
questions.157 The resolution passed and the Senate adopted rules for 
the Johnson trial as a Senate and not as a court.158 After the trial con­
cluded, Senator Sumner, a bitter enemy of Johnson, elaborated on the 
political nature of the proceeding by explaining that Senators are not 
constrained in impeachment by any obligation to serve the traditional 
role of a criminal trial judge:
[The Constitution] provided that “the Senate shall have the sole power 
to try all impeachments,” thus positively making a distinction between 
the judicial power and the power to try impeachments; . . . the Senate 
on an impeachment does not exercise any portion of the judicial power, 
but another and different power, exclusively delegated to the Senate,
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153. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2307 (Blount). See also 1 J. Story  § 809.
154. 3 H in d s’ § 2314. See also 1 J. Story §§ 800, 812.
155. 3 H in d s’ § 2324.
156. Id. § 2057.
157. Id.
158. Id. Chief Justice Chase, however, presented a written dissent from the views 
taken by the Senate with regard to its constitutional function as a political body rather 
than as a court in an impeachment trial. Id.
having for its sole object removal from office and disqualification there­
for; . . . the proceeding by impeachment is . . . from beginning to 
end political, being conducted before another political body having 
political power only, and ending in a judgment which is political only.159
Later in the Archbald case, the issue of the proper role of the 
Senate in an impeachment trial was again raised and debated:
[M]uch. has been attempted by counsel for the respondent in their effort 
to show that this is a court in the ordinary acceptance of that term. 
Whatever name you call this body sitting here now, whatever functions 
they may discharge, it cannot be said to be a court as that word is em­
ployed in the Constitution or understood by the ordinary man. It is 
more than a court. Under our Government it is clothed with the highest 
and most extraordinary powers of any body or any functionary or any 
agency of our Federal Government. Your powers here invoked are polit­
ical in their nature. Mr. Bayard announced that doctrine in the first 
impeachment case, that of Blount. Every commentator, including Story 
and all the rest, has quoted it with approval, and should any man deny 
it he would at once confess himself ignorant of the history and the law 
of impeachment.160
If this conclusion were not reached and were the verdict of the Senate 
trial not reviewable by the federal courts,161 the exercise of judicial 
power by the Senate would appear to violate the vesting of the judicial 
power of the United States in one Supreme Court.162
Accordingly, it is generally understood that the Senate functions 
as a political body in impeachment trials, exercising its political duty 
in a political manner and to a political end. Several conclusions 
follow from this proposition. First, the Senate and not the judiciary 
is charged with adopting rules with respect to the conduct of impeach­
ment trials.163 Second, as a matter of public policy, rules of admis­
sibility of evidence in an impeachment trial need not necessarily comply 
strictly with judicial exclusionary rules designed to protect the integrity 
of the judicial process, particularly those designed to insulate a jury in 
a criminal trial. Third, the rules of evidence adopted by the Senate 
are subject to modification on an ad hoc basis where the Senate deems
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159. Id. § 2057, at 385.
160. 6 C a n n o n ’s § 471, at 665.
161. See section VII accompanying notes 310-31 infra.
162. U.S. C o n st , art. Ill, § 1.
163. New impeachment trial rules were proposed for the Peck trial, 3 H in d s’ § 2372, 
the Archbald trial, 6 C a n n o n ’s § 483, and recently for the Nixon trial, S. Res. 390, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), but in each of these cases the proposed new rules were re­
jected and the rules framed in the earliest impeachment cases continued in effect..
it appropriate.164 Fourth, judicial review is inapplicable to the im­
peachment process and judgment.
B. Initation of the Senate Trial
The House, by notifying the Senate that it has impeached a civil 
officer, formally sets in motion the impeachment trial machinery of the 
Senate. Notification in the earlier impeachments was transmitted to 
the Senate by a committee of two or three appointed for that purpose, 
which made formal accusations on behalf of the House and signified 
that articles of impeachment would later be exhibited.165 In some in­
stances, the Senate has organized for trial before receiving the 
articles,186 but in other cases it has organized only after the articles have 
been presented.167 Upon presentation of the articles, the Senate is 
required by its own rules to proceed to prompt consideration.168 In 
presenting the articles of impeachment at the bar of the Senate,169 the 
chairman of the House managers generally reads the articles and then 
delivers them at the table of the Senate.170 In organizing for trial, the 
Senate suspends ordinary business, administers oaths to the Senators,171
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164. The Senate amended some of its existing rules and added other rules in the 
Johnson trial. 3 H in d s’ § 2414. Also, additional rules were adopted by the Senate for 
the trial of Judge Louderback. 6 C a n n o n ’s § 519.
165. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2294 (A single House member notified the Senate that 
Blount had been impeached by the House.). The Pickering impeachment was carried 
to the Senate by a committee of two. Id. § 2319. For other cases in which impeach­
ment resolutions were carried to the Senate by a committee of two, see id. § 2343 
(Chase); id. § 2367 (Peck); id. § 2385 (Humphreys); id. § 2412 (Johnson); and id. 
§ 2505 (Delahay). See generally 1 J. Story  § 807.
166. In the Blount impeachment, the Senate “took order for the trial” upon the pre­
sentation of the impeachment resolution. 3 H in d s’ § 2296; accord, id. §§ 2325, 2328 
(Pickering). See also 1 J. Story § 807.
167. In the Pickering case, the Senate concluded that there was no impeachment be­
fore the Senate until the articles of impeachment were exhibited. 3 H in d s’ § 2324; ac­
cord, id. § 2450 (Belknap).
168. See, e.g., 6 Cannon’s § 546; 3 Hinds’ § 2079. See also Senate Impeachment 
R u l e  III, app. B infna; 1 J. Story § 807.
169. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2301 (Blount); id. § 2328 (Pickering); /</..§ 2346 (Chase); 
id. § 2369 (Peck); id. § 2389 (Humphreys); id. § 2420 (Johnson); id. § 2449 (Belk­
nap); id. § 2476 (Swayne).
170. See, e.g., 6 C a n n o n ’s § 501 (Archbald); 3 H ind s’ § 2328 (Pickering); id. §
2346 (Chase); id. § 2420 (Johnson); id. § 2449 (Belknap).
171. Senators sitting for an impeachment trial are required by the Constitution to be 
on oath or affirmation. U.S. C o n st , art. I, § 3. Until 1876 the Senate under its own 
rules empowered its presiding officer to administer to Senators the oath required for an 
impeachment trial. In the Belknap trial, the oath was initially administered by the 
Chief Justice, but during the trial a bill was enacted conferring on the presiding office 
authority “to administer all oaths or affirmations that are or may be required by the 
Constitution or by law to be taken by any Senator, officer of the Senate, witness, or
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assumes jurisdiction by majority vote,172 appoints a presiding of­
ficer,173 and notifies the House of Representatives that the Senate is 
ready to proceed.174
Once the articles have been presented and the Senate organized 
for trial, the managers generally demand that process be issued against 
the accused to appear and answer the charges presented by the 
House.175 The writ of summons which is issued by the Senate recites 
the articles of impeachment and notifies the respondent to appear at 
a fixed time and place and to file an answer.176 Where respondent 
fails to appear or to answer either in person or by counsel,177 the trial 
proceeds as on a plea of “not guilty.”178 The respondent is usually 
allowed to appear and move for a delay in the filing of his answer, but 
requests are often not accepted.179
In answering, the respondents have either (1) taken articles one 
by one, denying some of the charges, admitting others but denying that 
they set forth impeachable offenses, and excepting to the sufficiency
other person, in respect to  any m atter w ith in  the jurisd iction  o f  the Senate .” 3 H in d s’ 
§ 2081, at 412. Subsequently, a  Senator is designated  by resolu tion  to adm inister the 
oath  to the presiding o fficer , w h o  in turn adm inisters the oath  sim u ltan eou sly  to  a ll Sen­
ators standing in their p laces. See, e.g., 6 Ca n n o n 's § 502 (A rch b a ld ). T h e Senate  
in  its rules has refrained from  prescribing an oath  fo r  the C h ief Justice w hen  he presides  
at an im peachm ent trial. 3 H in d s* § 2079; see S e n a t e  I m p e a c h m e n t  R u l e s  III, IV, 
app. B infra.
172. 3 H in d s’ § 2059.
173. Generally, the President pro tempore of the Senate presides in impeachment 
trials against all civil officers except the President. Where the President pro tempore 
is unable or unwilling to preside at trial when it is his duty, a presiding officer is ap­
pointed by resolution. See 3 H in d s’ § 2477 (Swayne). In presidential impeachment, 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides in accordance with the constitutional 
requirement. See U.S. C o n st , art. I, § 3.
174. 3 H in d s’ § 2070. See also 1 J. Story  § 811.
175. 3 H in d s’ § 2127; see, e.g., 6 C a n n o n ’s § 503; 3 H in d s’ § 2423 (J o h n so n );  id. 
§ 2478 (S w a y n e );  id. § 2451 (B e lk n a p ). See also 1 J. Story  § 807.
176. 3 H in d s’ § 2127; see, e.g., id. § 2304 (Blount); id. § 2329 (Pickering); id. §
2347 (Chase). See also 1 J. Story  § 807.
177. 3 H in d s’ § 2127. Justice Chase appeared “in his own proper person,” id. § 2349, 
and Judge Peck attended in person and by counsel, id. § 2371. Johnson entered his ap­
pearance by a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, which named a counsel who would 
appear for him. Id. § 2424. See also 1 J. S tory § 809.
178. 3 H in d s’ § 2127.
179. The Senate declined to allow Judge Peck to delay his answer until the next ses­
sion of Congress and set an earlier date for filing an answer than he had requested. 3 
id. § 2371. The Senate also denied President Johnson’s request for forty days in which 
to prepare an answer and instead granted ten days. Id. §§ 2424-25. The Senate, on 
the other hand, has allowed reasonable requests for time to prepare an answer. For ex­
ample, the Senate has granted motions by respondents that ten days be granted for the 
purposes of answering the impeachment charges. See, e.g., 6 C a n n o n ’s  §§ 482, 504 
(Archbald).
of others,180 (2) demurred to the articles generally, raising a question 
as to the jurisdiction of the Senate to try the charges,181 or (3) de­
murred severally to all the articles and then replied in detail to the 
charges set forth in each article.182 It has been commonly held that 
the answer of respondent under the parliamentary law of impeachment 
need not observe neat strictness of form,183 just as the articles need 
not be as specific as an indictment. If a guilty plea is entered in 
answer, judgment may be entered without further proceedings.184 
Otherwise, a Senate trial must follow to a final conviction or acquittal.
Upon receiving the respondent’s answer, time is allowed for the 
replication of the managers, on the condition that any further pleadings 
be duly filed with the Secretary and notice be given to the other party 
prior to a designated date.185 A replication by the House managers 
usually consists of a general denial of all allegations set forth in the 
respondent’s answer and of an averment that the charges contained in 
the articles set forth impeachable offenses.186 A  replication, on the 
other hand, can allege a new matter not set forth in the articles,187 
thereby necessitating further pleadings.188 The parties may submit 
briefs in support of their pleadings, but the briefs typically are not sub­
mitted until after the managers and counsel for the respondent have 
made opening statements and introduced witnesses at the Senate 
trial.189
The time granted by the Senate for the respondent to prepare for 
trial after presentation of his answer will vary, but the Senate usually 
allows the question of calendaring to be argued by both sides. President 
Johnson, for example, requested 30 days, and arguments were heard 
on the motion with the Senate granting less time190 and suggesting that 
there should be no delays once trial was commenced.191 In the Nixon 
case, counsel for the respondent was notified by the Senate, after the 
Judiciary Committee had voted to report articles of impeachment to the
Vol. 1974:1023] IMPEACHMENT 1055
180. 3 H in d s* § 2428 (Johnson).
181. See, e.g., id. § 2453 (Belknap demurred to the imepachment articles on the 
grounds that he was not a civil officer.).
182. See, e.g., 6 C a n n o n ’s § 505 (Archbald).
183. 3 H in d s’ § 2121. See also Jefferson's Manual § 620, at 3t)5.
184. 3 H in d s’ § 2127. See also Se n ate  I m pe a c h m e n t  R u l e  VIII, app. B infra.
185. See, e.g., 6 C a n n o n ’s § 547 (English). In the Belknap trial the forms of plead­
ing, including rejoinder, surrejoinder, and similiter, were discussed. 3 H in d s’ § 2455.
186. See, e.g., 6 C a n n o n ’s § 507 (Archbald).
187. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2454 (Belknap).
188. Id. § 2455 (Belknap).
189. See, e.g., 6 C a n n o n ’s § 480 (Archbald); 3 H in d s’ § 2125 (Swayne).
190. 3 H in d s’ § 2430.
191. Id.
House, that the President would be granted two to three weeks for the 
preparation of the case should the House vote impeachment.
C. The Presiding Officer
The presiding officer during Senate impeachment proceedings is 
the Vice-President and, in his absence or own trial, the President pro 
tempore,192 except in cases involving the President, where the pre­
siding function is performed by the Chief Justice of the United 
States.193 The presiding officer is empowered by rule to make and 
issue orders, writs, precepts, and regulations/94 and to direct the form 
of proceedings for which the rules otherwise have not provided.195 All 
motions by the parties are to the presiding officer,196 who 
sometimes makes preliminary rulings on evidentiary issues and instructs 
and interrogates witnesses.197 The preliminary rulings of the presiding 
officer stand as judgments of the Senate unless a vote is requested by 
a Senator198 and the Senate thereafter overrules the preliminary 
ruling.199
The role of the Chief Justice as the presiding officer in a presiden­
tial impeachment is unsettled at least as to whether he is entitled to 
a tie-breaking vote on procedural questions. Although Chief Justice 
Chase voted on minor procedural issues in the Johnson trial,200 the 
propriety of his doing so was not conclusively settled.201 Nevertheless, 
since we musit infer that, where the impeachment rules are silent, the 
general Senate rules of procedure apply,202 the presiding officer should
192. Id. § 2309 (Blount); id. § 2337 (Pickering); id. § 2477 (Swayne). See also 
id. § 2394  (In the absence of the Vice-President, the President pro tempore presided in 
the Humphreys case.).
193. U.S. Const, art. I, § 3. See also 3 Hinds’ §§ 2055, 2082.
194. 3 H in d s’ § 2083. See also S e n ate  I m pe a c h m e n t  R u l e  V, app. B infra.
195. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2331 (Pickering). See also S en ate  Im p e a c h m e n t  R u l e
V, app. B infra.
196. 3 H in d s’ § 2131. See also Se n ate  I m p e a c h m e n t  R u l e  XVI, app. B infra.
197. 3 H in d s’ §§ 2085-87. See also S en ate  I m pe a c h m e n t  R u l e  XIX, app. B infra.
198. The right to challenge the presiding officer’s preliminary rulings belongs to the 
Senators and to counsel. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2195 (where the President pro tempore 
as presiding officer in the Belknap trial held that counsel for respondent could not appeal 
a preliminary ruling to the Senate although a Senator might have the point submitted 
to the Senate). In the Johnson trial, Chief Justice Chase held that tfie managers*might 
not appeal from a decision of the presiding officer as to evidence. Id. § 2084.
199. Id. For instances where the presiding officer has made evidentiary deci­
sions, see id. §§ 2226-29, 2252, 2271, 2276; For instances where a presiding officer’s 
preliminary ruling was overruled by the Senate, see id. §§ 2208, 2222, 2238.
200. Id. § 2067.
201. Id. § 2098.
202. Id. § 2100 . For a discussion of the form and history of the Senate Rules appli­
cable to impeachment trials, see the following sections in 3 H in d s’: § 2078  (Rule I);
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be entitled to exercise a tie-breaking vote on questions of procedure 
unless his power is otherwise limited.
D. Conduct of the Impeachment Trial
The Senate sits for an impeachment trial with open doors but con­
ducts secret sessions when deliberating on any decision,203 be it an 
evidentiary ruling or the final judgment. However, the final judgment 
has been considered on occasion in open session.204 Thus, as a general 
rule the orders and decisions of the Senate trial are debated in closed 
session, but the Senate by majority vote can proceed with debate in 
open session.205 All motions must be presented in writing to the 
presiding officer,206 and any question or remark of a Senator must be 
similarly presented.207
Impeachment trials are exempted from the constitutional require­
ment of trial by jury.208 The trial is initiated by each side making an 
opening statement,209 which generally (1) outlines what is expected 
to be proven or rebutted, (2) discusses constitutional questions, and 
(3) controverts or defends charges preferred in the articles of impeach­
ment.210 During the impeachment trial, all preliminary or interlocutory
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§ 2126 (Rule II); § 2079 (Rule III); § 2082 (Rule IV); § 2083 (Rule V); § 2158 (Rule 
VI); § 2084 (Rule VII); § 2127 (Rule VIII); § 2128 (Rule IX); § 2129 (Rule X); 
§ 2070 (Rule XI); § 2069 (Rule XII); § 2090 (Rule XIII); § 2130 (Rule XIV); § 2131 
(Rule XV); § 2168 (Rule XVI); § 2163 (Rule XVII); § 2176 (Rule XVIII); § 2075 
(Rule XIX); §§ 2091-93 (Rule XX); § 2132 (Rule XXI); § 2098. (Rule XXII); § 2094 
(Rule XXIII); §§ 2080, 2119, 2162 (Rule XXIV); § 2076 (Rule XXV).
203. Id. § 2075. See, e.g., 6 Cannon’s § 524. (In the. Louderback case the Senate 
deliberated in secret session on the final judgment.); 3 Hinds’ ..§ 2309 (In the Blount 
case all questions were decided in secret session and by yea and nay votes.); id. § 2437 
(In the Johnson trial deliberation on the final question was conducted in secret session.). 
See also Senate Impeachment Rules XX, XXIV, app. B infra.
204. See, e.g., 3 Hinds’ § 2383 (Peck); id. § 2397 (Humphreys).
205. Id. § 2094. The rule that decisions of the Senate sitting for an impeachment 
trial shall be without debate has been rigidly enforced. Id. § 2088; cf. id. § 2154 (In 
the Swayne trial, the Senators were permitted to debate to a greater extent than usual.). 
Debate in secret session is limited to ten minutes on interlocutory questions and to fif­
teen minutes on the final question, unless modified by consent of the Senate. Id. § 2094. 
See also Senate Impeachment Rule XXIV, app. B infra.
206. 3 Hinds’ § 2131. See also Senate Impeachment R ule XVI, app. B infra.
207. See 6 Cannon’s § 519. See also Senate Impeachment R ule XIX, app. B in­
fra.
208. U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3.
209. See, e.g., 6 Cannon’s § 522 (Louderback); 3 Hinds’ § 2132 (Johnson). See 
also Senate, Impeachment Rule XXII, app. B infra.
210. See, e.g., 6 Cannon’s § 509 (Charges preferred in the articles were controverted 
in the opening address of respondent’s counsel in the Archbald case.); 3 Hinds’ §§ 2133­
34 (The managers in the Swayne case outlined, in their opening statements what it was
questions and motions are limited to one-hour arguments on each 
side.211
Both sides are generally allowed to present witnesses at the trial212 
and are required to furnish to each other a list of prospective wit­
nesses.213 Should either party later desire to present any additional 
witnesses, an application must be made to the presiding officer.214 The 
Senate, on the application of managers or of the respondent or his 
counsel, is empowered to issue subpoenas in impeachment trials to 
compel the attendance of any witnesses215 or to procure papers.216 It 
is also the Senate, and not the presiding officer, that must rule on any 
motion for attachment of persons or papers.217 Where either party is 
not prepared to present testimony, the Senate, upon motion, may 
exercise discretion in delaying the trial to permit time for prepara­
tion.218
The presentation of testimony in the Senate trial is controlled by 
Senate, rather than by judicial, rules. Testimony presented in an im­
peachment trial need not be classified according to the particular article 
to which it applies.219 Witnesses are examined by one person on both 
sides,220 and any person, including Senators, may be questioned as a 
witness.221 Although the managers and counsel for the respondent 
usually conduct all examinations of witnesses, Senators have on occa­
sion presented questions by directing, through the presiding officer,222
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they expected to prove.); id. § 2433 (Evidence to be presented in the trial was outlined 
and constitutional issues raised in the opening addresses of the Johnson trial.).
211. 3 H in d s’ §§ 2091-93. The Senate may by order extend the time allowed for 
arguments of motions and interlocutory questions. Id. See also Sen ate  I m p e a c h m e n t  
R u l e  XXI, app. B infra.
212. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2353 (Chase).
213. See, e.g., 6 Ca n n o n ’s § 484 (Archbald); 3 H in d s’ § 2156 (Belknap).
214. 6 Ca n n o n 's § 508 (Archbald).
215. 3 H in d s’ I 2158. See also S en ate  I m pe a c h m e n t  R u l e  VI, app. B infra.
216. 3 H in d s’ §§ 2038-39 (Blount).
217. Id. §§ 2152-53 (Swayne). See also 6 C a n n o n ’s § 523 (The Senate in the Lou- 
derback impeachment ordered process to compel the attendance of a witness who had 
declined to respond to a subpoena.); id. § 531 (A witness who refused to testify was 
arrested and detained in custody.); 3 H in d s’ § 2160 (The Senate in the Belknap case 
commanded a reluctant witness to produce certain papers in his possession.).
218. See, e.g., 3 H i n d s ’ § 2353 (The Senate in the Chase trial granted the managers’ 
motion for a continuance because they were unprepared to present testimony.); id. § 
2433 (The Senate in the Johnson trial granted the respondent’s motion to continue to 
permit time for preparation of testimony for the defense.).
219. Id. § 2165 (Chase).
220. Id. § 2168 (Chase). See also Se n a t e  Im p e a c h m e n t  R u l e  XVII, app. B infra.
221. See, e.g., 3 H in d s’ § 2164 (Belknap); id. § 2309 (Blount); id. § 2336 (Picker­
ing); id. § 2378 (Peck). See also Se n ate  I m pe a c h m e n t  R u l e  XVIII, app. B infra.
222. 3 H in d s’ § 2176. See, e.g.t 6 C a n n o n ’s § 522 (Louderback); 3 H in d s’ § 2331
q u e s tio n s  in  w r i t te n  fo rm  to  w itn e sses , m a n a g e rs , o r  c o u n s e l .223 T h e  
r e s p o n d e n t  ty p ic a lly  is p e rm it te d  to  a p p e a r  in  h is  o w n  b e h a lf 224 a n d  
to  r e s p o n d  a t  le n g th  to  th e  c h a rg e s  a g a in s t  h im .
E . E v id e n t ia r y  R u l in g s
S in ce  th e  S e n a te  s its  a s  b o th  ju d g e  a n d  ju ry , i t  is n e c e s sa ry  fo r  th a t  
b o d y  to  a d o p t  ru le s  o f  e v id e n c e  to  g o v e rn  th e  a d m iss ib ili ty  a n d  re le v ­
a n c e  o f  e v id e n tia ry  p re s e n ta t io n s  in  th e  c o u rs e  o f  its  o w n  tr ia l .  I n  so m e  
tr ia ls ,  th e  S e n a te , fo llo w in g  E n g lis h  p re c e d e n t ,  h a s  p e r fu n c to r i ly  v o te d  
to  a d o p t  th e  ru le s  o f  e v id e n c e  c u r re n tly  in  fo rc e  in  th e  c o u r ts .225 H o w ­
e v e r, s in c e  th e  ru le s  o f  e v id e n c e  v a ry  f ro m  ju r is d ic tio n  to  ju r is d ic t io n  
in  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  a n d  s in c e  th e  r a t io n a le  b e h in d  se v e ra l e v id e n tia ry  
ru le s  b e c o m e s  in a p p o s ite  in  a  S e n a te  t r ia l  w h ic h  o p e ra te s  w ith o u t  a  ju ry  
th a t  c a n  b e  s e q u e s te re d , i t  h a s  b e e n  a rg u e d  in  o th e r  tr ia ls ,  o f te n  p e r s u a ­
siv e ly , th a t  th e  r e g u la r  ru le s  o f  e v id e n c e  s h o u ld  b e  r e la x e d .226
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(Pickering). The managers or counsel for the respondent, however, may object to a 
witness’ answering a question put by a Senator. See, e.g., id. §§ 2182, 2186, 2187. In 
such a case the Senate must rule on the objection. See, e.g., id. § 2188.
223. Cf. 3 Hinds’ §§ 2180-81 (Several Senators addressed verbal questions to the 
managers and to counsel for respondent, notwithstanding Senate Impeachment Rule
XIX, app. B infra, which requires questions from one Senator to be in writing and to 
be put by the presiding officer.).
224. See, e.g., 6 Cannon’s § 524 (Louderback appeared at the trial and testified at 
length in his own behalf.).
225. 3 Hinds’ § 2218. President Ford has recently signed into law the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. See Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975), reprinted in 43 U.S.L.W.
137. Since these uniform rules have been enacted, they are likely to be utilized in sub­
sequent impeachment trials unless special rules of evidence adapted to the impeachment 
process also are enacted. Historically, the Senate has remained faithful, broadly speak­
ing, to the rules of evidence applicable in criminal trials before juries. However, Senate 
rules are such that this general position has been most often eaten up by exceptions in 
particular circumstances.
The Senate, after considering English precedent, ruled in the Peck trial that the 
strict rules of evidence in force in the courts should be applied. The ruling came after 
a lengthy debate and appeared to be the result of the Senate’s efforts to assure a fair 
trial. Representative Storrs argued:
I confess I feel alarmed to hear it gravely urged here that an impeachment 
is to be governed by other rules than the well-known and long-established rules 
of evidence. Rules of evidence are as much a part of the law of the land as 
any other part of it, and they constitute the security of every man. A more 
dangerous principle could not be broached, or a more alarming principle estab­
lished than that in the trial of an impeachment, the ordinary rules of evidence 
are to be relaxed . . . [such a practice] might easily lead to the most unjust 
and oppressive proceedings. 3 Hinds’ § 2218, at 539.
226. In the Johnson trial, for example, it was suggested that the ordinary rules of 
evidence bs relaxed:
Considering the character of this proceeding, that it is a trial of impeach­
ment before the Senate of the United States, and not a proceeding by indict­
ment in an inferior court;
Considering that Senators are, from beginning to end, judges of law as 
well as fact, and that they are judges from whom there is no appeal;
E v id e n tia ry  ru lin g s  a re  m a d e  in  th e  c o u rse  o f  th e  t r ia l  its e lf  in  a n  
a d  h o c  fa sh io n . E v id e n tia ry  q u e s tio n s  a re  “b y  lo n g -e s ta b lish e d  c u s to m , 
su b m itte d  b y  th e  p re s id in g  o f f ic e r  to  th e  S e n a te  fo r  d e c is io n ” ;227 
h o w e v e r, a  S e n a to r  a t  h is  o p t io n  m a y  s u b m it th e  q u e s tio n  to  th e  m e m ­
b e rs  o f  th e  S e n a te  in  th e  f irs t  in s ta n c e . W h ile  e v id e n tia ry  ru lin g s  of 
th e  p re s id in g  o f f ic e r  a re  s a id  to  b e  c o n tro l lin g , th e y  c a n  in  p ra c t ic e  b e  
o v e r ru le d  b y  a  m a jo r i ty  v o te  o f  th e  S e n a te . F o r  e x a m p le , in  th e  
J o h n s o n  im p e a c h m e n t, a l th o u g h  th e  C h ie f  J u s t ic e  o f  th e  U n ite d  
S ta te s , w h o  p re s id e d  o v e r  th e  tr ia l ,  m a d e  p re lim in a ry  ru lin g s , e v e ry  
e v id e n tia ry  q u e s tio n  in v a r ia b ly  w a s  s u b m itte d  to  th e  S e n a te  f o r  f in a l 
d e te r m in a t io n .228 A s  a  re su lt ,  se v e ra l o f  th e  C h ie f  J u s t ic e ’s p re lim in a ry  
e v id e n tia ry  ru lin g s  w e re  o v e r ru le d  b y  m a jo r i ty  v o te .229 T h u s ,  w h ile  th e  
S e n a te  h a s  d e c lin e d  to  l ib e ra liz e  th e  s tr ic t  ru le s  o f  e v id e n c e  a c ro ss  th e  
b o a rd ,  th e  p r o p o s it io n  th a t  th e  S e n a te  m a y  a d m it  o r  e x c lu d e  e v id e n c e  
b y  m a jo r i ty  v o te  h a s  n e v e r  b e e n  s e rio u s ly  q u e s tio n e d ,230 a n d  th e  S e n a te  
h a s  o f te n  v o te d  n o t  to  fo llo w  c e r ta in  ru le s  o f  e v id e n c e  in  p a r t ic u la r  
c a se s .231
I n  o r d e r  to  a v o id  th e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  m a n ip u la tin g  ju s t ic e  th ro u g h  
a d  h o c  e v id e n tia ry  ru lin g s , i t  is su g g e s te d  th a t  a  c o m m itte e  o f  th e  
S e n a te  b e  r e q u e s te d  to  e x a m in e  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  th e  a p p ro p r ia te n e s s
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Considering that the reasons for the exclusion of evidence on an ordinary 
trial where the judge responds to law and the jury to the fact are not applicable 
to such a proceeding;
Therefore, . . .  it is deemed advisable that all evidence offered on either 
side not trivial or obviously irrelevant in nature shall be received without objec­
tion. 3 Hinds’ § 2219, at 540.
A strong argument can be made for modifying in a Senate impeachment trial those 
exclusionary rules of evidence designed primarily to protect a jury in a criminal proceed­
ing. Similarly, in a criminal trial without a jury, evidentiary rules are modified substan­
tially because the court presumably is able to determine the appropriate weight to be 
given all the evidence without being swayed unduly by questionable evidence. In a Sen­
ate trial,, the Senators sit as deciders of fact and law, judge and jury; thus it need not 
follow that the Senate should be bound by rules designed to protect only its jury func­
tions. Moreover, the political nature of the impeachment process is such, especially in 
presidential impeachment, that much of the evidence upon which conviction or exonera­
tion is based is by then in the public domain. There is simply no way to sequester the 
Senate. If defense counsel is fairly to have an opportunity to rebut formally in the 
course of a Senate trial evidence of wrongdoing, whether hearsay or otherwise, all seri­
ous issues should be presented within that forum.
227. 6 Cannon’s § 491, at 678.
228. 3 Hinds’ § 2222. See also 6 C annon’s § 491, at 678 (The President pro tem­
pore referred to the Johnson trial for the precedent that the Chief Justice’s rulings were 
invariably put to a Senate vote.).
229. 3 Hinds’ § 2222.
230. /</. § 2167 (Belknap).
231. See, e.g., 6 Cannon’s § 510 (The Senate by its own order disregarded an estab­
lished rule of evidence in the Archbald case.).
o f  p r e s e n t  e v id e n tia ry  ru le s  g o v e rn in g  a n  im p e a c h m e n t t r ia l  a t  a  tim e  
w h e n  m in d s  a re  f re e  f ro m  th e  a d v e r s a r ia l  in f lu e n c e s  g e n e ra te d  in  th e  
a n t ic ip a t io n  o r  c o n d u c t  o f  a  p a r t i c u la r  tr ia l .  G e n e ra l  g u id e lin e s  c a n  b e  
a d o p te d ,  a n d  p r in c ip le s  fo r  a d a p t in g  th e  ju ry -o r ie n te d  e v id e n tia ry  ru le s  
t o  S e n a te  u se  c a n  b e  d e lin e a te d :
F . F in a l A r g u m e n ts  a n d  V o t in g
F in a l  a rg u m e n ts  o n  th e  m e ri ts  in  a n  im p e a c h m e n t t r ia l  a r e  m a d e  
b y  tw o  p e rso n s  o n  e a c h  s id e , u n le ss  m o d if ie d  b y  p r io r  a p p l ic a t io n .232 
F o llo w in g  f in a l  a rg u m e n ts , th e  f in a l ju d g m e n t is p u t  to  th e  S e n a te .233 
C o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  S e n a te  ru le  a l lo w in g  o n ly  y e a  a n d  n a y  v o tin g  in  
im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e e d in g s ,234 th e  S e n a te  h a s  d e c lin e d  to  p e r m i t  a n y  
e x p re ss io n  a s  to  w h e th e r  th e  o ffe n ses  c h a rg e d  c o n s ti tu te d  h ig h  c r im e s  
a n d  m is d e m e a n o rs .235 T h e  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  th is  r u le  is t h a t  a  n e g a tiv e  
v o te  c o u ld  m e a n  e i th e r  th a t  a  S e n a to r  c o n s id e re d  (1 ) th a t  th e  o ffe n se  
e m b o d ie d  in  th e  a r t ic le  o f  im p e a c h m e n t d id  n o t  c o n s ti tu te  a  “ h ig h  c r im e  
a n d  m is d e m e a n o r ,” w h e th e r  o r  n o t  c o m m itte d  b y  th e  d e fe n d a n t,  o r  (2 ) 
th a t  th e  d e f e n d a n t  w a s  n o t  g u ilty  o f  th e  c o m m iss io n  o f  th e  o ffe n se  
c h a rg e d , w h e th e r  o r  n o t  i t  c o n s ti tu te d  a n  im p e a c h a b le  o ffe n se . H o w ­
ev e r, in  th e  in te re s t  o f  p re c e d e n t ia l  c la r i ty  a n d  d u e  to  th e  d u a l  ro le  
o f  th e  S e n a te  as b o th  ju d g e  a n d  ju ry ,  i t  is u rg e d  th a t  th e  fo rm  o f th e  
f in a l  q u e s tio n  b e  m o d if ie d  in  o r d e r  to  a llo w  e a c h  S e n a to r  to  re s p o n d
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232. See 3 Hinds’ § 2132 (The managers and counsel for respondent in the Johnson 
trial successfully objected to the rule limiting the number entitled to make final argu­
ments on each side.). See also Senate Impeachment R u le  XXII, app. B infra.
233. The articles are generally read successively, with the question of guilty or not 
guilty being presented in open session to each Senator for separate consideration.
234. See, e.g., 3 Hinds’ § 2363 (Chase). The form of the final question, following 
the Chase precedent, has been:
M r .__________________ how say you; is the respondent-------------------- ;— ,—
guilty or not guilty of a high crime or misdemeanor, as charged in the
• . ___________ _ . article of impeachment. Id.
235. See, e.g., id. § 2339 (Pickering). See also 6 C annon’s § 457, containing a 
monograph by Wrisley Brown, of counsel on behalf of the managers in the Archbald 
impeachment, which was printed as a public document following Archbald’s conviction, 
and which reads as follows:
The impeachments that have failed of conviction are of little value as 
precedents because of their close intermixture of fact and law, which makes 
it practically impossible to determine whether the evidence was considered in­
sufficient to support the allegation of the articles, or whether the acts alleged 
were ‘adjudged insufficient in law to constitutue impeachable offenses.’ . . . 
Neither of the successful impeachments prior to the case of Judge Archbald 
was defended, and they are not entitled to great weight as authorities. . . .
But, it will be observed, none of the articles exhibited against Judge Archbald 
charged an indictable offense, or even a violation of positive law. . . . There­
fore, the judgment of the Senate in this case has forever removed from the do­
main of controversy the proposition that judges are only impeachable for the 
commission of crimes or misdemeanors against the laws of general application.
Id. at 637-38.
o n  b o th  th e  le g a l  a n d  f a c tu a l  e le m e n ts  o f  th e  f in a l  v e rd ic t .236
T h e  issu e  o f  th e  a p p l ic a b i l i ty  o f  th e  d o c tr in e  o f  d is q u a lif ic a tio n  
b a s e d  u p o n  p e r s o n a l  in te re s t,  a s  a p p l ie d  to  a  S e n a to r  v o tin g  o n  im ­
p e a c h m e n t,  h a s  b e e n  ra is e d  b u t  n o t  a c te d  u p o n .237 T h e  P re s id e n t p ro  
te m p o re  o f  th e  S e n a te  d u r in g  th e  J o h n s o n  tr ia l ,  f o r  e x a m p le , p a r t ic i ­
p a te d  d e s p ite  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a  c o n v ic tio n  w o u ld  h a v e  m a d e  h im  P re s i­
d e n t .238 A lso , a  S e n a to r  r e la te d  t o  J o h n s o n  w as  n o t  c h a lle n g e d  w h e n  
h e  v o te d  o n  th e  f in a l  im p e a c h m e n t q u e s tio n .239
G . J u d g m e n t
U n d e r  th e  C o n s ti tu t io n ,  i f  a n  im p e a c h m e n t is  n o t  s u s ta in e d  b y  a  
tw o - th ird s  v o te  o n  a n y  a r tic le ,  th e  a c c u s e d  is a c q u i t te d .240 W h e re  c o n ­
v ic t io n  is  a c c o m p lish e d , th e  S e n a te  m u s t  d e c re e  th e  d e f e n d a n t’s r e ­
m o v a l f ro m  o ffic e  a n d  m a y  d isq u a lify  h im  f ro m  h o ld in g  a n y  p u b lic  
o f f ic e  in  th e  f u tu r e .241 D e b a te  h a s  o c c u r re d  in  th e  S e n a te  a s  to  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  re q u ir e s  b o th  re m o v a l a n d  d isq u a lif ic a ­
t io n  u p o n  c o n v ic tio n . I n  b o th  th e  A rc h b a ld  a n d  th e  H u m p h re y s  c a se s , 
th e  P re s id e n t  p r o  te m p o re  r u le d  th a t  th e  tw o  q u e s tio n s  w e re  s e p a ra te  
a n d  d iv is ib le  p ro p o s itio n s , th e  fo rm e r  b e in g  m a n d a to r y  a n d  th e  la t te r  
d is c re tio n a ry .242
V . Raising the D efense of Executive Privilege
W hy, w h at m ockery  it w ould  be  fo r the  C onstitu tion  o f the  U n ited  S tates 
to  say th a t the  H ouse shou ld  have the  pow er o f im peachm ent ex tending
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236. The filing of individual opinions to be published in the Senate records presently 
provides the only indication, other than the actual vote, as to whether the offense 
charged constituted a “high crime and misdemeanor” and whether the accused was guilty 
of its commission.
237. See, e.g., 3 Hinds* § 2061 (Johnson).
238. Id.
239. Id. It should also be noted that in the Pickering trial a Senator, who had pre­
viously voted for impeachment as a member of the House, was challenged but allowed 
to vote. Id. § 2327. Senators on the other hand, have often been excused from voting 
for various reasons. See, e.g., 6 Cannon’s § 516 (Senators in the Louderback case were 
excused for various reasons from voting on all or part of the impeachment articles.); 
3 Hinds’ § 2114 (A Senator who had not heard the evidence was excused from voting 
on the question of guilt in the Swayne trial.); id. § 2383 (One Senator in the Peck trial 
was excused from voting on the judgment because he had appeared as a witness and an­
other Senator was excused from voting because he had taken his seat after part of the 
testimony had been presented.); id. § 2396 (Various Senators were excused from voting 
in the Humphreys case.).
240. U.S. Const, art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
241. Id. cl. 7.
242. See 6 Cannon’s § 512, at 706 (Archbald); 3 Hinds’ § 2397, at 820 (Hum­
phreys).
even to the P resid en t o f the U n ited  S tates him self, an d  y e t to  say  th a t 
th e  H ouse h ad  n o t the pow er to  ob ta in  the  evidence and  p roofs on  w hich 
th e ir  im peachm ent was based. I t  ap p eared  to him  [John  A dam s] equ i­
valen t to  a  se lf-ev ident p rincip le, th a t the pow er of im peachm ent gives 
to  th e  H o u se  necessarily  the pow er to  ca ll fo r persons and  papers.
Jo h n  Q uincy  A d am s243 
C o n g re s s io n a l  p o w e r  to  o b ta in  in fo rm a tio n  c o n c e rn in g  a n  o ff ic ia l’s 
c o n d u c t is c r i t ic a l  to  e v e ry  s ta g e  o f  a n y  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss . C o n s e ­
q u e n tly , a  c la im  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  to  w ith h o ld  in fo rm a tio n  f ro m  
a n  im p e a c h m e n t  in v e s tig a to ry  c o m m itte e  a t  a n y  s ta g e  o f  th e  p ro c e ss  
w o u ld  th r e a te n  to  e m a s c u la te  th e  p o w e r  g r a n te d  C o n g re s s  b y  th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n  to  im p e a c h  a n y  fe d e ra l  o ff ic ia l, e sp e c ia lly  th e  P re s id e n t .244 
T h u s ,  w h ile  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  p o sse sse s  a  c e r ta in  le g itim a c y  in  sp ite  
o f  d u b io u s  p a re n ta g e ,  th e r e  ex is ts  a  s tro n g  p re s u m p tio n  a g a in s t  a n y  u se  
o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  to  o b s tru c t  a n  im p e a c h m e n t in v e s tig a tio n .
T h e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s ta tu s  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  h a s  b e e n  th e  s u b ­
je c t  o f  m u c h  r e c e n t  d e b a te .245 H is to r ic a lly , th e  d o c tr in e  w as  in v o k e d  
ra re ly  a n d  in  n a r ro w  c irc u m s ta n c e s .246 D u r in g  th e  E is e n h o w e r  a d m in ­
is t ra t io n  i t  w as  se rio u s ly  c o n te n d e d  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t h a s  u n lim ite d  d is ­
c re tio n  to  w ith h o ld  a n y  in fo rm a tio n  f ro m  C o n g re s s  o r  th e  c o u r ts ,247 b u t
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243. Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 580 (1842).
244. “The House of Representatives shall . . . have the sole Power of Impeachment.” 
U.S. C onst, art. I, § 2, cl. 5. “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach­
ments.” Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. Congress, the coordinate political branch, and not its 
least dangerous sister, is ultimately the only natural balance to the executive. Cf. 
Bickel, Should Rodino Go to Court?, The New Republic, June 8, 1974, at 11.
245. See, e.g., Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L. 
Rev. 1287 (1965); Committee on Civil Rights of the New York City Bar, Executive 
Privilege: Analysis and Recommendations for Congressional Legislation, 29 Record o f  
N.Y.C.B.A. 177 (1974); Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege, The Congress and the 
Courts, 35 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1974); Ervin, Controlling “Executive Privilege,” 20 Loyola 
L. Rev. 11 (1974); Harden, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 Y ale  L.J. 
879 (1962); Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the 
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 271 (1971); Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privi­
lege—A Study of the Period 1953-1960, 29 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 623, 827 (1961); Kut- 
ner, Executive Privilege . . . Growth of Power over a Declining Congress, 20 Loyola 
L. Rev. 33 (1974).
246. Executive Privilege 163-208.
247. The House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee re­
ported in March 1973 that since 1952 executive privilege had been invoked 49 times— 
more than twice the number of all prior claims. The Present Limits of "Executive Privi­
lege,” Cong. Rec. 2243-46 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1973). After that report, the Nixon 
Administration asserted executive privilege at least four additional times including an 
assertion against complying with a subpoena duces tecum directed by the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, a subpoena from Special Prosecutor 
Archibald Cox, and later from Special Prosecutor Jaworski, and finally a subpoena is­
sued by the House Judiciary Committee incident to its impeachment inquiry.
th e  v a lid ity  o f  th a t  c la im  o f a b s o lu te  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  h a s  b e e n  v ig o r­
o u s ly  c o n te s te d  b y  b o th  th e  c o u r ts 248 a n d  C o n g re s s .249 I n  v iew  o f  th e  
f irm  re sp o n se s  o f  th e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  a n d  C o n g re s s  d e n y in g  th e  P re s i­
d e n t’s c la im  o f  a n  a b s o lu te  p r iv ile g e  to  w ith h o ld  in fo rm a tio n , i t  is  a p ­
p r o p r ia te  to  e x a m in e  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  th e  d o c tr in e  o f  e x e c u tiv e  
p r iv ile g e  a n d  its  lim ita tio n s .
U n d e r  th e  c o m m o n  la w  o f  E n g lis h  p a r l ia m e n ta r y  g o v e rn m e n t, in  
w h ic h  th e  P r im e  M in is te r  m u s t b e  e le c te d  as a  m e m b e r  o f  P a r l ia m e n t ,  
th e re  ex is ts  a m p le  p r e c e d e n t  f o r  p a r l ia m e n ta r y  in v e s tig a tio n  o f  e x e c u ­
tiv e  c o n d u c t,  b o th  f o r  p u rp o s e s  o f  in i t ia t in g  le g is la tio n  a n d  u n d e r ta k in g  
im p e a c h m e n t.250 I n  A m e r ic a ,  h o w e v e r, th e  s e p a r a t io n  o f  p o w e rs  
d o c tr in e ,  w h ic h  m a k e s  th e  E x e c u tiv e  in d e p e n d e n t  o f  d ir e c t  le g is la tiv e  
c o n tro l ,  h a s  g iv e n  b i r th  to  a  l im ite d  d o c tr in e  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e . 
T h e  E x e c u tiv e  h a s  f re q u e n tly  w ith h e ld  in fo rm a tio n  f ro m  th e  c o u r ts ,  t h ;  
C o n g re s s , a n d  th e  p e o p le  b y  a s se r tin g  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  s e p a r a t io n  o f  
p o w e rs  d ire c tly , th e  n e e d  fo r  c o n f id e n tia lity , o r  r ig h ts  g r a n te d  b y  s ta t ­
u te , N e v e rth e le ss , n o n e  o f  th e se  b a s e s  c a n  s u p p o r t  a n  a b s o lu te  c la im  
to  ex e c u tiv e  p riv ile g e , e sp e c ia lly  w ith  re s p e c t  to  a  c o n g re s s io n a l im ­
p e a c h m e n t in v e s tig a tio n .
A . E x e c u t iv e  P r iv i le g e  B a s e d  o n  S e p a r a t io n  o f  P o w e r s
T h e  c la im  o f  a n  a b s o lu te  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  b a s e d  o n  s e p a ra tio n  
o f  p o w e rs 251 w a s  re je c te d  ju d ic ia l ly  in  N ix o n  v . S ir ic a 252 a n d  U n ite d  
S ta te s  v . N ix o n ,253 a n d  i t  w as  r e p u d ia te d  c o n g re ss io n a lly  in c id e n t  to  th e  
N ix o n  im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e e d in g .254 T h e s e  ju d ic ia l  a n d  c o n g re s s io n a l 
p ro n o u n c e m e n ts  im p ly  th a t  th e  d o c t r in e  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  is p re ­
d o m in a n tly  e x tra -c o n s ti tu t io n a l .  I n  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. N ix o n ,255 th e
248. The Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974), rejected 
the Executive’s claim to privilege based upon separation of powers and the need for con­
fidentiality between the President and his closest aides. See also Nixon v. Sirica, 487
F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
249. The House Judiciary Committee repudiated President Nixon’s claim of privilege 
to withhold information from an impeachment investigation by voting the articles of im­
peachment contained in appendix C infra;
250. Executive Privilege 15-48.
251. See notes 247 supra & 263 infra and accompanying texts.
252. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
253. 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
254. See note 249 supra. Although a minority of the Committee argued that its sub­
poena should be taken to the courts for enforcement, counsel for the majority of the 
Committee concluded that congressional power to inquire incident to impeachment has 
an even more well-established constitutional base than judicial power to compel presiden­
tial disclosure. 32 Cong. Q. 2013-14 (1974).
255. The case arose when the President filed a motion to quash a trial subpoena 
duces tecum directed to the President for presidential materials and a motion to expunge
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P re s id e n t’s c o u n s e l r a is e d  th r e e  p o in ts  b e fo re  th e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  to  
s u p p o r t  h is  a s s e r t io n  th a t  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  is a  p r o p e r  b a s is  fo r  d is ­
r e g a rd in g  a  s u b p o e n a  o f  a  fe d e ra l  d is t r ic t  c o u r t .  A ll th r e e  w e re  e s se n ­
t ia l ly  s e p a r a t io n  o f  p o w e rs  a rg u m e n ts :  f irs t , t h a t  “ [ i]n h e re n t  in  th e  
e x e c u tiv e  p o w e r  v e s te d  in  'the P re s id e n t  u n d e r  a r t ic le  11 o f  th e  C o n ­
s ti tu tio n  is  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e , g e n e ra lly  re c o g n iz e d  a s  a  d e r iv a tiv e  o f  
th e  s e p a ra t io n  o f  p o w e rs ” ;256 se c o n d , th a t  s in c e  th e  c o u r ts  h a v e  n o  
ju r is d ic t io n  o v e r  im p e a c h m e n t- r e la te d  m a tte rs ,  th e  u se  o f  a  c o u r t  s u b ­
p o e n a  to  fo rc e  th e  p ro d u c t io n  o f  p r e s id e n tia l  d o c u m e n ts  w h ile  a n  
im p e a c h m e n t  is in  p ro c e s s  w o u ld  a c c o m p lish  in d ire c tly  w h a t  th e  C o n ­
s ti tu tio n  c le a r ly  p r o h ib i ts ;257 a n d  th ird ,  th a t  “ th e  c o m m o n  la w  a n d  its  
e m b o d im e n t o f  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  c o n f id e n tia l i ty  as a  p re re q u is i te  to  th e  
e ffe c tiv e  a d m in is t ra t io n  o f  g o v e rn m e n t” 258 r e q u ire s  th a t  th e  p r iv ile g e  
b e  re c o g n iz e d . T h e  C o u r t ,  h o w e v e r , u n c e re m o n io u s ly  r e je c te d  e a c h  
o f  th e se  a rg u m e n ts ;259 w h ile  c o n c e d in g  th a t  p r e s id e n tia l  c o m m u n ic a ­
t io n s  a re  “p re s u m p tiv e ly  p r iv ile g e d ,”  th e  C o u r t  h e ld  th a t  th e  “g e n e r ­
a l iz e d  a s s e r t io n  o f  p r iv ile g e  m u s t y ie ld  to  th e  d e m o n s tr a te d ,  sp e c if ic  
n e e d  fo r  e v id e n c e  in  a  p e n d in g  c r im in a l  t r ia l .” 260
C e r ta in ly ,  th is  d e n ia l  o f  a  P re s id e n t’s a s se r tio n  o f  p r iv ile g e  a g a in s t  
a  ju d ic ia l  s u b p o e n a  re c o g n iz e d  g e n e ra l  lim its  o n  th e  d o c t r in e  o f  
e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e , a t  le a s t  t o  th e  e x te n t t h a t  a n  a s s e r t io n  o f  p r iv ile g e  
m a y  b e  c o u n te r e d  b y  th e  c o m p e tin g  in te re s ts  o f  th e  o th e r  b ra n c h e s  o f
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any finding of the grand jury that he was an unindicted co-conspirator in the criminal 
proceedings commonly known as Watergate. 94 S. Ct. at 3096, citing United States v. 
Mitchell, No. 110 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1974). The district court held that under Nixon 
v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court had the authority to- rule on the 
scope and applicability of executive privilege and further that its jurisdiction was not 
affected by the intra-executive nature of the dispute. 94 S. Ct. at 3103. It then found 
that the Special Prosecutor had demonstrated a “compelling need” which under Sirica 
was necessary to overcome the presumptively privileged nature of presidential documents 
and papers. Id. at 3105.
256. Brief for Respondent at 17 & 49, United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
257. Id. at 15.
258. Id. at 50.
259. The first: “[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for 
confidentiality of high level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, 
unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circum­
stances.” 94 S. Ct. at 3106.
The second: “[T]he legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh presi­
dential privilege . . . Id. at 3107.
And the third:
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national se­
curity secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very 
important interest in confidentiality of presidential communications is signifi* 
cantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with 
all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide. Id.
260. Id. at 3110.
g o v e rn m e n t e x e rc is in g  th e i r  re sp e c tiv e ly  a u th o r iz e d  fu n c tio n s . T h u s ,  
i t  w o u ld  se e m  th a t ,  w h e n  th e  p r iv ile g e  is a s s e r te d  a g a in s t  a n  im p e a c h ­
m e n t  in q u iry , th e  c irc u m s ta n c e s  u n d e r  w h ic h  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  w o u ld  
ju s t ify  th e  P re s id e n t’s re fu s a l  to  d iv u lg e  in f o rm a tio n  a r e  in d e e d  lim ite d , 
if  n o t  w h o lly  h y p o th e tic a l .  S ta te d  a n o th e r  w a y , a  p re s u m p tio n  o f  
a lm o s t in s u rm o u n ta b le  p ro p o r t io n s  ex is ts  a g a in s t  th e  e x e rc ise  o f  
e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  w h e n  i t  is u s e d  to  a v o id  su p p ly in g  p e rs o n s  o r  p a p e rs  
r e q u e s te d  b y  th e  H o u s e  u p o n  its  c o n s ti tu t io n a lly  b a s e d  p o w e r  to  im ­
p e a c h . T h is  c o n c lu s io n  is c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  e a r l ie r  t r e a tm e n t  o f  
c la im s  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  in  o th e r  c o n te x ts  b a s e d  u p o n  th e  s e p a ra ­
t io n  o f  p o w e rs .
T h e  e a r l ie r  ca se s  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  h a v e  b e e n  r e a d  b y  its  
p r o p o n e n ts  to  s u p p o r t  th e  in v o c a tio n  o f  a n  a b s o lu te  p r iv ile g e ; h o w e v e r, 
a  m o re  c a re fu l  a n a ly s is  sh o w s th a t  th e se  p re c e d e n ts  a c tu a lly  re fu te  su c h  
a  p ro p o s it io n . F re q u e n tly ,  th e  f irs t  p r e c e d e n t  c i te d  is W a s h in g to n ’s r e ­
fu s a l  in  1 7 9 6  to  s u b m it  r e q u e s te d  m a te r ia ls  c o n c e rn in g  th e  J a y  t r e a ty  
n e g o t ia t io n s  to  th e  H o u se . T h is  in c id e n t  c a n n o t  b e  in te r p re te d  to  s u p ­
p o r t  a n  a r g u m e n t  fo r  a b s o lu te  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  b a s e d  u p o n  th e  
d o c tr in e  o f  s e p a ra t io n  o f  p o w e rs , s in c e  W a s h in g to n  h a d  a lre a d y  s u b ­
m it te d  th e  r e q u e s te d  m a te r ia ls  to  th e  S e n a te . R a th e r  th a n  a s se r tin g  
a n y  e x e c u tiv e  p riv ile g e , W a s h in g to n  re fu s e d  to  d isc lo se  to  th e  H o u se  
th e  in s tru c tio n s  th a t  h e  h a d  g iv e n  to  h is  m in is te rs  o n  th e  g ro u n d s  th a t  
th e  tr e a ty -m a k in g  p o w e r  w as  e x c lu s iv e ly  v e s te d  in  th e  P re s id e n t  a n d  
th e  S e n a te . H e  th e re fo re  c o n te n d e d  th a t  th e  H o u se  r e q u e s t  w as  n o t  
in c id e n t  to  o n e  o f  its  a s s ig n e d  re sp o n s ib ilit ie s :  “ [T ]h e  in s p e c t io n  o f  
th e  p a p e r s  a s k e d  f o r  c a n  [n o t] b e  r e la t iv e  to  a n y  p u rp o s e  u n d e r  th e  
c o g n iz a n c e  o f  th e  H o u se  . . . e x c e p t  th a t  o f  im p e a c h m e n t- ,  w h ic h  th e  
re s o lu t io n  h a s  n o t  e x p re s se d .” 261 W a s h in g to n ’s r e fu s a l  w as  c o u c h e d  
c a re fu lly  in  n a r ro w  te rm s ; r a th e r  th a n  re je c tin g  th e  p o w e r  o f  C o n g re s s  
to  in q u ire  in to  e x e c u tiv e  c o n d u c t  w h e n  su c h  a n  in v e s tig a tio n  is  c o n ­
d u c te d  in c id e n t to  a  le g it im a te  c o n g re s s io n a l re sp o n s ib ili ty  su c h  as im ­
p e a c h m e n t, W a s h in g to n  e x p lic i tly  re c o g n iz e d  th a t  r ig h t .262
261. 5 Annals of Cong. 759-60 (1796) [1789-1824] (emphasis added).
262. Washington declared his intent not to “withhold any information . . . which 
could be required of him by either House of Congress as a right.” Id. at 760. Nev­
ertheless, his refusal was not wholly acquiesced to by the House of Representatives. 
Members insisted on clarifying their right to demand information from the Executive:
The right of calling for papers was sanctioned . . .  by the uniform and unde­
niable practice of the House ever since the organization of the Government 
. . . .  [T]he House had the fullest right to the possession of any papers in the 
Executive department . . . .  [T]his was the first time it had ever been contro­
verted. Id. at 601.
Accordingly, a member of the House asserted that if information “came within [the 
House’s] powers, [it] would have a right to the papers” and the House would “de­
mand them, and insist on the demand.” Id. at 458.
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P re s id e n t A n d re w  J a c k s o n  in  1 8 3 3  w as  th e  f irs t  P re s id e n t  to  a s se r t  
th e  d o c tr in e  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  b a s e d  u p o n  th e  s e p a ra t io n  o f  
p o w e rs . H e  re fu s e d  to  a n s w e r  a  S e n a te  r e q u e s t  fo r  p a p e rs  w h ic h  c o n ­
ta in e d  th e  P re s id e n t’s p o lic y  s ta te m e n ts  to  h is  c a b in e t  c o n c e rn in g  th e  
re m o v a l o f  p u b l ic  fu n d s  f ro m  th e  B a n k  o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  (p e rh a p s  
in  a n t ic ip a t io n  o f  o r  to  h a s te n  its  fa ilu re ) . H e  e x p la in e d  to  C o n g re s s :
The Executive is a coordinate and independent branch of the Gov­
ernment equally with the Senate, and I have yet to learn under what 
constitutional authority that branch of the Legislature has a right to re­
quire of me an account of any communication . . . made to the heads 
of Departments acting as a Cabinet council. . . .
I am constrained, therefore, by a proper sense of my own self re­
spect and of the rights secured by the Constitution to the executive 
branch of the Government to decline a compliance with your request.263
I n  1 8 3 5 , J a c k s o n  re a s s e r te d  th is  a r g u m e n t  in  re fu s in g  to  s u p p ly  th e  
S e n a te  w ith  a  c o p y  o f  c h a rg e s  th a t  h a d  b e e n  b r o u g h t  a g a in s t  a  re c e n tly  
d ism isse d  s u rv e y o r-g e n e ra l:  “T h is  is a n o th e r  o f  th o s e  c a lls  fo r  in fo rm a ­
t io n  m a d e  u p o n  m e  b y  th e  S e n a te  w h ic h  h a v e , in  m y  ju d g m e n t,  e i th e r  
r e la te d  to  th e  su b je c ts  e x c lu s iv e ly  b e lo n g in g  to  th e  e x e c u tiv e  d e p a r t ­
m e n t  o r  o th e rw ise  e n c ro a c h e d  o n  th e  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  p o w e rs  o f  th e  
E x e c u tiv e .” 284 I n  a s se r tin g  a  c la im  o f  p r iv ile g e  b a s e d  o n  s e p a ra tio n  
o f  p o w e rs , h o w e v e r, J a c k s o n  d is t in g u ish e d  b e tw e e n  c o n g re s s io n a l 
in v e s tig a tio n  o f  p u re ly  e x e c u tiv e  a ffa irs  a n d  c o n g re s s io n a l in q u iry  in ­
c id e n t to  a  c o n s ti tu t io n a lly  m a n d a te d  c o n g re s s io n a l d u ty :
[CJases m ay  occur in  th e  course o f its legislative o r  executive p ro ceed ­
ings in  w hich it m ay  be  ind ispensable to  th e  p ro p e r  exercise of its pow ers 
th a t it should  inqu ire  o r decide u pon  the  conduc t of the  P re s id en t o r  
o th e r public  officers, and  in  every case its cons titu tiona l righ t to  d o  so 
is cheerfully  conceded .265 
T h u s , w h ile  J a c k s o n  c le a r ly  p r o p o u n d e d  a  s e p a ra t io n  o f  p o w e rs  a r g u ­
m e n t in  d e fe n se  o f  a  p r iv ile g e  t o  w ith h o ld  in fo rm a tio n ,  th e  a s s e r tio n  
w as  n a r r o w  r a th e r  th a n  a b s o lu te  a n d  c a n n o t  se rv e  as a  p r e c e d e n t  fo r  
a  re fu sa l to  p ro v id e  in f o rm a tio n  r e la te d  to  a n  im p e a c h m e n t in q u iry . 
T h is  sa m e  re s tr ic t iv e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  p r iv ile g e  w as  a d h e re d  to  b y  
P re s id e n t  T y le r .266 T h is  d is t in c t io n , a lo n g  w ith  a n  a c k n o w le d g e d  r e ­
263. 3 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers o f th e  P residen ts 36 (1897). 
Rather than acquiescing to the President’s conduct, the Senate censured the President. 
See note 408 infra.
264 Id. at 132.
265. Executive Privilege 182.
266. See 4 J. Richardson, supra note 263, at 105-06.
While I shall ever evince the greatest readiness to communicate to the House
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s e rv a tio n  fo r  in q u iry  p u r s u a n t  to  a n  im p e a c h m e n t in v e s tig a tio n , w as  
d r a w n  b y  B u c h a n a n  in  1 8 6 0 : “E x c e p t  in  [the] s in g le  c a se  [o f im p e a c h ­
m e n t] , th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  h a s  in v e s te d  th e  H o u s e  o f  R e p re s e n ta tiv e s  w ith  
n o  p o w e r , n o  ju r is d ic tio n ,  n o  su p re m a c y  w h a te v e r  o v e r  th e  P re s id e n t .  
I n  a l l  o th e r  re sp e c ts  h e  is q u ite  as in d e p e n d e n t  o f  th e m  as  th e y  a re  
o f  h im .” 267 T h e  sa m e  th e s is  w as  a s se r te d  b y  G r a n t  in  1 8 7 6  in  re fu s in g  
to  c o m p ly  w ith  a  r e q u e s t  fo r  in fo rm a tio n  w h e n  th e  D e m o c ra tic  H o u s e  
a p p e a re d  b e n t  o n  p u b lic ly  e m b a r ra s s in g  th e  a d m in is tra t io n :
I  fail, however, to find in the Constitution of the United States the au­
thority given to the House of Representatives . . .  to require of the 
Executive, an independent branch of the Government, coordinate with 
the Senate and the House of Representatives, an account of his dis­
charge of his appropriate and purely executive offices, acts, and duties, 
either as to when, where, or how performed.
What the House of Representatives may require as a right in its 
demand upon the Executive for information is limited to what is 
necessary for the proper discharge of its powers of legislation or of 
impeachment,268
U n ti l  th e  p r e s e n t  e ra , th is  in te r p re ta t io n  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  a n d  
th e  im p e a c h m e n t in v e s tig a to ry  p o w e rs  o f  C o n g re s s  h a d  g o n e  u n c h a l­
le n g e d . R e c e n tly , h o w e v e r, th e  c la im  o f  p r iv ile g e  h a s  b e e n  d e b a te d  
a t  le n g th  in  th e  c o n te x t  o f  c o n te m p o ra ry  p o li t ic a l  c o n tro v e rs ie s .269 T h is  
h a s  le d  to  th e  a d v a n c e m e n t o f  th e  fu r th e r ,  m o re  sw e e p in g  c la im  th a t  
a ll c o m m u n ic a tio n s  b e tw e e n  em p lo y e e s  in  th e  e x e c u tiv e  b r a n c h  m u s t 
b e  p e r  se  im m u n e  f ro m  th e  in v e s tig a tio n s  o f  C o n g re s s  in  o r d e r  th a t
of Representatives all proper information which the House shall deem neces­
sary to a due discharge of its constitutional obligations and functions, yet it 
becomes me, in defense of the Constitution and laws of the United States, to 
protect the executive department from all encroachment on its powers, rights, 
and duties. In my judgment a compliance with the resolution which has been 
transmitted to me would be a surrender of duties and powers which the Con­
stitution has conferred exclusively on the Executive . . . .  Id.
267. 5 id. at 615.
268. 7 id. at 362 (emphasis added).
269. In one such debate Congressman Richard Nixon, a member of the House 
Un-American Activities Committee, responded to President Truman’s refusal to re­
lease information pertaining to the loyalty of a prominent government scientist:
The point has been made that the President of the United States has issued 
an order that none of this information can be released to the Congress and 
that therefore the Congress has no right to question the judgment of the Presi­
dent in making that decision. .......
I say that that proposition cannot stand from a constitutional standpoint 
or on the basis of the merits for this very good reason. That would mean that 
the President could have arbitrarily issued an Executive order in the Myers 
case, the Teapot Dome case, or any other case denying the Congress of the 
United States information it needed to conduct an investigation of the execu­
tive department and the Congress would have no right to question his decision.
Any such order of the President can be questioned by the Congress as to 
whether or not that order is justified on the merits. 94 Cong. Reg. 4783 
(1948).
fe d e ra l  e m p lo y e e s  c a n  “b e  c o m p le te ly  c a n d id  in  a d v is in g  w ith  e a c h  
o th e r .” 270 N e v e rth e le ss , th e  lo g ic  a n d  in te r n a l  c o n s is te n c y  o f  th is  p o s i­
t io n  h a s  b e e n  s h a rp ly  c r i t ic iz e d .271 I t  is d if f ic u lt  t o  im a g in e  a  n e e d  fo r  
c a n d o r  b e tw e e n  tw o  m e m b e rs  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  b r a n c h  w h ic h  is  so  p r o ­
fo u n d  as to  im p e d e  C o n g re s s ’ a b ili ty  to  u til iz e  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
p ro c e sse s  to  p r o te c t  a g a in s t  th e  a b u s e  o f  p u b lic  o ffic e .
N e i th e r  th e  h is to r ic a l  p re c e d e n ts  n o r  th e  d a y - to -d a y  p re s su re s  
u p o n  th e  e x e c u t iv e  b r a n c h  c a n  s u p p o r t  a  c la im  o f  a b s o lu te  im m u n ity  
f o r  p r e s id e n tia l  d o c u m e n ts  o r  te s tim o n y  b a s e d  u p o n  th e  d o c t r in e  o f  
s e p a ra t io n  o f  p o w e rs , w h e n  s u c h  m a te r ia ls  a r e  s o u g h t to  b e  w ith h e ld  
f ro m  C o n g re s s  a c tin g  p u r s u a n t  t o  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p o w e rs . T h e re fo re ,  
w h ile  th e  m o s t  r e s p e c ta b le  c la im  to  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  c a n  p ro b a b ly  
b e  b a s e d  u p o n  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  s e p a r a t io n  o f  p o w e rs , t h a t  c la im  su re ly  
fo u n d e r s  in  th e  im p e a c h m e n t c o n te x t s in c e  im p e a c h m e n t  w a s  c o n ­
c e iv e d  a s  a n  “ e x c e p t io n  to  [the] p r in c ip le ” 272 o f  s e p a r a t io n  o f  p o w e rs .
B . W ith h o ld in g  I n f o r m a t io n  W h e n  th e  P u b l ic  I n te r e s t  R e q u ir e s
E x e c u t iv e  S e c r e c y
T h e  c o u r t  in  N ix o n  v . S ir ic a 273 c h a ra c te r iz e d  th e  p r e d o m in a n t  b a s is  
o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  as o n e  o f  p u b lic  p o lic y ,274 n o t  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  
m a n d a te ,  a n d  th is  v ie w  is in  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  th e  w e ig h t o f p re c e d e n t .  
T h u s ,  th e  p r iv ile g e  o f  se c re c y  is  n o t  im p re g n a b le  a n d  m a y  b e  o v e r ­
r id d e n  b y  a  s u p e r io r  p u b lic  p o lic y  in te re s t ,  a n d  i t  w ill b e  o v e r r id d e n  
w h e re v e r  a  c o m p e tin g  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  in te re s t,  s u c h  as im p e a c h m e n t,  is  
p re s e n t.
F r o m  th e  e a r l ie s t  d a y s  o f th e  R e p u b lic ,  th e  d o c t r in e  o f  e x e c u tiv e  
p r iv ile g e  h a s  b e e n  a s so c ia te d  w ith  a  c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  p u b lic  p r o te c t io n  
r a th e r  th a n  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p re ro g a tiv e .  I n  1 7 9 2 , f o r  e x a m p le , w h e n  
W a s h in g to n  w a s  P re s id e n t ,  th e  H o u s e  o f  R e p re s e n ta tiv e s  re q u e s te d  
m il i ta ry  p a p e r s  p e r ta in in g  to  M a jo r  G e n e ra l  S t. C la i r ’s u n su c c e s s fu l e x ­
p e d i t io n  a g a in s t  t h e  In d ia n s .  S in ce  a ll  o f  th e  p a p e r s  w e re  g iv e n  to  
C o n g re s s , th e  te n u o u s  p re c e d e n t ia l  v a lu e  o f  th is  t r a n s a c t io n  re s ts  o n  
J e f fe r s o n ’s n o te s  o f  a  c a b in e t  m e e tin g  d isc u ss in g  th e  c irc u m s ta n c e s  
u n d e r  w h ic h  n o n d is c lo s u re  w o u ld  b e  p r o p e r :
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270. Executive Priv ilege 234. This argument appears in an executive directive 
reprinted in 100 Cong. Rec. 6621 (1954). See generally Executive P riv ilege 234-35.
271. Executive Priv ilege 164. See also United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 
(1974).
272. 1 A nnals o f  Cong., supra note 9.
273. 487 F.2d 700, 713, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
274. Public policy, for these purposes, will protect national security and a neces­
sary degree of confidentiality and candor in presidential conversation.
We had all considered and were of one mind. 1. that the house was 
an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries. 2. that they might 
call for papers generally. 3. that the Executive ought to communicate 
such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to refuse those 
the disclosure of which would injure the public.
It was agreed in this case that there was not a paper which might not 
be properly produced. . . .275
T h is  il lu s tra te s  th e  p o in t  th a t  th e  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  o f  se c re c y  c a n  o n ly  
b e  a s se r te d  u p o n  so m e  sh o w in g  o f  in ju ry  to  th e  p u b lic  g o o d . T r a d i t io n ­
a lly , th e  c o u r ts  a n d  C o n g re s s  h a v e  re sp e c tfu lly  p r e f a c e d  re q u e s ts  fo r  
p r e s id e n tia l  in fo rm a tio n  w ith  th e  d e c la ra t io n  th a t  s u c h  m a te r ia ls  a r e  
“p re s u m p tiv e ly  p r iv ile g e d ,” a n d  th e y  h a v e  in v ite d  th e  w ith h o ld in g  b y  
th e  E x e c u tiv e  o f  a n y  m a te r ia ls  w h e n e v e r  th e i r  r e le a s e  w o u ld  n o t  b e  
in  th e  p u b lic  in te re s t .276 T h e  n e e d  f o r  s u s ta in in g  th a t  p r iv ile g e  o f  
p re s id e n tia l  c o n f id e n tia l i ty ,  h o w e v e r, h a s  o n ly  b e e n  r e s p e c te d  w h e re  
s o m e  e x p lic i t  p u b lic  g o o d  is sh o w n  to  b e  je o p a rd iz e d  b y  d isc lo su re . I n  
th e  B u r r  t r ia l ,  fo r  e x a m p le , th e  c o u r t  s u b p o e n a e d  c e r ta in  le t te rs  in  
J e f fe r s o n ’s c o n tro l  w h ic h  B u r r  d e e m e d  e s se n tia l to  h is  d e fe n se  a n d  r e ­
q u ire d  th a t  th e y  b e  p r o d u c e d  u n le ss  i t  c o u ld  b e  s h o w n  th a t  th e  le tte rs  
c o n ta in e d  m a tte r s  w h ic h , in  th e  p u b lic  in te re s t  o r  se c u r ity , o u g h t  n o t  
to  b e  d isc lo se d :
There is certainly nothing before the Court, which shews, that the letter 
in question contains any matter, the disclosure of which would endanger 
the public safety. If it does contain any matter which it would be im­
prudent to disclose, which it is not the wish of the Executive to disclose, 
such matter, if it be not immediately and essentially applicable to the 
point, will of course, be suppressed.277
C o n s e q u e n tly , th e  b u r d e n  o f  p r o o f  w as  p la c e d  u p o n  th e  E x e c u tiv e  
se e k in g  to  ra is e  a  d e fe n se  o f  im m u n ity  b a s e d  u p o n  a  n e e d  f o r  se c re c y  
o r  c o n f id e n tia lity . A c c o rd in g ly , J e f f e r s o n  re s p o n d e d  to  th e  s u b ­
p o e n a ,278 re se rv in g  o n ly  th e  r ig h t  to  w ith h o ld  m a te r ia ls  w h ic h  w e re  im ­
275. Berger has argued that Jefferson misinterpreted English precedent in suggest­
ing that the Executive had authority in certain circumstances to refuse to provide 
presidential papers. Executive Privilege 169-70.
276. The House request, for example, for materials involving the Jay Treaty in­
structions excepted “such of said papers as any existing negotiation may render im­
proper to be disclosed.” 5 A nnals o f Cong., supra note 261, at 759. The House re­
quest for presidential papers bearing on the Burr conspiracy also excepted such mate­
rials as Jefferson “may deem the public welfare to require not to be disclosed.” Ex­
ecu tive Privilege 179.
277. 1 T. C arpen ter, The T ria l o f  C o lo n e l A aron B u rr  133 (1807), cited in 
Berger The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 Y ale  L.J. 1111, 1114 (1974).
278. Berger cited references to commentators who have stated that Jefferson re­
fused to respond to Chief Justice Marshall’s subpoena. Executive Privilege 1112.
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m a te r ia l  to  th e  a c tio n  s u b  j u d k e ,  b y  t r a n s m it t in g  a ll e v id e n c e  re q u e s te d , 
“ e x c e p tin g  s u c h  p a r ts  th e re o f  as a re , in  m y  o p in io n , n o t  m a te r ia l  fo r  
th e  p u rp o s e s  o f  ju s t ic e , fo r  th e  d e fe n se  o f  th e  a c c u s e d , o r  p e r t in e n t  
to  th e  is su e  . . . .  T h e  a c c u ra c y  o f  th is  o p in io n , I  a m  w il l in g  to  r e f e r  
to  th e  ju d g m e n t  o f  th e  C o u r t ,  b y  su b m itt in g  th e  o r ig in a l  le t te r  fo r  its  
in s p e c t io n .” 279 T h e  B u r r  t r ia l  p ro v id e s  p r e c e d e n t  f o r  ju d ic ia l  p o w e r  
to  s u b p o e n a  p re s id e n t ia l  p a p e rs  s u b je c t  to  th e  l im ita t io n  th a t  m a te r ia ls  
su rv e y e d  b y  th e  c o u r t  w h ic h  a re  ir re le v a n t  to  th e  c a se  u n d e r  a d ju d ic a ­
t io n  m a y  p ro p e r ly  b e  w ith h e ld  a n d  s u p p re s s e d  o n  a  c la im  o f  p riv ile g e . 
T h e  o n u s  o f  p r o o f  ju s tify in g  a n y  b r o a d e r  c la im  o f  c o n f id e n tia lity , 
h o w e v e r, c le a r ly  fa lls  u p o n  th e  E x e c u tiv e .
T h e  c o u r ts  in  b o th  N ix o n  v. S ir ic a  a n d  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. N ix o n  
fo llo w e d  th e  B u r r  p r e c e d e n t  b y  r e q u ir in g  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t  p ro v id e  
m a te r ia ls  “e s se n tia l to  th e  ju s t ic e  o f  th e  [p e n d in g  c r im in a l]  c a se .” 280 
T h e  c o u r t  in  N ix o n  v. S ir ic a  re c o g n iz e d  th a t  w h ile  i t  o u g h t  to  “ sh o w  
re s p e c t  f o r  th e  P re s id e n t  in  w e ig h in g  th o s e  re a so n s  [fo r  n o n d isc lo su re ]
. . . th e  u l t im a te  d e c is io n  r e m a in e d  w ith  th e  c o u r t .” 281 I n  U n ite d  
S ta te s  v. N ix o n ,  th e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  fo llo w e d  th e  B u r r  c a se  in  h o ld in g  
th a t ,  w h ile  p re s id e n t ia l  d o c u m e n ts  w e re  “p re s u m p tiv e ly  p r iv ile g e d ,” 
th e  c la im  “ c a n n o t  p re v a i l  o v e r  th e  f u n d a m e n ta l  d e m a n d s  o f  d u e  p ro c e ss  
o f  la w  in  th e  f a i r  a d m in is t ra t io n  o f  c r im in a l  ju s t ic e . T h e  g e n e ra liz e d  
a s se r tio n  o f  p r iv ile g e  m u s t y ie ld  to  th e  d e m o n s tr a te d ,  sp e c if ic  n e e d  fo r  
e v id e n c e  in  a  p e n d in g  t r ia l .” 282 A lth o u g h  th e  N ix o n  c a se s  a ro se  o u t  
o f  a  d is p u te  ex c lu s iv e ly  w ith in  th e  e x e c u tiv e  b r a n c h ,  th e  lo g ic  o f  th e se  
d e c is io n s  is e q u a lly  p e rsu a s iv e  w h e n  a p p lie d  to  c o n g re s s io n a l re q u e s ts . 
W h e re  th e  P re s id e n t  c la im s  a  p r iv ile g e  o f se c re c y  to  w ith h o ld  m a te r ia l  
in f o rm a tio n  f ro m  e i th e r  th e  c o u r ts  o r  C o n g re s s , fu n c tio n in g  w ith in  th e i r  
r e sp e c tiv e ly  m a n d a te d  sp h e re s , th e  P re s id e n t’s c la im  m u s t b e  m a d e  r e ­
sp o n s ib ly  a n d  s u b je c t  to  p r im a  fa c ie  rev ie w . I n  th e  ca se  o f  p e n d in g  
c r im in a l  tr ia ls ,  th e  c o u r ts  h a v e  p ro v id e d  th e  p r o c e d u re  o f  in  c a m e r a  
in s p e c t io n  o f  p r e s id e n tia l  p a p e r s  as a  m e a n s  o f  re v ie w in g  s u c h  a  c la im  
o f  p r iv ile g e , b u t  in  th e  c a se  o f  c o n g re s s io n a l in q u ir ie s ,  th e  p ro c e d u re  
is  p re s e n tly  u n c le a r .  S in c e  th e  p u b lic  in te re s t  in v o lv e d  in  c o n g re s s io n a l 
in q u ir ie s , p a r t ic u la r ly  im p e a c h m e n t in q u ir ie s , is a t  le a s t  as g r e a t  as th e  
in te re s ts  in v o lv e d  in  th e  p ro m o t io n  o f  c r im in a l  ju s t ic e , C o n g re s s  to o  
sh o u ld  e s ta b lish  a  s im ila r  re v ie w in g  p r o to c o l  w ith  se le c te d  le a d e rs  a c ­
279. Id. at 1116 (emphasis added), quoting 3 T. C arpen ter, supra note 277, at 30.
280. United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3110 (1974), citing United States
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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c o m p lis h in g  a n  in  c a m e r a  in s p e c t io n  to  re v ie w  c la im s  o f  c o n f id e n tia l i ty  
in  o p p o s it io n  to  c o n g re s s io n a l re q u e s ts  fo r  p e r s o n s  a n d  p a p e rs .
C . W ith h o ld in g  I n f o r m a tio n  o n  th e  B a s is  o f  a  S ta tu to r y  P r iv i le g e
S ta tu te s  p e r m i t t in g  c o n f id e n tia l i ty  h a v e  b e e n  in v o k e d  in  s u p p o r t  
o f  a n  e x e c u tiv e  c la im  o f  p r iv ile g e  u n d e r  l im ite d  c irc u m s ta n c e s  b u t  
n e v e r  in  o p p o s it io n  to  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss . T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  th e  
F re e d o m  o f  I n fo r m a tio n  A c t283 is  to  m a k e  a v a ila b le  to  “ a n y  p e r s o n ” 
u p o n  r e q u e s t  g o v e rn m e n ta l  re c o rd s  n o t  fa ll in g  w ith in  c e r ta in  sp e c if ie d  
e x c e p t io n s ,284 a n d  to  a  c e r ta in  e x te n t,  th e  A c t  a t te m p ts  to  c o d ify  th e  
d o c tr in e  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e .285 B u t  th e  A c t  e x p lic i tly  s ta te s : “T h is  
s e c tio n  is n o t  a u th o r i ty  to  w ith h o ld  in f o rm a tio n  f ro m  C o n g re s s .” 286 
F u r th e rm o re ,  s in c e  th e  c o u r ts  h a v e  g e n e ra lly  d e c lin e d  to  a b d ic a te  c o n ­
t r o l  o v e r  e v id e n c e  to  th e  c a p r ic e  o f  e x e c u t iv e  o f f ic e rs ,287 a n d  s in c e  it 
c a n n o t  b e  c o n c lu d e d  th a t  C o n g re s s  h a s  re l in q u is h e d  a n y  o f  its  e x t r a ­
o r d in a r y  p o w e r  to  im p e a c h  th e  P re s id e n t  s im p ly  b y  h a v in g  re c o g n iz e d  
th e  d o c t r in e  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  in  g e n e ra l  in fo rm a tio n -a c c e s s  le g is ­
la t io n ,  o n e  m u s t  c o n c lu d e  th a t  a  c la im  o f  p r iv ile g e  a s s e r te d  u n d e r  th e  
F re e d o m  o f  I n fo r m a t io n  A c t  o r  a n y  o th e r  s u c h  s ta tu te  is n o t  a p p l ic a b le
283. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
284. EPA v. Mink 410 U.S. 73 (1973). The Supreme Court held that where gov­
ernment documents are clearly classified under the statute even an in camera pro­
ceeding was improper. Id. at 84. For a discussion of Mink, see Comment, D e­
velopments Under the Freedom of Information Act— 1973, 1974 Duke L.J. 251, 252-57.
285. Committee on Civil Rights of the New York City Bar, supra note 245, at 182. 
Prior to the passage of the Freedom of Information Act, cases invoking the 
privilege were often based upon R.S. 161 (5 U.S.C. § 22, now 5 U.S.C. § 301), 
which provided that department heads were authorized to prescribe regulations, 
not inconsistent with law, for the custody and use of governmental records. Id. 
at 205 n. 19.
See, e.g., Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Boske v. Commingore, 111 U.S. 459 
(1900); Hubbard v. Southern Ry., 179 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Ga. 1959).
286. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970). The Act exempts nine types of information from 
its coverage. The doctrine of executive privilege is apparently codified in exemptions 
(1), (,5) and (7). Exemption (1) includes materials “specifically required by Execu­
tive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy.” 
Exemption (5) includes “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which 
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the 
agency.” This exemption relates to law enforcement and civil and criminal discovery. 
Exemption (7) is essentially the same as (5) differing only in that (5) covers cases 
in which the government is a party and (7) extends to all contexts involving the dis­
covery of law enforcement investigatory files. See generally Comment, supra note 
284, at 252-59, 274-80, 284-88.
287. See, e.g., Tennessean Newspapers Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972); 
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Harden, 444 F.2d
21 (4th Cir. 1971). But see Consumers Union of United States v. Veterans Admin­
istration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y, 1969), dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d 
O r. 1971).
to  c o n g re s s io n a l in v e s tig a tio n s , e s p e c ia lly  w h e re  th e  in v e s tig a tio n  is 
in c id e n t  to  a n  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g .
I n  su m , th e  a s s e r t io n  th a t  th e  E x e c u tiv e  h a s  a n  a b s o lu te  d is c re tio n  
to  w ith h o ld  m a te r ia ls  f ro m  b o th  th e  C o n g re s s  a n d  th e  c o u r ts  o n  a n y  
b as is  h a s  b e e n  s h a t te re d  b y  b o th  th e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  in  U n ite d  S ta te s  
v . N ix o n 288 a n d  th e  J u d ic ia ry  C o m m itte e  o f  C o n g re s s  b y  its  v o te  o n  
th e  th i r d  a r t ic le  o f  im p e a c h m e n t .289 T h is  re je c t io n  o f  e x e c u tiv e  
p r iv ile g e , ta k e n  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  fo rm a l c o n g re s s io n a l r e a c t io n  to  
e x e c u tiv e  (u n d e c la re d )  w a r ,290 to  ex e c u tiv e  a c ts  a p p ro a c h in g  th e  
m o n a rc h ic a l  t r a d i t io n  o f  b e in g  a b o v e  th e  la w ,291 to  e x e c u tiv e  c o r r u p t io n  
o f  g o v e rn m e n t a g e n c ie s ,292 a n d  to  c a m p a ig n  f in a n c in g  a b u s e s ,293 c lo ses  
a n  e r a  o f  u n c h a lle n g e d  p r e s id e n tia l  a s c e n d a n c y .
V I .  Excluding E vidence on Other Constitutional or 
Evidentiary Grounds
J u s t  a s  a  c la im  o f  e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e  m a y  n o t  b e  e x te n d e d  t o  b a r  
c o n g re s s io n a l in v e s tig a tio n  o f  e x e c u tiv e  w ro n g d o in g , so  m a n y  o th e r  
p r o c e d u ra l  a n d  c iv il p r iv ile g e s  ta k e  o n  a  d if fe re n t  le g a l m e a n in g  w ith in  
th e  c o n te x t  o f  a n  im p e a c h m e n t  tr ia l .  C o n fu s io n  o f  th e  p o l i t ic a l  ro le  o f  
th e  im p e a c h m e n t  t r ia l  w ith  th e  ju r id ic a l  ro le  o f  a  t r ia l  b y  ju r y  m ig h t 
su g g e s t th e  n e e d  to  t r a n s p o s e  th e  p re v a il in g  c o n c e p ts  o f  p r o c e d u ra l  o r  
s u b s ta n tiv e  d u e  p ro c e s s  f ro m  th e  ju d ic ia l  s e t t in g  to  th e  im p e a c h m e n t 
p ro c e s s . D u e  p ro c e s s , h o w e v e r, is  n o t  s im p ly  th e  e q u iv a le n t  o f  b e in g  
f a ir ;  s u c h  a  s im p lis tic  tr a n s p o s it io n  w o u ld  n o t  b e  p ro p e r .  N e v e r th e le s s , 
s u c h  c o n c e p ts  a s  d u e  p ro c e s s  a n d  e v id e n tia ry  p r iv ile g e s  m a y  in  th e  
f u tu re  p la y  a n  im p o r ta n t  ro le  in  e s ta b l is h in g  th e  e v id e n c e  n e c e s sa ry  fo r  
im p e a c h m e n t  a n d  re m o v a l f ro m  o ffic e , e sp e c ia lly  as c o n c re te  e v id e n c e  
lik e  ta p e  re c o rd in g s  o f  in c r im in a t in g  c o n v e rs a tio n s  m a y  n o t  b e  a v a ila b le  
f o r  f u tu r e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g s . N o  d o u b t  th e  f if th  a m e n d m e n t 
r ig h ts ,  th e  f o u r th  a m e n d m e n t p ro te c tio n s ,  a n d  th e  e v id e n tia ry  p riv ile g e s  
a f fo rd e d  a n  a c c u s e d  o r  te s tify in g  w itn e sse s  m a y  b e c o m e  a  d e b a te d  issu e  
in  f u tu r e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g s .
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288. 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
289. See A rtic le s  o f  Im peachm ent art. Ill, app. C infra.
290. In order to limit the Executive’s heretofore untrammeled power to carry on 
undeclared war, Congress has passed the War Powers Act. Act of Nov. 8, 1973, 87 
Stat. 555 (codified at 50U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-48 (Supp. 1974)).
291. See A rtic le s  o f  Im peachm ent art. I, app. C infra.
292. See A rtic le s  o f Im peachm ent art. II, app. C infra.
293. In an attempt to ameliorate presidential campaign financing abuses Congress 
recently has enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. Act 
of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443.
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T h e  a p p lic a b il i ty  o f  c o n c e p ts  o f  d u e  p ro c e s s  is im m e d ia te ly  su g ­
g e s te d  b y  th e  m e re  p r o s p e c t  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t’s ta k in g  v a lu a b le  
p e r s o n a l  r ig h ts ,  o ffic e s , a n d  e m p lo y m e n t f ro m  th e  c itiz e n s  w h o  h o ld  
th e m .294 T h e  f if th  a m e n d m e n t w o u ld  a p p e a r  to  p r o te c t  p u b lic  o ffic e rs  
f ro m  a n y  ta k in g  o f  o ff ic e  o r  in ju ry  to  r e p u ta t io n  o r  f u tu re  o p p o r tu n i ty ,  
e x c e p t u p o n  th e  c o n d i t io n  th a t  i t  is a c c o m p lish e d  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  r e ­
q u ire m e n ts  o f  d u e  p ro c e s s ,295 s in c e  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  w o u ld  se em  to  
a u th o r iz e  d ism issa l f ro m  o ffic e  o n ly  u p o n  a  sh o w in g  o f  g o o d  c a u s e .296 
H o w e v e r , a  P re s id e n t  w h o  a t te m p ts  to  in v o k e  th e  d u e  p ro c e s s  c la u se  
o f  th e  f if th  a m e n d m e n t  to  im p o s e  u p o n  th e  C o n g re s s  a  sp e c if ic  s ta n d a r d  
o f  ju s t ic e  to  b e  o b se rv e d  in  th e  c o n d u c t  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g  
m a y  fa il fo r  th e  fo llo w in g  re a so n s . F ir s t ,  th e  B ill o f  R ig h ts  w as  a d o p te d  
to  p r o te c t  p r iv a te  c itiz e n s  f ro m  e n c ro a c h m e n ts  u p o n  th e i r  l ib e r tie s  b y  
p o w e r fu l fe d e ra l  o ff ic e rs ; n e v e r  d o es  th e re  a p p e a r  a n y  in d ic a t io n  in  th e  
w ritin g s  o f  J e f f e r s o n  o r  th o s e  w h o  a d v o c a te d  th e  r a t i f ic a t io n  o f  th e  f if th  
a m e n d m e n t th a t  th e  d u e  p ro c e s s  c la u se  s h o u ld  a lso  r e g u la te  th e  in te r ­
r e la t io n s h ip s  b e tw e e n  th o se  fe d e ra l  o f f ic e rs  o r ,  in d e e d , c o n s t i tu te  a n  
u l t im a te  p r in c ip le  su p e r im p o s e d  u p o n  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  s e p a ra t io n  o f  
p o w e rs  o th e rw ise  d e f in e d  in  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n .  M o re o v e r ,  c e r ta in  
p r e s id e n tia l  c la im s, su c h  as th e  a s s e r t io n  o f  e x e c u t iv e  p r iv ile g e , r e s t  e x ­
c lu s iv e ly  u p o n  th e  a s s u m p tio n  th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l  ra is in g  th e m  d o e s  
so  a s  P re s id e n t  a n d  n o t  in  h is  c a p a c i ty  a s  a  p r iv a te  c itiz e n . T h u s , in  
o rd e r  to  in v o k e  th e  p e r s o n a l  p ro te c t io n s  o f  th e  f if th  a m e n d m e n t,  th e  
P re s id e n t  m u s t ta k e  a  p o s it io n  th a t  w o u ld  b e  in c o n s is te n t  w ith  a n y  p r o ­
te c tio n s  t h a t  h e  c la im e d  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  s ta tu s  o f  h is  o ffic e . S ec o n d , 
th e re  is n o  s im p le  c o n c e p t o f  d u e  p ro c e s s  p e r  se. R a th e r ,  th e  s ta n d a r d
294. See Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 497, 501 (W.D.N.C. 1973); cf. Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
295. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cafeteria 
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951).
296. By enumerating specific crimes and circumstances against which impeach­
ment may ensue, the Constitution would appear to incorporate a “good cause” require­
ment for dismissal. Moreover, the phrase “high Crimes or Misdemeanors” does not 
nullify that requirement through any vagueness, as the following historical analysis 
demonstrates. The English impeachment of Warren Hastings for high crimes and 
misdemeanors was voted shortly before the beginning of the Constitutional Conven­
tion, and his trial was referred to in the debates. See R. B erger 3 n.15, 94; 2 Records 
550; 1 J. S to ry  § 799, at 583. Story asserts that “what are and what are not high 
crimes and misdemeanors is to be ascertained by a recurrence to English law.” In 
the Swayne trial, it was argued that the phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” 
is a “term of art,” of fixed meaning in English parliamentary law and transplanted 
to the Constitution in unchangeable significance. See 3 Hinds’ § 2009; Firmage, note 
14 supra, at 682.
o f  d u e  p ro c e s s  w h ic h  is r e q u ir e d  b y  a n y  g iv e n  s i tu a t io n  is d e te rm in e d  
in d e p e n d e n tly  b y  re fe re n c e  to  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  r ig h t  w h ic h  is s o u g h t 
to  b e  p r o te c te d .297 J u s t  as th e  p r o c e d u re  w h ic h  is  a d e q u a te  f o r  th e  
v in d ic a t io n  o f  w e lfa re  r ig h ts  is n o t  th e  sa m e  a s  th a t  w h ic h  is r e q u ir e d  
to  p ro v e  a  fe lo n y  c h a rg e ,298 so  o n e  c a n n o t  im p o r t  in to  a n d  a p p r o p r ia te  
fo r  u se  in  -the im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss  a n y  g iv e n  s ta n d a r d  o f  d u e  p ro c e ss  
w h ic h  h a p p e n s  to  a t ta c h  to  a n o th e r  g iv e n  su b s ta n tiv e  r ig h t  in  o u r  
so c ie ty . T h e  m e a n in g  w h ic h  d u e  p ro c e s s  th e re fo r e  w ill  h a v e  in  th e  
im p e a c h m e n t c o n te x t m u s t  b e  fo u n d e d  u p o n  a  w id e - ra n g in g  a n a ly s is  
o f  th e  to ta l  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s ; i t  m u s t  n o t  m e re ly  re f le c t  th e  in te r ­
es ts  o f  a n y  o n e  o f f ic e r  w h o  is s e e k in g  t o  r e ta in  h is  o ffic e . T h ir d ,  th e  
im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s  is its e lf  a  w e ll-d e fin e d  p o li t ic a l  p ro c e e d in g  w h ic h  
o p e ra te s  o n ly  u p o n  th e  o b s e rv a n c e  o f  i ts  e s ta b l is h e d  ru le s  a n d  c o n ­
s tra in ts .  T h e s e  p ro v is io n s  p ro v id e  a m p le  p r o c e d u ra l  p ro te c t io n ,  a f f o rd ­
in g  a n  a c c u s e d  th e  r ig h ts  o f  n o t ic e  a n d  h e a r in g  w h ic h  c h a ra c te r iz e  th e  
e s se n c e  o f  d u e  p ro c e s s .209 N o  ta k in g  o f  o ff ic e  o c c u rs  b e fo re  th is  
e la b o r a te  p ro c e d u re  h a s  b e e n  c a r r ie d  o u t ,  a n d  e v e n  a f te r  i t  h a s  b e e n  
c a r r ie d  o u t  th e  re m o v e d  o f f ic e r  h a s  a d d i t io n a l ,  th o u g h  lim ite d  o p p o r ­
tu n it ie s  to  c le a r  h is  n a m e  a n d  r e p u ta t io n  in  su b se q u e n t a c tio n s  in  th e  
c o u r ts .300 F in a lly ,  s in c e  th e  to ta l  sc h e m e  w h ic h  is e m b e d d e d  in  th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n  a r t ic u la te s  b o th  th e  r ig h ts  o f  o ffic e  a n d  th e  m a n n e r  in  
w h ic h  a  p e r s o n ’s te n u re  o f  o ff ic e  te rm in a te s ,  th e  in e s c a p a b le  c o n c lu s io n  
is th a t  a n y  p e r s o n  c la im in g  th e  r ig h ts  o f  p u b l ic  o ff ic e  a n d  e n jo y in g  th e  
p a r t ic u la r  p ro te c tio n s  o f  th e  re m o v a l p ro c e s s  as d e f in e d  in  th e  C o n s ti­
tu t io n  c a n n o t  b e  h e a r d  a t  th e  sa m e  tim e  to  c o n te s t  th e  “ c o n s t i tu t io n ­
a lity ” o f  a n  im p e a c h m e n t c o n d u c te d  p e r s u a n t  to  th e  te rm s  o f  th a t  
d o c u m e n t. A s  M r. J u s t ic e  R e h n q u is t  h a s  re c e n tly  s ta te d :  “ [W ]h e re  
th e  g r a n t  o f  a  s u b s ta n tiv e  r ig h t  is in e x tr ic a b ly  in te r tw in e d  w ith  th e  lim it­
a t io n s  o n  th e  p ro c e d u re s  w h ic h  a re  to  b e  e m p lo y e d  in  d e te rm in in g  th a t  
r ig h t,  [o n e  c la im in g  r ig h ts  u n d e r  th a t  g ra n t]  m u s t ta k e  th e  b i t te r  w ith  
th e  sw e e t.” 301 I n  th e  c a se  o f  a  p re s id e n t ia l  im p e a c h m e n t e sp e c ia lly , 
s in c e  th e  p r o c e d u ra l  re la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  o ffic e  o f  th e  P re s id e n t  
a n d  th e  o th e r  b r a n c h e s  o f  g o v e rn m e n t is u n d e n ia b ly  in te r tw in e d  w ith
297. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 
541-42 (1971). “The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible 
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Cafeteria Local 473 
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S 134, 154-55 
(1974) (Rehnquist, J.).
298. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971).
299. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 360 
U.S. 474 (1959); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
300. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1970).
301. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.).
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th e  su b s ta n tiv e  c r e a t io n  o f  th e  o ffic e , th e  p r o c e d u ra l  r ig h ts  w h ic h  a t ta c h  
to  th a t  o ff ic e  a re  to  b e  d e f in e d  e x c lu s iv e ly  b y  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p r o ­
v is io n s  a s  th e y  a p p e a r  e x p lic i tly  in  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n . T h e se  p ro v is io n s  
d o  n o t  in c o rp o r a te  a  ju d ic ia l ly  d e f in e d  d u e  p ro c e s s  r e q u ir e m e n t  in to
H o w e v e r , th is  a r g u m e n t  a g a in s t  th e  a p p l ic a b i l i ty  o f  th e  d u e  p r o ­
cess c la u se  o f  th e  f if th  a m e n d m e n t sh o u ld  n o t  le a d  to  th e  c o n c lu s io n  
th a t  th e  H o u s e  a n d  th e  S e n a te  h a v e  th e  p o w e r  to  d e a l  a rb i t r a r i ly  w ith  
th e  im p e a c h m e n t p o w e r . T h e  c o n c e p t o f  d u e  p ro c e s s  is  im p o r ta n t  to  
th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g , n o t  b e c a u s e  i t  a p p e a r s  in  th e  f if th  
a m e n d m e n t,  b u t  b e c a u s e  i t  p e rv a d e s  th is  c o u n try ’s c o n c e p t o f  ju s tic e  
a n d  th e re fo re  a c ts  as a  p o w e r fu l  p o li t ic a l  c o n s tr a in t  o n  c o n g re s sm e n  
w h o  p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  im p e a c h m e n t in v e s tig a tio n s  a n d  tr ia l .  C o n s e ­
q u e n t ly , w h ile  th e  S e n a te  m a y  v o te  o n  a n  a d  h o c  b a s is  to  o v e r ru le  p a r t ­
ic u la r  e v id e n tia ry  o r  p r o c e d u ra l  ru le s  w h ic h  c o n v e n tio n a lly  a re  fo llo w e d  
in  th e  c o u r ts ,302 i t  is  h ig h ly  u n lik e ly  th a t  th e  S e n a te  w o u ld  d e n y  a n  im ­
p e a c h e d  c iv il o f f ic e r  w e ll- re c o g n iz e d  p r o c e d u ra l  s a fe g u a rd s  e x c e p t in  
r a r e  ca se s . A s  th e  h is to ry  o f  p r io r  im p e a c h m e n t tr ia ls  h a s  sh o w n , th e  
su b s ta n c e  o f  d u e  p ro c e s s  c u r re n tly  re c o g n iz e d  in  ju d ic ia l  p ro c e e d in g s  
g e n e ra lly  w ill b e  r e c o g n iz e d  in  im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e d in g s , w ith  th e  
s in g le  c a v e a t  th a t  a  p a r ty  a s se r tin g  th e  p r iv ile g e  o r  r ig h t  is  s u b je c t  to  
th e  c o n c e p ts  o f  ju s t ic e  h e ld  b y  c o n g re ssm e n , a n d  d e r iv a tiv e ly  b y  th e ir
T h is  sa m e  lin e  o f  re a s o n in g  a p p lie s  to  th e  fu ll  p a n o p ly  o f  r ig h ts  
a n d  p r iv ile g e s  w h ic h  a n  a c c u s e d  o f f ic e r  m ig h t a t te m p t to  d e r iv e  f ro m  
th e  fo u r th  a m e n d m e n t o r  f ro m  th e  c o m m o n  la w . C o n s id e r  w h a t  w o u ld  
h a p p e n  if  th e  C o n g re s s  w e re  to  a u th o r iz e  a n d  c o n d u c t  a n  u n la w fu l 
s e a rc h  o f  th e  W h ite  H o u se  to  g a in  p o sse ss io n  o f  a  P re s id e n t’s p e r s o n a l 
p a p e rs .  W h ile  th e  P re s id e n t  c o u ld  e a s ily  su p p re s s  th a t  e v id e n c e  in  a  
s u b s e q u e n t t r ia l  o f  h is  c r im in a l  g u i l t  in  th e  c o u r ts ,  h e  c o u ld  n o t  c o m p e l 
its  su p p re s s io n  b e fo r e  th e  S e n a te  th r o u g h  th e  fo u r th  a m e n d m e n t. H is  
o n ly  re c o u rs e  w o u ld  b e  to  a p p e a l  to  th e  c o n s c ie n c e  o f  th e  C o n g re s s  
a n d  to  th e  p u b lic  c o m m itm e n t to  th e  ru le  o f  la w . I f  t h a t  a p p e a l  w e re  
u n su c c e s s fu l , h e  m ig h t se e k  m o n e y  d a m a g e s  d ir e c tly  u p o n  th e  v io la tio n  
o f  h is  fo u r th  a m e n d m e n t r ig h ts  w h ic h  h e  h a d  s u f fe re d ,303 b u t  b e y o n d  
th a t ,  i t  w o u ld  e x c e e d  th e  p o w e rs  o f  th e  c o u r ts  e i th e r  to  in te rv e n e  in  
th e  c o n d u c t  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t t r ia l  o r  t o  re v e rs e  its  v e rd ic t  f o r  an y  
p e rc e iv e d  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  in f irm ity .304 E v e n  le ss  lik e ly  is  th e  p o ss ib ility
302. See S enate R u les  o f Procedure, app. B infra.
303. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
304. For the further ramifications of judicial review of the impeachment process, 
see Section VII accompanying notes 310-31 infra.
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th a t ,  i t  w o u ld  e x c e e d  th e  p o w e rs  o f  th e  c o u r ts  e i th e r  to  in te rv e n e  in  
o r d e r  to  p r o te c t  e v id e n tia ry  p r iv ile g e s  th a t  e x is t b e tw e e n  a  h u s b a n d  a n d  
w ife  o r  b e tw e e n  a n  a c c u s e d  a n d  h is  c o u n se l. T h e  so c ia l in s t i tu tio n s  
w h ic h  th e se  p riv ile g e s  w e re  c re a te d  to  p r o te c t  s im p ly  c a n n o t  b e  g iv e n  
p re c e d e n c e  o v e r  th e  n a t io n ’s c o n s ti tu t io n a l  in f r a s tr u c tu re  w h ic h  is d e ­
s ig n e d  to  r e g u la te  th e  re la t io n s h ip  a m o n g  th e  g o v e rn m e n ta l  b ra n c h e s  
in  a n  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g .
A  f u r th e r  d u e  p ro c e s s  a rg u m e n t m a y  c o n c e iv a b ly  b e  a d v a n c e d  b y  
a  p u b lic  o f f ic e r  w h o  h a s  b e e n  s u b je c te d  to  im p e a c h m e n t  in v e s tig a tio n s  
o r  b y  w itn e sses  b r o u g h t  to  te s tify  in  su c h  tr ia ls :  th a t  c e r ta in  d e m a n d e d  
d isc lo su re s  m a y  je o p a r d iz e  th e  r ig h ts  o f  th i r d  p a r t ie s  a n d  th e re fo r e  c a n ­
n o t  b e  c o m p e lle d . O n  o c c a s io n — b u t  n o t  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  a n  im p e a c h ­
m e n t t r ia l— P re s id e n ts  h a v e  o b je c te d  to  a n d  re s is te d  c e r ta in  d isc lo su re s  
w h ic h  w o u ld  in f r in g e  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h ts  o f  th i r d  p a r t ie s .  F o r  
e x a m p le , P re s id e n t  J a c k s o n  re fu s e d  to  d isc lo se  in f o rm a tio n  to  th e  
H o u se  c o n c e rn in g  th e  c o n d u c t  o f  a  su rv e y o r -g e n e ra l w h o  h a d  b e e n  r e ­
m o v e d  f ro m  o ff ic e  o n  th e  p u r p o r te d  g ro u n d s  o f  f ra u d u le n t  c o n d u c t.  
J a c k s o n  a rg u e d  th a t  d is c lo s u re  w o u ld  d e p r iv e  a  c i tiz e n  o f  h is  b a s ic  r ig h t  
to  “ a  p u b lic  in v e s tig a tio n  in  th e  p re s e n c e  o f  h is  a c c u s e rs  a n d  th e  w it­
n esses  a g a in s t  h im .” 305 L a te r ,  P re s id e n t  T y le r  a lso  c la im e d  a  p r iv ile g e  
to  w ith h o ld  c e r ta in  in fo rm a tio n  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  e v id e n tia ry  p r iv ile g es . 
I n  s u p p o r t  o f  h is  re fu s a l  t o  su p p ly  th e  r e q u e s te d  m a te r ia ls ,  T y le r  s ta te d  
th a t  “ th e se  p r in c ip le s  [e v id e n tia ry  p riv ile g es]  a r e  a s  a p p l ic a b le  to  e v i­
d e n c e  s o u g h t b y  a  le g is la tu re  a s  to  th a t  r e q u ir e d  b y  a  c o u r t .” 306 I f  
th is  p r in c ip le  w e re  n o t  g e n e ra lly  r e s p e c te d , i t  m ig h t b e  a rg u e d , C o n ­
g re ss  c o u ld  fa s h io n  its  o w n  c o n c e p t  o f  p r o c e d u ra l  d u e  p ro c e s s  a n d  th e n  
p ro c e e d , fo r  e x a m p le , to  c o m p e l a  w itn e ss  to  te s tify  a b o u t  a  c o n v e rs a ­
t io n  c o n c e rn in g  c r im in a l  c o n d u c t  in  w h ic h  th e  w itn e ss  p a r t ic ip a te d .  I t
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305. Executive P rivilege 181. Berger argued that Jackson’s assertion that such 
an inquiry was not “indispensable to the proper exercise of congressional power can­
not be supported. Otherwise the President could cut off Congress’ power to investigate 
executive misconduct merely by removing the officer.” Id. at 182.
306. 3 H inds’ § 1885, at 182. In more recent years, both Truman and Eisenhower 
claimed privileges, based in part on due process considerations, to support directives 
prohibiting the disclosure of government information to congressional committees in­
vestigating the loyalty of federal employees. In a 1948 memorandum to all federal 
employees, President Truman directed that they were not to respond to inquiries in­
volving the Employees’ Loyalty Program. It is clear that the memorandum was 
prompted at least in part by due process considerations: “This is necessary . . .  to 
protect Government personnel against the dissemination of unfounded or disproved 
allegations. It is necessary also in order to insure the fair and just disposition of 
loyalty cases.” 13 Fed. Reg. 1359 (1948). Likewise Eisenhower’s refusal to permit 
Defense Department personnel to testify at the Army-McCarthy hearings was prompted 
largely by due process considerations.
w o u ld  a p p e a r  t h a t  a  w itn e ss  c o u ld  th e re b y  b e  e ffe c tiv e ly  d e p r iv e d  o f  
h is  r ig h t  a g a in s t  s e lf - in c r im in a tio n , w h e re a s  th e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  in  
E m s p a k  v. U n ite d  S ta te s 307 a n d  Q u in n  v. U n ite d  S ta te s 308 s p e c if ic a lly  
h a s  e x te n d e d  th e  p r iv ile g e  a g a in s t  s e lf - in c r im in a tio n  to  a p p ly  to  a  
w itn e ss  te s tify in g  b e fo re  a  c o n g re s s io n a l in v e s tig a to ry  b o d y . T h e  
m o d e m  d o c tr in e  o f  th e  p r iv ile g e  “e x te n d s  to  a l l  m a n n e r  o f  p ro c e e d in g s  
in  w h ic h  te s tim o n y  is le g a lly  c o m p e lla b le , w h e th e r  lit ig io u s  o r  n o t  a n d  
w h e th e r  e x  p a r te  o r  o th e rw ise .” 309
W ith o u t  d ism iss in g  o u t  o f  h a n d  th e  d u e  p ro c e s s  a rg u m e n ts  th u s  
r a is e d  o n  b e h a lf  o f  th ir d  p a r t ie s ,  i t  is  c o n te n d e d  th a t  a n y  e f fo r t  to  e x ­
c lu d e  e v id e n c e  o n  su c h  g ro u n d s  f ro m  a n  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g  m u s t 
b e a r  a  n e a r ly  in s u rm o u n ta b le  b u r d e n  o f  p e rs u a s io n  w h e n e v e r  th a t  
e v id e n c e  is d e e m e d  s ig n if ic a n t to  th e  re s o lu t io n  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t 
issu e . T h is  r e s u l t  is d ic ta te d  b o th  b y  th e  e x t r a o rd in a ry  n a tu r e  o f  th e  
im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e e d in g  a n d  b y  th e  a b ili ty  o f  a  c o u r t  to  su p p re ss  o r  
c o n t r a d ic t  th e  c o n g re s s io n a l te s tim o n y  in  a  s u b s e q u e n t t r ia l  if  th a t  
s h o u ld  p ro v e  n e c e s sa ry  to  v in d ic a te  th e  r ig h ts  o f  th i r d  p a r t ie s .  A n y  
e a r l ie r  in te rv e n tio n  b y  th e  c o u r ts  in to  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s , 
h o w e v e r, o n  th e  p re te n s e  o f  su p p ly in g  th a t  p ro c e e d in g  w ith  a  g iv e n  
m e a s u re  o f  d u e  p ro c e ss , m u s t  b e  p e rc e iv e d  a n d  d ism issd  a s  p r e m a tu r e  
a n d  e x tra -c o n s ti tu t io n a l .
V I I .  IMPEACHMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
U n ti l  r e c e n tly , i t  h a s  n o t  b e e n  su g g e s te d  s e r io u s ly  th a t  th e  S u ­
p re m e  C o u r t  w o u ld  h a v e  th e  p o w e r  to  re v ie w  th e  in te r lo c u to ry  o r  f in a l 
d e c is io n s  o f  th e  S e n a te  in  a n  im p e a c h m e n t  t r ia l .310 N e v e r th e le s s ,  as
307. 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
308. 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
309. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2252, at 327 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
The privilege against self-incrimination has not been exercised in American im­
peachment proceedings for several reasons. First although the privilege was incorpo­
rated into the fifth amendment, it was rarely used in early criminal cases. See id. § 
2252. Second, although recognition of the privilege became more widespread toward 
the end of the nineteenth century, it was not until McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34 
(1924), that the privilege was also extended to civil trials.
In the case of public officials, however, the scope of the privilege remains sub­
stantially limited. The privilege does not extend to public documents or papers, as 
distinguished from purely personal documents and papers, on the basis that it would 
be an intolerable handicap for the government to be unable to discover what its own 
doings are. See 7 J. Wigmore, supra § 2259(c)(1). See also Note, Quasi Public 
Records and Self-Incrimination, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 838 (1947). Consequently public 
officials, particularly the President, will be more likely to assert other privileges of 
confidentiality such as executive privilege rather than the privilege against self-incrimi­
nation in seeking to prevent disclosure of information recorded in public documents.
310. For recent assertions that an impeachment judgment is reviewable, see R.
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th e  n a t io n  m a tu re s  a n d  its  c o m m u n a l ro o ts  d e e p e n , i t  b e c o m e s  in c re a s ­
in g ly  m o re  r e a s o n a b le  to  r e q u ir e  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  g o v e rn m e n t to  b e  
“m a d e  in  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  ru le s  o f  la w  a n d  s o m e w h a t le ss  b y  p o l i t ic a l  
a c c o m m o d a t io n .” 311 O n e  c a n  a n t ic ip a te  th a t  th e  p o li t ic a l  q u e s tio n  
d o c tr in e ,312 p re c lu d in g  ju d ic ia l  re v ie w  o f  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  a  c o o r d in a te  
p o li t ic a l  d e p a r tm e n t ,  is b o u n d  to  r e c e d e  a s  tim e  g o es  o n ,313 a n d  as its  
c i rc u m fe re n c e  c o n tra c ts ,  th e  fe a s ib ili ty  o f  a l lo w in g  ju d ic ia l  re v ie w  o f  
d e c is io n s  m a d e  in  th e  c o u rs e  o f  a n  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g  m a y  w e ll 
a p p e a r  to  b e  e n h a n c e d . I t  is su g g e s te d , h o w e v e r, t h a t  th e re  ex is ts  a  
h a r d  c o re  o f  issu es , e x te n d in g  b e y o n d  th e  c o n d u c t  o f  fo re ig n  p o lic y , 
in  w h ic h  p e rc e iv e d  le g itim a c y  o f  g o v e rn m e n ta l  in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  d e c i­
s io n s  d e m a n d s  th e  f in a l  p o li t ic a l  r e s o lu t io n  o f  p ro b le m s  b y  o n e  o r  th e  
o th e r  o f  th e  p o li t ic a l  b ra n c h e s .  O v e r  th e se  m a tte r s  ju d ic ia l  re v ie w  
s h o u ld  n o t  e x te n d . I m p e a c h m e n t  is su c h  a n  issu e .
A  p o li t ic a l  q u e s tio n  w h ic h  e v a d e s  ju d ic ia l  re v ie w  is s a id  to  a r is e  
u n d e r  a n y  o f  s ix  c o n d itio n s : w h e re  th e  a c tu a l  te x t  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  
c o m m its  th e  issu e  to  o th e r  b ra n c h e s  fo r  d e te rm in a t io n ,  w h e re  ju d ic ia l ly  
d is c o v e ra b le  o r  m a n a g e a b le  s ta n d a r d s  fo r  re so lv in g  th e  is su e  a r e  
la c k in g , w h e re  th e  q u e s tio n  c a n n o t  b e  re so lv e d  w ith o u t  p re s u p p o s in g  
a n  in it ia l  p o lic y  d e te r m in a t io n  o f  a  k in d  c le a r ly  c a llin g  fo r  n o n ju d ic ia l  
d is c re tio n , w h e re  ju d ic ia l  re v ie w  w o u ld  e n ta i l  a n  e x p re s s io n  o f  d is re ­
s p e c t f o r  o th e r  b ra n c h e s  o f  g o v e rn m e n t,  w h e re  c o n tra d ic to ry  re s o lu t io n s  
m ig h t c a u s e  e m b a r ra s s m e n t to  th e  g o v e rn m e n t as a  w h o le , a n d  w h e re
B erger 103-21; I. B ryant, Impeachment, T ria ls  and E rro rs  182-97 (1972); Fee- 
rick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A  Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 
Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1970); Rezneck, Is Judicial Review of Impeachment Coming?, 
60 A.B.A.J. 681 (1974); Comment, Presidential Impeachment and Judicial Review, 23
The more conventional view, however, has been to the contrary. Willoughby 
viewed impeachment as nonreviewable: “It is scarcely necessary to say that the pro­
ceeding and determinations of the Senate when sitting as a court of impeachment are 
not subject to review in any other court.” 3 W. Willoughby, The Constitutional 
Law of the United States 1451 (2d ed. 1929). Black expressed essentially the
It will be perceived that the power to determine what crimes are impeachable 
rests very much with Congress. For the House, before preferring articles of 
impeachment, will decide whether the acts or conduct complained of constitute 
a “high crime or misdemeanor.” And the Senate, in trying the case, will also 
have to consider the same question. If, in the judgment of the Senate, the of­
fense charged is not impeachable, they will acquit; otherwise, upon sufficient 
proof and the concurrence of the necessary majority, they will convict. And 
in either case, there is no other power which can review or reverse their deci­
sion. H. Black, Constitutional Law 121-22 (1897).
311. Firmage, Law and the Indochina War: A  Retrospective View, supra note 3,
312. See notes 314-31 infra and accompanying text.
313. Firmage, Law and the Indochina War: A  Retrospective View, supra note 3, at
th e re  is n e e d  to  a d h e re  to  a  p o li t ic a l  d e c is io n  a l re a d y  m a d e .314 I t  is 
su g g e s te d  th a t  u n d e r  a ll b u t  p e rh a p s  th e  s e c o n d  o f  th e se  c r i te r ia ,  ev e ry  
q u e s tio n  w h ic h  is m a te r ia l  t o  a n  im p e a c h m e n t d e c is io n  p re s e n ts  a  
p o li t ic a l  q u e s tio n  n o t  su b je c t to  ju d ic ia l  rev iew .
I n  th e  f ir s t  in s ta n c e , th e  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  te x t  e x p re ss ly  g r a n ts  th e  e x ­
c lu s iv e  p o w e r  o f  im p e a c h m e n t to  th e  h o u se s  o f  C o n g re s s . T h e  p o w e r  
to  im p e a c h  a n d  c o n v ic t  is h e ld  s o le ly  b y  'the H o u s e  a n d  th e  S e n a te .315 
I t  w o u ld  se em  to  b e  a n o m a lo u s  to  c o n te n d  th a t  th is  p o w e r  c a n  b e  e x ­
e rc ise d  o n ly  in  c o m p lia n c e  w ith  th e  d ic ta te s  o f  th e  S u p re m e  C o u r t .
T h is  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  th e  d e m o n s tr a b le  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  c o m m itm e n t 
o f  th e  issu e  o f  im p e a c h m e n t  to  C o n g re s s  h a s  b e e n  c o n s is te n tly  a c ­
c la im e d  b y  th e  c o u r ts  a n d  th e  c o m m e n ta to rs ,  a n d  i t  c le a rly  re f le c ts  th e  
u n a m b ig u o u s  in te n tio n s  o f  th e  f ra m e rs  a t  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n a l  C o n v e n ­
tio n . J o s e p h  S to ry , in  h is  C o m m e n ta r ie s ,  e x p re sse d  th e  c o m m o n  v ie w  
o f  th e  e a r ly  w ri te rs  th a t  C o n g re s s , n o t  th e  c o u r ts ,  p o sse sse d  a  te x tu a l  
g r a n t  o f  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  a u th o r i ty  to  re so lv e  a n y  q u e s t io n  o f  im p e a c h ­
m e n t:  “ T h e  t r u e  e x p o s it io n  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  o n  [ th is  p o in t]  is 
b ro u g h t  b e fo re  th e  le a rn e d  r e a d e r  as m a tte rs  s ti l l  s u b  ju d lc e ,  th e  f in a l 
d e c is io n  o f  w h ic h  m a y  b e  r e a s o n a b ly  le f t  to  th e  h ig h  t r ib u n a l  c o n s t i tu t­
in g  th e  c o u r t  o f  im p e a c h m e n t w h e n  th e  o c c a s io n  sh a ll a r is e .” 316 T h is  
v ie w  is a m p ly  s u p p o r te d  b y  th e  r e c o rd  o f  th e  C o n v e n tio n . I m p e a c h ­
m e n t, as o r ig in a lly  p ro p o s e d , w as  to  b e  w ith in  th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f  th e  
“N a t io n a l  J u d ic ia ry .” 317 A f te r  m u c h  d is c u s s io n , h o w e v e r , im p e a c h ­
m e n t  ju r is d ic t io n  w as ta k e n  a w a y  f ro m  ju d ic ia l  c o g n iz a n c e  a n d  v e s te d  
so le ly  in  C o n g re s s .318 T h e  d e b a te s  o u tl in e  th e  re a so n s  f o r  th e  c h a n g e . 
F ir s t ,  th e  ju d ic ia ry  h a s  th e  p o w e r  to  p ro c e e d  u n d e r  a n  in d ic tm e n t 
a g a in s t  a n  a c c u s e d  a t  th e  sa m e  t im e  th a t  h e  is th e  s u b je c t o f  a n  im ­
p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e e d in g , a n d  i t  w as  c o n s id e re d  u n d e s ira b le  th a t  th e  
c o u r ts  sh o u ld  e n te r ta in  tw o  p ro c e e d in g s  a t  th e  s a m e  tim e  a g a in s t  o n e  
in d iv id u a l .319 S e c o n d , th e  f ra m e rs  r e c o g n iz e d  th a t  im p e a c h m e n t w as 
n o n re v ie w a b le  a n d  d e fe n d e d  th is  p r o v is io n  a g a in s t  th e  a rg u m e n t  th a t
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314. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961).
315. U.S. C onst, art. 1, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 6.
316. 1 J. Story § 805, at 587.
317. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more 
supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legis­
lature . . . that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear and 
determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and deter­
mine in the dernier resort . . . impeachments of any National Officers. . . .
1 Records 21-22.
318. 2 id. at 186, 493, 547.
319. “A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the 
judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the trial of 
the impeachment.” Id. at 500 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris).
i t  w o u ld  s u b je c t  th e  E x e c u tiv e  to  te n u re  a t  th e  m e re  p le a s u re  o f  th e  
le g is la tu re ,320 fo r  th e  a s s u m p tio n  c o u ld  n o t  b e  in d u lg e d  th a t  th e  S e n a te  
w o u ld  a b u s e  its  p o w e r:
[N]o other tribunal than the Senate could be trusted. The Supreme 
Court were too few in number and might be warped and corrupted. 
[Madison] was agst. a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, 
considering the Legislative tyranny the great danger to be apprehended; 
but there could be no danger that the Senate would say untruly on their 
oaths that the President was guilty of crimes or facts, especially as in 
four years he can be turned out.321
F in a lly , i t  w as  su g g e s te d  th a t  i t  w o u ld  b e  u n w ise  to  p e r m i t  a  b o d y  a p ­
p o in te d  b y  th e  P re s id e n t  to  h o ld  th e  u l t im a te  p o w e r  to  t r y  h im  o n  a  
b ill  o f  im p e a c h m e n t:  “T h e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  [m u s t b e  re g a rd e d ]  as  im ­
p r o p e r  to  t r y  th e  P re s id e n t ,  b e c a u s e  th e  ju d g e s  w o u ld  b e  a p p o in te d  b y  
h im .” 322 F o r  th e se  re a s o n s , ju d ic ia l  t r ia l  o f  im p e a c h m e n ts  w a s  r e je c te d  
b y  th e  f ra m e rs  o f  th e  C o n s ti tu t io n .
T h e  v iew s e x p re s se d  b y  th e  fo u n d e rs  a n d  s u p p o r te d  h is to r ic a l ly  
b y  th e  w e ig h t o f  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  s c h o la rs h ip 323 h a v e  b e e n  s u b s e q u e n tly  
su s ta in e d  b y  th e  c o u r ts .324 J u d g e  R i t te r ’s u n p re c e d e n te d  c o l la te ra l  a t ­
ta c k  o n  th e  S e n a te ’s im p e a c h m e n t c o n v ic tio n  w a s  f irm ly  r e je c te d  b y  a 
u n a n im o u s  o p in io n  o f  th e  C o u r t  o f  C la im s :
We think that when the provision that the Senate should have “the 
sole power to try all impeachments” was inserted in the Constitution, 
the word “sole” was used with a definite meaning and with the intention 
that no other tribunal should have any jurisdiction of the cases tried 
under the provisions for impeachment. The dictionary definition of the
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320. [Madison] objected to a trial of the President by the Senate, especially as 
he was to be impeached by the other branch of the Legislature, and for any 
act which might be called a misdemeanor. The President under these circum­
stances was made improperly dependent. He would prefer the Supreme Court 
for the trial of impeachments. Id. at 551.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See T. Cooley, The G en e ra l Princip les o f  C o n s titu tio n a l Law 206 (1931); 
New Y ork C ity Bar Association, Law o f  P residen tia l Im peachm ent 14-17 (1974); 
W. R aw le, A View o f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  (1829); C. W arren, The Making o f  th e  
C o n s titu tio n  658-64 (1928); Kurland, supra note 4, at 569-70; Ross, “Good Behavior■” 
of Federal Judges, 12 U. Kan. C ity  L. Rev. 119, 125-26 (1944); Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law , 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1959); Bestor, Book 
Review, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 255, 268 (1973); Fordham, Book Review, 47 U. So. C al. 
L. Rev. 673, 680-82 (1974).
324. But cf. State ex re l Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 63, 256 N.W. 377 (1934) 
(reviewing Governor Langer’s impeachment with regard to the term “disability” as 
grounds for impeachment); Ferguson v. Maddox, 114 Tex. 85, 263 S.W. 888 (1924) 
(holding that a court may determine whether the state Senate had exceeded its im­
peachment jurisdiction by acting on the basis of neither treason, bribery, nor high 
crimes and misdemeanors); Fordham, supra note 323, at 681.
word “sole” is “being or acting without another” and we think it was 
intended that the Senate should act without any other tribunal having 
anything to do with the case. This would be the ordinary signification 
of the words and this construction is supported by a consideration of 
the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and the uniform 
opinion of the authorities which have considered the matter.323
G iv e n  th e  fo re g o in g  a rg u m e n ts , th e re  c a n  b e  l i t t le  d o u b t  th a t  th e re  
ex is ts  d e m o n s tra b le  te x tu a l  c o m m itm e n t o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t d e c is io n  
p ro c e s s  to  th e  le g is la tu re , b r in g in g  th e  e x e rc ise  o f  th a t  p o w e r  s e c u re ly  
w ith in  th e  r e a lm  o f  th e  p o li t ic a l  q u e s tio n  d o c tr in e .
P e rh a p s  m o s t im p o r ta n t ,  ju d ic ia l  re v ie w  o f p r e s id e n tia l  im p e a c h ­
m e n t  w o u ld  g e n e ra te  p r a c t ic a l  p ro b le m s  o f  th e  m o s t g ra v e  a n d  p e r h a p s  
ir re m e d ia b le  n a tu re .  T h e re  is a n  a b s o lu te  n e e d  to  a b id e  b y  a n y  
p o li t ic a l  d e c is io n  to  im p e a c h , o n c e  th a t  v e rd ic t  h a s  b e e n  r e a c h e d  b y  
th e  S e n a te . J u d ic ia l  re v ie w  o f su c h  a  v e rd ic t  w o u ld  c a s t  th e  o ffic e  o f  
th e  E x e c u tiv e  in to  a n  in to le ra b le  s ta te  o f  l im b o  as  th e  su c c e e d in g  
P re s id e n t a w a ite d  th e  o p in io n  o f  th e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  o n  th e  c o r re c tn e s s  
o f  th e  S e n a te ’s d e c is io n . P re s id e n t ia l  le g itim a c y , n e v e r  m o re  n e c e s sa ry  
f o r  re a f f i rm a t io n ,  w o u ld  b e  h e ld  in  a b e y a n c e  if  n o t  in  a  c o n d i t io n  o f  
f u r th e r  d is in te g ra t io n . F u r th e r ,  th e  p a in fu l  r e c o n c i l ia t io n  o f  C o n g re s s  
a n d  th e  n e w  P re s id e n t  w o u ld  b e  c r i t ic a l ly  c o m p lic a te d  b y  th e  b ro o d in g  
a p p a r i t io n  o f  th e  fo rm e r  P re s id e n t’s p o ss ib le  r e tu r n .  T h e  g o v e rn m e n t 
b u r e a u c r a c y  w o u ld  b e  fo rc e d  to  h e d g e  its  a c tiv itie s  in  s e lf -p ro te c tio n  
a g a in s t  th e  r e tu r n  o f th e  o u s te d  P re s id e n t ;  th e  g ra d u a lly  s p re a d in g  
p a ra ly s is  o f  g o v e rn m e n t,  to  so m e  d e g re e  in e v ita b le  d u r in g  c o n g re s ­
s io n a l im p e a c h m e n t a c tiv ity , w o u ld  b e  c o n t in u e d . A n d  if  th e  fo rm e r  
P re s id e n t  w e re  to  b e  re in s ta te d  b y  ju d ic ia l  re v e rsa l,  i t  is u n im a g in a b le  
th a t  a n  e ffe c tiv e  re la t io n s h ip  w o u ld  e v e r  b e  re -e s ta b lis h e d  b e tw e e n  h im  
a n d  th e  C o n g re s s  w h ic h  h a d  p r o n o u n c e d  h im  g u ilty  o f  th e  c o m m iss io n  
o f  im p e a c h a b le  o f fe n se s .326 I n  s h o r t,  n e i th e r  p o li t ic a l  n o r  b u r e a u c ra t ic
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325. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293, 296 (1936), cert, denied, 300 U.S. 668 
(1937).
326. Interposition of the courts to pass upon the legal sufficiency of articles of im­
peachment following their adoption by the House would considerably prolong the pe­
riod of uncertainty in the leadership of government that impeachment of a President 
would necessarily produce; and judicial review after a judgment of conviction and re­
moval by the Senate would cast doubt, with the greatest potential repercussions, on the 
fundamental question of who is entitled to hold the office of President of the United 
States in the period following the final vote in the Senate. These considerations sup­
port our basic conclusion, that the Constitution has committed exclusively and finally 
to the measured discretion of elected representatives the unique, quasi-judicial function 
of determining whether an elected or appointed officer of the United States must be 
removed from office on grounds of fitness. New Y ork C ity Bar Association, supra 
note 323, at 170.
le v e ls  o f  g o v e rn m e n t c o u ld  f u n c t io n  u n d e r  su c h  c o n d itio n s . T h e  p r o ­
fo u n d ly  p o li t ic a l  n a tu r e  o f  im p e a c h m e n t is n o w h e re  m o re  e v id e n t th a n  
in  a n  a n a ly s is  o f th e  im p ro p r ie ty  o f  ju d ic ia l  r e v ie w  o f  th is  s e m in a l 
p o li t ic a l  ac t.
M o re o v e r ,  t h e  f u n d a m e n ta l ly  p o l i t ic a l  n a tu r e  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t  
p ro c e s s  s h o u ld  p re c lu d e  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f  ju d ic ia l  re v ie w  o f  in te r m e ­
d ia te  as w e ll a s  f in a l  d e te rm in a tio n s  m a d e  b y  C o n g re s s  in  th e  e x e rc is e  
o f  its  im p e a c h m e n t p o w e r . I n te r lo c u to ry  a p p e a ls  o f  su c h  c o n g re s s io n a l 
d e c is io n s , in  a d d i t io n ,  m a y  b e  d is c o u n te d  o n  th e  f u r th e r  g ro u n d  th a t  
th e  th r e a t  o f  r e p e a te d  d e la y s  in  tr ia l ,  w h ic h  su c h  re v ie w  w o u ld  in e v ita b ly  
c re a te ,  w o u ld  s tif le  m o s t  a t te m p ts  to  e x e rc ise  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p o w e r  
e ffe c tiv e ly  a s  a  p o l i t ic a l  p ro p h y la c tic .  O f  c o u rse , im p e a c h m e n t is  h e a v y  
p o l i t ic a l  a r t i l le ry  w h ic h  is n o t  m e a n t  t o  o p e r a te  to o  q u ic k ly . N e v e r th e ­
le ss , i t  is  d e s ig n e d  to  o p e ra te  e ffe c tiv e ly , a n d  a  m u tip lic i ty  o f  in te r lo c u ­
to ry  a p p e a ls  b y  a  P re s id e n t  w h o  w a n te d  to  “ r u n  o u t  th e  c lo c k ”  w o u ld  
th r e a te n  to  s ta l l  se r io u s ly  i ts  b a s ic  o p e r a t io n  a n d  th u s  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  
p e rm itte d .
I t  h a s  re c e n tly  b e e n  su g g e s te d , h o w e v e r, t h a t  th e  d ir e c t io n  in  
w h ic h  th e  C o u r t  h a s  m o v e d  th r o u g h  its  in te r v e n t io n  in to  a re a s  p r e ­
v io u s ly  c o n s id e re d  to  b e  b e y o n d  th e  s c o p e  o f  its  ju r is d ic t io n  w a r ra n ts ,  
i f  n o t  d e m a n d s , a  s im ila r  e x te n s io n  o f  i ts  a u th o r i ty  in to  th e  r e a lm  o f  
im p e a c h m e n t .327 T h e  m a in  p r o p o n e n ts  o f  th is  v ie w  h a v e  r e l ie d  
p r im a r ily  u p o n  s ta te m e n ts  in  P o w e l l  v. M c C o r m a c k 328 a n d  B a k e r  v . 
C a r r 329 th a t  a  p o li t ic a l  q u e s tio n  ex is ts  w h e re  ju d ic ia l ly  d is c o v e ra b le  a n d  
m a n a g e a b le  s ta n d a rd s  fo r  re so lv in g  th e  p r o b le m  a r e  la c k in g . T h u s ,  i t
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327. See note 310 supra.
328. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Powell involved the expulsion of Congressman Adam 
Clayton Powell from the House of Representatives. The Court reached the merits not­
withstanding the constitutional delegation to Congress of the responsibility of judging 
the qualifications of its own members. Article I, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitu­
tion describes three qualifications that must be met by a Representative, and article
I, section 5, clause 1 provides that “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the . . . 
Qualifications of its own Members.” It is submitted, however, that Powell cannot be 
extended to permit judicial review of impeachment, for the exercise of judicial review 
in Powell is distinguishable from its invocation in an impeachment proceeding. In 
Powell, the Court did not find a “textually demonstrable commitment” of a discretion­
ary power to each House. See N ew  Y ork C ity Bar Association, supra note 323, at 
169. The constitutional text and the framers’ own interpretation are quite different 
with regard to impeachment. Although the Constitution limits impeachment to “Trea­
son, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” U.S. Const, art. II, § 4, it 
also grants to Congress the “sole” authority to apply those terms, id. art. I, § 2, cl. 
5. Rather than limiting impeachment to grounds unambiguously circumscribed, the 
framers delegated a significant degree of political discretion to Congress, a fact which 
could not be shown in Powell.
329. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
is  a rg u e d  th a t  s in c e  th e  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  te rm  “h ig h  C r im e s  a n d  
M is d e m e a n o rs ” is su sc e p tiv e  t o  p r in c ip le d  ju d ic ia l  s ta n d a rd s ,  th e  
p o li t ic a l  q u e s tio n  d o c t r in e  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  in v o k e d  in  d e r o g a t io n  o f  ju ­
d ic ia l  ju r is d ic t io n  to  re v ie w  th e  c o n g re s s io n a l in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th is  
p h ra s e . T h is  a rg u m e n t,  h o w e v e r , c a n n o t  s ta n d . T h is  v e ry  m a t te r  w as  
sp e c if ic a lly  c o n s id e re d  a n d  re je c te d  in  th e  C o n v e n tio n .  B r o a d  p o li t ic a l  
ju d g m e n t,  n o t  ju d ic ia l  in te r p re ta t io n ,  w as  th o u g h t  n e c e s sa ry  to  d e te r ­
m in e  th e  s c o p e  o f  th is  p h r a s e ’s a p p l ic a t io n  to  p a r t i c u la r  o ffe n se s : “ [ 0 ] n  
th is  b a s is , th e  p r o p r ie ty  o f  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  th e s e  p o w e rs  in  a  p a r t i c u la r  
c a se  w o u ld  p r e s e n t  a  p o l i t i c a l  q u e s tio n , r e g a rd le s s  o f  w h e th e r  ‘h ig h  
C r im e s  a n d  M is d e m e a n o rs ’ is  g iv e n  a  b r o a d  o r  a  n a r r o w  m e a n in g .” 330 
B e y o n d  th a t ,  th e  a r g u m e n t  lo o k s  o n ly  to  o n e  o f  s ix  c r i te r ia  s e t  f o r th  
f o r  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a  p o li t ic a l  q u e s tio n , a n d  f ro m  th a t  s in g le  p ro p o s i t io n  
i t  in c o r re c t ly  in fe rs  th a t ,  s in c e  a  p o l i t ic a l  q u e s t io n  e x is ts  w h e re  su ita b le  
ju d ic ia l  s ta n d a rd s  a r e  la c k in g , i t  n e c e s s a r ily  fo llo w s  th a t  th e  d o c tr in e  
c a n  b e  d is re g a rd e d  w h e re v e r  m a n a g e a b le  ju d ic ia l  s ta n d a r d s  a re  p re s ­
e n t . T h a t  e x t ra p o la t io n ,  h o w e v e r, is  f a lla c io u s : if  su c h  a  c o n c lu s io n  
w e re  r e a c h e d , i t  w o u ld  fo re c lo s e  th e  p o li t ic a l  q u e s t io n  d o c t r in e  w h e r ­
e v e r  d e c is io n s  c a p a b le  o f  fo rm a l r a t io n a l iz a t io n  a re  m a d e  in  e i th e r  o f
I t  is n o t  d is p u te d  th a t  B a k e r  a n d  P o w e l l  h a v e  s ig n if ic a n t ly  c o n tr ib ­
u te d  to  th e  e ro s io n  o f  th e  p o li t ic a l  q u e s t io n  d o c tr in e . N e v e r th e le s s , 
th e  e ro s io n  c a n n o t  w a sh  a w a y  th o s e  p o w e rs  te x tu a l ly  c o m m itte d  b y  th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n  so le ly  to  th e  p o li t ic a l  b r a n c h e s  o f  g o v e rn m e n t. T h e  n u b  
o f  th e  p o li t ic a l  q u e s tio n  d o c t r in e  is  n o t  s im p ly  th a t  th e  c o u r ts  w ill n o t  
in te rv e n e  w h e re  ju d ic ia l  s ta n d a rd s  a re  v a g u e , b u t  r a th e r  t h a t  in  a  d e m o ­
c r a t ic  c o m m u n ity  c e r ta in  d e c is io n s , b e c a u s e  o f  th e ir  in h e re n t ly  p o li t ic a l  
n a tu re ,  m u s t  b e  le f t  t o  p o li t ic a l  b r a n c h e s  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t. I n  r e c o g ­
n iz in g  th is  p r in c ip le ,  th e  C o u r t  o f  C la im s  h a s  c o n c lu d e d  th a t  im p e a c h ­
m e n t  is  in d e e d  su c h  a  p o l i t ic a l  p ro c e s s  w h ic h  is  n o t  su s c e p tib le  to
While the Senate in one sense acts as a court on the trial of an 
impeachment, it is essentially a political body and in its actions is in­
fluenced by the views of its members on the public welfare. The courts, 
on the other hand, are expected to render their decisions according to 
the law regardless of the consequences. This must have been realized 
by the members of the Constitutional Convention and in rejecting pro­
posals to have impeachments tried by a court composed of regularly 
appointed judges we think it avoided the possibility of unseemly conflicts
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between a political body such as the Senate and the judicial tribunals 
which might determine the case on different principles.331
V I I I .  IMPEACHMENT AND INDICTMENT
I t  h a s  re c e n tly  b e e n  q u e s tio n e d  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  th e  P re s id e n t ,  th e  
V ic e -P re s id e n t o r  a n y  c iv il o f f ic e r  c a n  b e  in d ic te d  b e fo re  im p e a c h m e n t, 
c o n v ic tio n , a n d  re m o v a l f ro m  o ffic e . T h e  is su e  in v o lv e s  th e  in te r p re ­
ta t io n  o f  a r t ic le  I ,  s e c tio n  3 o f  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n : “ J u d g m e n t  in  C a se s  
o f  I m p e a c h m e n t  sh a ll  n o t  e x te n d  fu r th e r  th a n  t o  r e m o v a l f ro m  O ff ic e , 
a n d  d is q u a lif ic a tio n  . . . b u t  th e  P a r ty  c o n v ic te d  sh a ll n e v e r th e le s s  b e  
lia b le  a n d  su b je c t  to  In d ic tm e n t ,  T r ia l ,  J u d g m e n t  a n d  P u n is h m e n t,  
a c c o rd in g  t o  L a w .” 332 T h e  d e b a te  in v o lv e s  t h e  “n e v e r th e le s s ” c la u se , 
w h ic h  u n d e r  o n e  r e a d in g  m ig h t o n ly  p r e c lu d e  th e  im p e a c h e d  f ro m  a s ­
se r t in g  d o u b le  je o p a rd y  a s  a  c r im in a l d e fe n se  o r  o n  a  b r o a d e r  r e a d in g  
m a y  a lso  e x te n d  to  e s ta b lish in g  a  p re c e d e n c e  o f  im p e a c h m e n t a n d  c o n ­
v ic t io n  b e fo re  a n y  s u b s e q u e n t c r im in a l in d ic tm e n t.  B e rg e r ,  in  c o n s id ­
e r in g  th e  issu e , d ir e c tly  lim its  th e  c la u se  to  th e  f i r s t  in te r p re ta t io n :
The implication of “shall nevertheless be liable” to indictment is that 
the given party is already liable, that the words are merely designed 
to preserve existing criminal liability rather than to qualify it. It would 
be unreasonable to attribute to the Framers an intention to insulate of­
ficers from criminal liability by mere appointment to office; like all men 
they are responsible under the law.333
T h is  is c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  m a jo r  b o d y  o f  th o u g h t  o n  th e  q u e s tio n , as  
fe w  h a v e  b e e n  w illin g  t o  b e s to w  a n  a b s o lu te  im m u n ity  f ro m  p ro s e c u t io n  
u p o n  a ll  p u b lic  se rv a n ts  d u r in g  th e i r  te n u re  in  o ffic e :
Otherwise, it might be a matter of extreme doubt whether . . .  a second 
trial for the same offense could be had, either after an acquittal or a 
conviction, in the court of impeachments.
The Constitution . . . has wisely subjected the party to trial in the com­
mon criminal tribunals, for the purpose of receiving such punishment
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668 (1937).
332. U.S. C onst, art. I, § 3, cl. 7. Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski advised the 
grand jury not to indict President Nixon: “It was researched at the time and the con­
clusion was that legal doubt on the question was so substantial that a move to indict 
a sitting President would touch off a legal battle of gigantic proportions.” N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 12, 1974, at 24, col. 1. Although the issue was presented by the President’s 
cross-petition for certiorari in United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3097 n.2 (1974), 
the Court found the resolution thereof unnecessary and hence dismissed the cross­
petition as improvidently granted. Id.
333. Berger, supra note 277, at 1123.
as o rd inarily  belongs to  the offense.334 
A n d  th e re  is  l i t t le  r e a s o n  to  c o n c e d e  su c h  a n  im m u n ity . T h e  fo u n d e rs ’ 
fe a r  o f  a  d e s p o tic  E x e c u tiv e  is w e ll k n o w n , a n d  i t  m il ita te s  d ire c tly  
a g a in s t  th e  g ra n tin g  o f  su c h  e x e c u tiv e  im m u n ity .335 I n  e a r ly  c o n g re ss ­
io n a l  d e b a te  r e g a rd in g  th e  l im ite d  im m u n ity  g r a n te d  to  c o n g re s sm e n ,338 
C h a r le s  P in c k n e y  c o m m e n te d : “N o  p r iv ile g e  o f  th is  k in d  w a s  in te n d e d  
f o r  y o u r  E x e c u tiv e  . . . .  T h e  C o n v e n tio n  . . . w e ll k n e w  th a t  . . . 
n o  s u b je c t  h a d  b e e n  m o re  a b u s e d  th a n  p r iv ile g e . T h e y  th e re fo re  d e ­
te rm in e d  to  s e t th e  e x a m p le , in  m e re ly  l im itin g  p r iv ile g e  to  w h a t  w a s  
n e c e s sa ry , a n d  n o  m o re .” 337 W ith  a  v ie w  to  a s su a g in g  th e  sa m e  fe a r ,  
W ilso n  a s su re d  th e  P e n n s y lv a n ia  R a t i f ic a t io n  C o n v e n tio n  th a t  “ n o t  a  
s in g le  p r iv i l e g e  is a n n e x e d  to  [ th e  P re s id e n t’s] c h a r a c te r .” 338
T h e  c o u r ts  h a v e  a lso  c o n c lu d e d  th a t  n o  o f f ic e r  is  im m u n e  f ro m  
re s p o n s ib ili ty  u n d e r  th e  c iv il a n d  c r im in a l  la w , re g a rd le s s  o f  th e  r e p e r ­
c u s s io n s  o f  c o n v ic tio n  a n d  p u n is h m e n t. T h e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  in  U n ite d  
S ta te s  v. L e e ,339 a  c iv il su it a g a in s t  a p p o in te d  m il i ta ry  o ffic e rs  a c tin g  
u n d e r  a  p re s id e n t ia l  d ire c tiv e , s ta te d :
[N]o officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. 
All the officers of government, from the highest to the lowest . . .  are 
bound to obey it.
It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and 
every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only 
the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe
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335. George Mason, in speaking to the need to broaden the impeachment provision 
beyond treason and bribery, noted that “attempts to subvert the Constitution may not 
be [treasonous].” 2 Records 550. Madison advocated that “some provision should 
be made for defending the community [against] the incapacity, negligence or perfidy 
of the Chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service . . . was not a 
sufficient security. . . .  He might pervert his administration into a scheme of pecula­
tion or oppression.” Id. at 65-66.
336. “The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, 
Felony or Breach of the Peace, be privileged from arrest during their Attendance at 
the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same 
. . . ” U.S. Const, art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
337. 10 Annals of Cong. 74 (1800) [1799-1801].
338. 2 J. E l l i o t t  480.
339. 106 U.S. 196 (1882). The Court has recently affirmed that position in dicta 
in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), a civil suit against a federal judge. 
The case, dismissed for failure to demonstrate a case and controversy, contained ele* 
ments of alleged civil and criminal misconduct:
We have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, 
or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise 
criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. . . .  On the contrary, the judi­
cially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach so far as to im­
munize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress. Id. at 503 (cita­
tions omitted).
the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which
it gives.340
L ik e w ise , in  G r a v e l  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,3*1 a  S e n a to r  a s s e r te d  a  c o n s ti tu ­
t io n a l  p r iv ile g e  to  d is r e g a rd  a  s u b p o e n a  r e q u ir in g  h im  to  a p p e a r  a s  a  
w itn e ss  b e fo re  a  f e d e ra l  g r a n d  ju ry .  T h e  C o u r t  s ta te d :  “ [T ]h e  c o n s ti­
tu t io n a l  f re e d o m  f ro m  a r re s t  d o e s  n o t  e x e m p t M e m b e rs  o f  C o n g re s s  
f ro m  th e  o p e r a t io n  o f  th e  o rd in a ry  c r im in a l  la w s , e v e n  th o u g h  im p r is o n ­
m e n t  m a y  p re v e n t o r  in te r fe re  w ith  th e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  th e i r  d u tie s  as  
M e m b e rs .” 342 T h u s ,  e le c te d  a n d  a p p o in te d  o f f ic e rs  a l ik e  a r e  n o t  a b o v e  
th e  la w , e v e n  w h e re  c o n v ic tio n  a n d  im p r is o n m e n t m a y  in te r fe re  w ith  
th e  e x e c u t io n  o f  th e  d u tie s  o f  th e i r  o ffic e .
I t  a lso  a p p e a r s  w e ll s e ttle d  th a t  a  c o n v ic tio n  in  th e  la w  c o u r ts  is 
n o t  sy n o n y m o u s  w ith  im p e a c h m e n t a n d  r e m o v a l f ro m  o ffic e . P re c e d e n t  
ex is ts  w h e re  e le c te d  o f f ic ia ls  a n d  c iv il o ff ic e rs  h a v e  b e e n  p ro s e c u te d  
w ith o u t  b e in g  e i th e r  im p e a c h e d  o r  e x p e lle d , th e re b y  su g g e s tin g  a t  le a s t  
th e  p o s s ib ility  t h a t  p re s id e n t ia l  im p e a c h m e n t  a n d  re m o v a l n e e d  n o t  
p re c e d e  in d ic tm e n t. I n  B u r to n  v .  U n i te d  S ta te s , 3 4 3  a  U n i te d  S ta te s  
S e n a to r  a p p e a le d  a  c o n v ic tio n  f o r  b r ib e ry ,  a rg u in g  th a t  c o n v ic tio n  w o u ld  
n e c e s sa r ily  le a d  to  h is  e x p u ls io n  f ro m  th e  S e n a te  w h e re a s  th e  C o n s t i ­
tu t io n  g r a n te d  th e  S e n a te  th e  so le  p o w e r  o f  e x p u ls io n . T h e  C o u r t ,  
q u o t in g  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. L e e  w ith  a p p ro v a l ,  r e je c te d  h is  c o n te n t io n  a n d  
fo u n d  n o  v io la t io n  o f  s e p a ra t io n  o f  p o w e rs .344 S im ila r ly , th e re  h a v e  
b e e n  se v e ra l c a se s  w h e re  f e d e ra l  ju d g e s  h a v e  b e e n  in d ic te d ,  a n d  in  
so m e  in s ta n c e s  c o n v ic te d , y e t  n e v e r  im p e a c h e d .345 M o s t  re c e n tly , th e  
q u e s tio n  o f  th e  c r im in a l  in d ic ta b il i ty  o f  a n  in c u m b e n t  f e d e ra l  ju d g e  w a s  
ra is e d  in  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. I s a a c s .348 C o -d e f e n d a n t  K e m e r ,  a  f e d e ra l  
d is t r ic t  ju d g e  a n d  a  fo rm e r  G o v e rn o r  o f  I l l in o is , a rg u e d  th a t  b e c a u s e  
c o n v ic tio n  o n  c r im in a l  c h a rg e s  is “ ta n ta m o u n t  to  re m o v a l f ro m  o ffic e , 
f e d e ra l  c o u r ts  a re  w ith o u t  ju r is d ic t io n  o v e r  th e  p e r s o n .” 347 T h e  c o u r t ,  
h o w e v e r, a g a in  re je o te d  th e  d e fe n d a n t’s c la im  o f  im m u n ity :
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343. 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
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345. For instance, Manton of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was 
criminally indicted but never impeached. See J. Borkin, The C o rru p t Judge 25 
(Meridian ed. 1966). Other examples are Davis of the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, who was indicted as an incumbent but iiever convicted or impeached, 
id. at 97, and Johnson of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who was convicted 
without being impeached, id. at 141.
346. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974).
347. Id. at 1140-41.
[T]hat an impeached judge is “subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment 
and Punishment, according to Law” does not mean that a judge may 
not be indicted and tried without impeachment first. The purpose of 
the phrase may be to assure that after impeachment a trial on criminal 
charges is not foreclosed by the principle of double jeopardy, or it may 
be to differentiate the provisions of the Constitution from the English
A f te r  c o n s id e r in g  th e  p re c e d e n ts ,  th e  c o u r t  u n e q u iv o c a lly  a p p ro v e d  
p re - im p e a c h m e n t in d ic tm e n t o f  a n y  c iv il o ff ic e r :
[W]hatever immunities or privileges the Constitution confers for the 
purpose of assuring the independence of the co-equal branches of gov­
ernment they do not exempt the members of those branches “from the 
operation of the ordinary criminal laws.” Criminal conduct is not part 
of the necessary functions performed by public officials. Punishment 
for that conduct will not interfere with the legitimate operation of a
N e v e rth e le s s , i t  h a s  b e e n  a rg u e d  th a t  w h e re a s  le s se r  o ff ic e rs  m a y  
b e  s u b je c t  to  in d io tm e n t b e fo re  im p e a c h m e n t,  th e  P re s id e n t  is  n o t .  
T h is  th e s is  h a s  b e e n  p re s e n te d  m o s t p e rsu a s iv e ly  b y  P ro fe s s o r  B ic k e l 
a n d  is  p re m is e d  u p o n  th e  th e o ry  th a t  “ [ i]n  th e  p re s id e n c y  is e m b o d ie d  
th e  c o n t in u i ty  a n d  in d e s tru c tib il i ty  o f  th e  s ta te .” 350 R e a s o n in g  th e re ­
f ro m , B ic k e l h a s  a rg u e d  th a t  “ th e  p re s id e n c y  c a n n o t  b e  c o n d u c te d  f ro m  
ja il ,  n o r  c a n  i t  b e  e ffec tiv e ly  c a r r ie d  o n  w h ile  a n  in c u m b e n t  is d e fe n d in g  
h im s e lf  in  a  c r im in a l  t r ia l .” 351 R a o u l  B e rg e r  in  re p ly  a rg u e d : “W h ile  
i t  is  t r u e  t h a t  th e  p re s id e n c y  ‘c a n n o t  b e  c o n d u c te d  f ro m  ja i l , ’ i t  is u n ­
re a lis tic  to  p o s tu la te  th a t  a  c o n v ic te d  P re s id e n t  c o u ld  n o t  b e  re le a s e d  
o n  b a i l  p e n d in g  a p p e a l  . . . .  I f  th e  P re s id e n t  la c k e d  th e  se n s itiv i ty  
to  re s ig n , a n  im p e a c h m e n t  c o u ld  sp e e d ily  f o l l o w . . . .” 352
S till, in  r e a c h in g  th is  c o n c lu s io n , o n e  n e e d  n o t  ig n o re  th e  f a c t  th a t  
c e r ta in  co s ts  a t ta c h  to  a  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  in te r p re ta t io n  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t  
is s u b je c t  to  c r im in a l  p ro c e sse s  b e fo re  o r  c o n te m p o ra n e o u s  w ith  im ­
p e a c h m e n t  p re c e e d in g s . T h is  in te r p re ta t io n  m a y  r e s u l t  in  so m e  in c a ­
p a c i ta t io n  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  o ffic e , b u t  to  ra is e  th e  s p e c tre  o f  to ta l  im ­
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348. Id  at 1142.
349. Id. at 1144.
350. Bickel, The Constitutional Tangle, The N ew Republic, Oct. 6, 1973, at 
14, 15.
351. Id. at 15.
352. Berger, supra note 277, at 1133.
It is we who have surrounded the President with a mystique that has contrib­
uted heavily to an “imperial presidency.” When we forget that the President 
is “but a man . . . but a citizen” we are on the road that has unfailingly led 
to Caesarism. It was because the Founders had learned this lesson from his­
tory that presidential powers were enumerated and limited, and that immunity 
from arrest was altogether withheld. Id. at 1136 (citations omitted).
m o b il iz a tio n  o f  e x e c u tiv e  a c tio n  is to  p r o je c t  th e  m a t te r  a b s u rd ly  o u t  
o f  p r o p o r t io n .  M o re o v e r , th e  “ c o n t in u ity  a n d  in d e s tru c tib il i ty  o f  th e  
s ta te ”  w o u ld  se em  to  b e  lin k e d  in d is so lu b ly  to  th e  p e rc e iv e d  le g itim a c y  
o f  a  g o v e rn m e n t w h o se  o ffic e rs  a re  r e q u ir e d  to  o p e ra te  w ith o u t  im ­
m u n ity  b a s e d  u p o n  sp e c ia l s ta tu s . I t  is  o u r  a d h e re n c e  to  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
in s t i tu tio n s , n o t  to  th e  e le v a te d  p e rs o n a li t ie s  o f  o u r  le a d e rs ,  w h ic h  p r o ­
v id es  a n  i r o n  r o d  o f  s u p p o r t  f ro m  a  r e p u b l ic a n  p a s t  t o  a  r e p u b l ic a n  
fu tu re .  N e i th e r  a  n a tu ra l  r e a d in g  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  a n d  th e  “n e v e r ­
th e le s s” c la u se  n o r  p re c e d e n t  n o r  p u b l ic  p o lic y  re q u ir e s  th a t  im ­
p e a c h m e n t  a n d  r e m o v a l p re c e d e  in d ic tm e n t,  e v e n — p e r h a p s  e sp e c ia lly  
— w h e n  th e  a c c u s e d  is  th e  P re s id e n t .
I X .  R E SIG N A T IO N  A N D  IM P E A C H M E N T
T h e  r e s ig n a tio n  o f  P re s id e n t  N ix o n  h a s  p r e c ip i ta te d  d e b a te  a b o u t  
th e  e ffe c tiv e n e ss  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t  p r o c e e d in g  a s  a  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
m e a n s  o f  re m o v in g  c iv il o f f ic e rs  f o r  o f f ic ia l m is c o n d u c t.  T h e  d ia lo g u e  
sp e a k s  to  b o th  th e  issu es  o f  w h e th e r  th e  im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e s s  m a y  b e  
c o n t in u e d  a f te r  th e  a c c u s e d  h a s  re s ig n e d  a n d  w h e th e r  th e  im p e a c h m e n t 
p ro c e ss  is to o  u n w ie ld y  to  p ro v id e  a n  e f f ic ie n t m e a n s  o f  re m o v in g  o f ­
f e n d in g  o ffic e rs . I t  is  su g g e s te d  th a t  th e  im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e s s  m a y  
c o n s ti tu t io n a lly  b e  c o n t in u e d  a f te r  a n  a c c u s e d  h a s  re s ig n e d  ( 1 )  a l th o u g h  
p u b lic  p o lic y  c o n s id e ra t io n s  m a y  r e q u ir e  th a t  th e  p ro c e e d in g  b e  d is c o n ­
t in u e d  n o n e th e le s s )  a n d  th a t ,  ( 2 )  a l th o u g h  th e  im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e d u re s  
a r e  c u m b e rs o m e  a n d  d e s e rv e  to  b e  re v ie w e d  a n d  a m e n d e d , th e  o v e ra ll  
e ffe c tiv e n e ss  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e s s  as a  m e a n s  o f  re m o v in g  c iv il 
o ff ic e rs  f ro m  o ff ic e  fo r  m is c o n d u c t m a y  b e  e n h a n c e d  r a th e r  th a n  d im ­
in is h e d  b y  a  r e s ig n a tio n  in  a n t ic ip a t io n  o f  in e v ita b le  c o n v ic tio n  a n d  r e ­
m o v a l. R e s ig n a tio n  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  v ie w e d  as b e in g  e x tra o rd in a ry ,  
e x tra - le g a l ,353 a l ie n  to , o r  e v e n  a p a r t  f ro m , th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss . 
T h e  C o n s t i tu t io n  p ro v id e s  f o r  re s ig n a tio n s  p re c ip i ta te d  d ir e c tly  b y  th e  
im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s ,354 a n d  th e y  a r e  m u c h  m o re  f r e q u e n t  th a n  c o n ­
v ic tio n s  a n d  re m o v a ls . U n d e r  p r o p e r  c irc u m s ta n c e s , r e s ig n a t io n  is  a  
fitting a n d  fo re se e a b le  c o n c lu s io n  t o  im p e a c h m e n t,  a  c o h e r e n t  p a r t  o f  
th e  p ro c e ss .
I n  a d d i t io n  to  P r e s id e n t  N ix o n , m a n y  c iv il o f f ic e rs  h a v e  re s ig n e d  
u n d e r  th e  p re s s u re  o f  a n  im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e e d in g  a g a in s t  th e m , a n d  
th e  q u e s tio n  o f  th e  c o n t in u a t io n  o f  p o s t- r e s ig n a tio n  im p e a c h m e n t  p r o ­
Vol. 1974:1023] IMPEACHMENT  1089
353. C/. Kurland, supra note 4, at 578. Kurland has stated that where “resigna­
tion is not a voluntary act but is in effect forced upon them by extra-legal pressures, 
the resignation is an extra-constitutional means of removal.” Id.
354. U.S. C onst, art. n , § 1, cl. 6,
c e e d in g s  h a s  f re q u e n tly  b e e n  d isc u sse d . I n  th e  e a r l ie s t  im p e a c h m e n t, 
th a t  o f  S e n a to r  B lo u n t,  w h o se  r e m o v a l w a s  a c tu a lly  a c c o m p lish e d  b y  
S e n a te  e x p u ls io n , th e  issu e  o f  c o n t in u in g  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s  
a f te r  r e s ig n a tio n  w as  v ig o ro u s ly  d e b a te d .  T h e  a r g u m e n t  th a t  C o n g re s s  
h a s  ju r is d ic t io n  to  c o n t in u e  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s  a f te r  a n  a c c u se d  
h a s  re s ig n e d  w a s  m a d e  b y  C o n g re s s m a n  B a y a rd :
If the impeachment were regular and maintainable when preferred, I 
apprehend no subsequent event, grounded on the willful act, or caused 
by the delinquency of the party, can vitiate or obstruct the proceeding. 
Otherwise, the party, by resignation or the commission of some offense 
which merited and occasioned his expulsion, might secure his impunity. 
This is against one of the sagest maxims of the law, which does not 
allow a man to derive a benefit from his own wrong.355
T h is  p o in t  w a s  e ffe c tiv e ly  c o n c e d e d  b y  b o th  p a r t ie s ,  w h ile  c o u n s e l fo r  
th e  r e s p o n d e n t  a rg u e d  th a t  B lo u n t c o u ld  n o t  b o th  b e  e x p e lle d  f ro m  th e  
S e n a te  u n d e r  its  o w n  ru le s 356 a n d  th e n  la te r  d isq u a lif ie d  f ro m  h o ld in g  
o ffic e  b y  a n  im p e a c h m e n t c o n v ic tio n .357 B lo u n t  w a s  u lt im a te ly  a c q u it­
te d  o n  th e  b a s is  -that a  S e n a to r  w a s  n o t  a  c iv il o f f ic e r  u n d e r  th e  
im p e a c h m e n t c la u se .
I n  th e  B e lk n a p  tr ia l ,  th e  q u e s tio n  a ro se  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  w h e th e r  
a  p r iv a te  c i tiz e n  w h o  h a d  “fo rm e r ly  h e ld  a n  o f f ic e  m a y  b e  im p e a c h e d  
fo r  ac ts  d o n e  as a n  in c u m b e n t  o f  th a t  o ff ic e .” 358 I t  w a s  a rg u e d , c i tin g  
S to ry , t h a t  su c h  a n  e x e rc ise  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p o w e r  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  
p o ss ib le :
All the reasons upon which the proceeding was supposed to be 
necessary were applicable only to a man who wielded at the moment 
the power of the Government, when only it was necessary to put in mo­
tion the great power of the people, as organized in the House of Rep­
resentatives, to bring him to justice. It is a shocking abuse of power 
to direct so overwhelming a force against a private man.359
I n  r e b u t ta l ,  h o w e v e r, th e  H o u s e  m a n a g e rs  c o n te n d e d  th a t  th e  im p e a c h ­
m e n t  p o w e r  d o e s  n o t  d e p e n d  u p o n  th e  c o n d i t io n  o r  th e  s ta tu s  o f  th e
355. 3 Hinds’ § 2317, at 678.
356. At the time of the Senate trial, Blount was no longer a Senator, having been 
expelled from the Senate under its own rules. Id.
357. Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Dallas, protested: “I certainly shall never 
contend that an officer may first commit an offense and afterwards avoid punishment 
by resigning his office; but the defendant has been expelled. Can he be removed 
at one trial and disqualified at another for the same offense?” Id.
358. Id. § 2007.
359. Id. at 313. It was further argued that “the only purpose of impeachment is 
to remove a man from office, when the man is out of office the object of impeachment 
ceases, and the proceeding must abate. There would be no further object to attain by 
the proceeding.” Id. at 318.
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c u lp r i t  a t  th e  t im e  o f  t r ia l  in  th e  S e n a te , so  lo n g  a s  ju r is d ic t io n  h a d  b e e n  
p ro p e r ly  o b ta in e d  o v e r  th e  re s p o n d e n t b y  th e  H o u se :
[T]he power of the Senate of the United States over all grades 
of public official national wrongdoers, a power conferred for the highest 
reasons of state and on fullest deliberation, to interpose by its judgment 
a perpetual barrier against the return to power of great political offend­
ers, does not depend upon the consent of the culprit, does not depend 
upon the accidental circumstance that the evidence of the crime is not 
discovered until after the official term has expired or toward the close 
of that term, but is a perpetual power, hanging over the guilty officer 
during his whole subsequent life, restricted in its exercise only by the 
discretion of the Senate itself and the necessity of the concurrence of 
both branches, the requirement of a two-thirds’ vote for conviction, and 
the constitutional limitation of the punishment.360
[W]e claim that the House of Representatives having obtained jurisdic­
tion of the subject-matter by instituting these proceedings against the de­
fendant, he could no more defeat them by resigning midway than he 
could defeat the Constitution itself.361
A f te r  c o n s id e ra t io n ,  th e  S e n a te  c o n c lu d e d  th a t  B e lk n a p  w as  s u b je c t  to  
th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s  n o tw ith s ta n d in g  h is  p r io r  re s ig n a t io n .362
C o n s is te n t  w ith  th is  c o n c lu s io n , w h e n  im p e a c h m e n t in v e s tig a tio n s  
h a v e  b e e n  d is c o n tin u e d  a f te r  th e  a c c u s e d  h a s  re s ig n e d ,363 th e  C o n g re s s  
h a s  re se rv e d  its  d is c re tio n a ry  a u th o r i ty  to  c o n t in u e  th e  im p e a c h m e n t 
p r o c e e d in g  d e s p ite  th e  re s ig n a tio n . I n  th e  E n g lis h  im p e a c h m e n t,  f o r  
e x a m p le , a l th o u g h  th e  S e n a te  v o te d  a f te r  h is  r e s ig n a tio n  to  d is c o n tin u e  
th e  p ro c e e d in g , th e  m a n a g e rs  e x p re sse d  th e  o p in io n  th a t  “th e  r e s ig n a ­
t io n  o f  J u d g e  E n g lish  in  n o  w a y  a ffe c ts  th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  S e n a te , s i t t in g  
as  a  c o u r t  o f im p e a c h m e n t,  to  h e a r  a n d  d e te rm in e  sa id  im p e a c h m e n t 
c h a rg e s .” 364 T h u s ,  th e  C o n g re s s  h a s  b e e n  a d a m a n t  in  r e ta in in g  im ­
p e a c h m e n t  ju r is d ic t io n  o v e r  a n  a c c u s e d  d e s p ite  h is  r e s ig n a tio n  f ro m  
o ffic e .
T h re e  a rg u m e n ts  c a n  b e  a d v a n c e d  in  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  c la im  th a t  
p o s t- re s ig n a tio n  im p e a c h m e n t is n o t  a n  id le  o r  v in d ic tiv e  g e s tu re . 
F i r s t ,  a s  h a s  b e e n  a rg u e d  in  p re v io u s  im p e a c h m e n t ca se s , th e  im p e a c h ­
m e n t  ju d g m e n t  m a y  e x te n d  to  b o th  re m o v a l f ro m  o ffic e  a n d  d isq u a l-
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360. Id. at 315-16.
361. Id. at 317.
362. Id. at 321.
363. See, e.g., 6 C annon’s § 526 (Hanford); id. § 547 (English); id. § 550 
(Winslow); 3 Hinds* § 2489 (Stephens); id. § 2500 (Irwin); id. § 2512 (Busteed); 
id. § 2509 (Durell).
364. 6 Cannon’s § 547.
i f ic a tio n  f ro m  h o ld in g  a n y  f u r th e r  o ffic e . R e s ig n a t io n  a c c o m p lish e s  
o n ly  th e  f ir s t  o b je c tiv e . S e c o n d , th e  a c c u s e d  m a y  s ta n d  to  re c e iv e  
e m o lu m e n ts  a n d  b e n e f its  u p o n  r e s ig n a tio n  w h ic h  w o u ld  n o t  o th e rw ise  
b e  a v a ila b le  s h o u ld  h e  b e  r e m o v e d  b y  c o n v ic tio n . T h u s , in  th e  im ­
p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e e d in g  o f  J u d g e  H a n f o rd  in  1 9 1 2 , th e  J u d ic ia ry  C o m ­
m it te e  re c o m m e n d e d  d is c o n tin u a n c e  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g s  
a f te r  th e  J u d g e  h a d  re s ig n e d  u p o n  th e  e x p re ss  r e a s o n  th a t  h e  w as  n o t  
e n t i t le d  to  re c e iv e  a n y  r e t i r e m e n t  b e n e f its :  “ [H ]is r e s ig n a t io n  b r in g s  
h im  n o  e m o lu m e n t o r  re w a rd  a n d  in v o lv e s  n o  e x p e n d itu re  o f  p u b lic  
m o n e y .” 365 B u t  in  th e  c a se  o f  a  p re s id e n tia l  re s ig n a tio n  in c id e n t  to  
a n  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g , th e  p re s e n c e  o f  e m o lu m e n ts  a n d  b e n e f its , 
w h ic h  a r e  a v a ila b le  n o tw ith s ta n d in g  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  r e s ig n a tio n  is n o t  
in  re a l i ty  v o lu n ta ry , m a y  d e m a n d  a  c o n tra ry  re su lt ,  a n d  c o n t in u in g  th e  
im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s  c o u ld  te rm in a te  th e  e x p e n d itu re  o f  p u b lic  m o n e y  
to  a  P re s id e n t  w h o se  o ff ic ia l m is c o n d u c t re s u lte d  in  re s ig n a tio n . T h ird ,  
lo o k in g  a t  th e  su b je c t  ju r is p ru d e n t ia l ly ,  im p e a c h m e n t in  E n g la n d  a n d  
A m e r ic a  w a s  d e v e lo p e d  to  e n fo rc e  a ff irm a tiv e ly  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
b o u n d s  o f  le g it im a te  o f f ic ia l a c tio n . A c c o rd in g ly , im p e a c h m e n t  as  a  
p o lit ic a l to o l  se rv es  to  m a in ta in  g o v e rn m e n t u n d e r  la w ; its  p u rp o s e  e x ­
te n d s  b e y o n d  th e  sc o p e  o f  a n y  p a r t ic u la r  c a se  to  its  e f fe c t  o n  th e  c o n ­
s ti tu tio n a l  s tru c tu re  o f  th e  s ta te . T a k in g  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss  to  
c o n v ic tio n  m a y  h a v e  th e  e ffe c t o f  s e ttin g  p o w e r fu l  p re c e d e n t ia l  l im ita ­
tio n s  o n  p re s id e n tia l  c o n d u c t ;  S e n a te  c o n v ic tio n  a f te r  r e s ig n a tio n  r e p ­
re s e n ts  th e  m o s t a w e so m e  ju d g m e n t  th a t  c e r ta in  b e h a v io r  is b e y o n d  th e  
p a le .
A lth o u g h  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s  m a y  c o n s ti tu t io n a lly  b e  c o n ­
t in u e d  a f te r  th e  a c c u s e d  h a s  re s ig n e d , s e v e ra l a rg u m e n ts  c a n  b e  m a d e  
a g a in s t su c h  c o n d u c t  u n d e r  c e r ta in  c irc u m s ta n c e s . F ir s t ,  w h e n  th e  o f ­
fe n se  c h a rg e d  c o n s titu te s  a n  in d ic ta b le  c r im e , a f te r  r e s ig n a t io n  i t  m a y  
b e  m o s t  p r a c t ic a b le  to  a llo w  th e  ju d ic ia l  p ro c e ss  to  b e  u til iz e d  to  
c o n c lu d e  th e  m a t te r  o n  c o n v e n tio n a l  c r im in a l  g ro u n d s . T h e  f ra m e rs  
c le a r ly  in te n d e d  th e  ju d ic ia l  p ro c e s s  to  su p p le m e n t th e  im p e a c h m e n t 
p ro c e ss , e v e n — p e rh a p s  e sp e c ia lly — a g a in s t  th e  a c ts  o f  th e  h ig h e s t 
o ff ic ia ls . M o re o v e r ,  a  ju d ic ia l  c o n v ic tio n  m a y  p ro v id e  a n  a l te rn a t iv e  
m o d e  fo r  c re a t in g  p r e c e d e n t  w h ic h  w o u ld  r e s tr a in  f u tu re  c o n d u c t  o f  th e  
o ffic e . S e c o n d , C o n g re s s  h a s  a l te rn a t iv e  m e a n s  to  lim it ,  a t  le a s t  
p ro sp e c tiv e ly , th e  r e t i r e m e n t  b e n e f its  f o r  c iv il o f f ic e rs  w h o  h a v e  r e ­
s ig n e d  u n d e r  th r e a t  o f  im p e a c h m e n t. T h ir d ,  w h e n  th e  o ffe n se  c h a rg e d  
m a y  b e  n o n in d ic ta b le ,  su c h  as a b u s e  o f  p o w e rs  o r  f a i lu re  to  c o m p ly  
w ith  c o n g re s s io n a l s u b p o e n a s  in  a n  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g , C o n g re s s
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c o u ld  p a s s  a  p re c e d e n t ia l  r e s o lu t io n  in d ic a t in g  th e  im p e a c h a b le  n a tu r e  
o f  su c h  a c ts ;  i t  c o u ld  th e n  c e n s u re  th e  a c c u s e d  o f f ic e r  a f te r  h is  r e s ig n a ­
t io n  r a th e r  th a n  p ro lo n g in g  th e  im p e a c h m e n t t r ia l  i ts e lf .366 T h e  a v a il­
a b i l i ty  o f  th e s e  la w -m a k in g  a l te rn a t iv e s  m a y  s u p p o r t  a n  a rg u m e n t  
a g a in s t  c o n t in u in g  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss  w h e n  th e  a c c u s e d  h a s  r e ­
s ig n e d , b u t  o n ly  to  th e  e x te n t  th a t  th e se  a l te rn a t iv e s  a re  a c tu a lly  u til iz e d  
a r e  th e  p u rp o s e s  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s  th e re b y  fu lfille d .
N o  m y th  o f  m a r ty rd o m  s h o u ld  b e  a l lo w e d  to  s u r ro u n d  o n e  n o t 
w o r th y  o f  s u c h  a  fa te . T h e  a b s e n c e  o f  f a c tu a l  a m b ig u ity  m u s t  b e  
a c h ie v e d  e i th e r  b y  c o n fe ss io n  c o n n e c te d  w ith  re s ig n a tio n  o r  b y  th e  p r o ­
cesses d isc u sse d  p re v io u s ly , o r  b y  so m e  c o m b in a t io n  th e re o f . O th e r ­
w ise , th e  d is c o n tin u a t io n  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss  u p o n  th e  re s ig n a ­
t io n  o f  th e  a c c u se d , if  fo llo w e d  b y  a  f a i lu re  o f  th e  c o u r ts ,  th e  P re s id e n t ,  
th e  J u s t ic e  D e p a r tm e n t ,  a n d  th e  C o n g re s s  to  f u r th e r  e f fe c tu a te  a l te r n a ­
tiv e s  to  im p e a c h m e n t,  to g e th e r  w o u ld  d e m o n s tr a te  th e  in a d e q u a c y  o f  
th e  sy s tem  p ro p e r ly  to  e n fo rc e  th e  ru le  o f  la w  as th e  c o h e s iv e  e le m e n t 
o f  th e  s ta te .
A s id e  f ro m  th e  c r i t ic a l  a n d  c o m p le x  issu e  as to  h o w  th e  la w ­
m a k in g , p re c e d e n t ia l  p u rp o se s  o f  im p e a c h m e n t c a n  b e s t  b e  a c c o m ­
p lis h e d , a n  a n a ly s is  o f  re s ig n a tio n  in c id e n t  to  im p e a c h m e n t d e m o n ­
s tra te s  th a t  th e  lim ite d  a n d  m o re  s im p le  p u rp o s e  o f  im p e a c h m e n t to  
re m o v e  h ig h  o ffic ia ls  f ro m  o ffic e  in  o r d e r  to  e n d  a  p a r t i c u la r  a b u s e  o f  
o ffic e  is n o t  f ru s t r a te d  b y  re s ig n a tio n . J o s e p h  B o rk in  h a s  n o te d  th a t  
“ [o ]f th e  f if ty -f iv e  ju d g e s  [su b je c t to  a  c o n g re s s io n a l in q u iry ]  . . . 
s e v e n te e n  . . . re s ig n e d  a t  o n e  s ta g e  o r  a n o th e r  o n  th e  c o n d u c t o f  th e  
in v e s tig a tio n  . . . .  A d d e d  to  th is  a re  th e  u n d e te rm in e d  n u m b e r  o f  
ju d g e s  w h o  re s ig n e d  u p o n  m e re  th r e a t  o f  in q u iry ;  f o r  th e m  th e re  a re  
n o  a d e q u a te  r e c o rd s .” 367 A  s im p le  lis tin g  o f  th e  re s ig n a tio n s  w h ic h
Vol. 1974:1023] IMPEACHMENT 1093
366. The House of Representatives acted in this manner, though with overcaution 
and consequently with much less normative impact, by ordering the printing of the 
final report of the House Committee on the Judiciary as a House document rather 
than following the usual procedure of printing it as a document of the Judiciary Com­
mittee. This reflects to some ambiguous degree House ratification of the Commit­
tee’s fact-finding conclusions and impeachment recommendation. The Committee re­
port presents an overwhelming factual case establishing the commission of impeach­
able offenses, but the report falls far short of a vote of impeachment after resignation. 
Where offenses, both criminally indictable and nonindictable, are as serious as those 
established, a vote of censure after resignation, rather than a continuation of impeach­
ment proceedings, is precedentially harmful to the rule of law. In such a situation, 
censure is so mild when compared with the seriousness of the offenses as to be insti­
tutionally harmful, arguably indicating congressional timidity toward the concept of 
equality before the law when high political figures are involved. See H.R. Rep. No. 
1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
367. J. Borkin, supra note 345, at 204.
h a v e  fo llo w e d  im p e a c h m e n t in v e s tig a tio n s  su g g e sts  th a t  th e  im p e a c h ­
m e n t p o w e r  o f  C o n g re s s  h a s  b e e n  su c ce ssfu lly  e m p lo y e d  as a  p o w e r fu l  
c o n s ti tu t io n a l  m e a n s  o f  re m o v in g  c iv il o ffic e rs  f ro m  o f f ic e  w h e re  m is ­
c o n d u c t  is a p p a re n t .  A m o n g  th e  ju d g e s  w h o  h a v e  re s ig n e d  d ire c tly  
as a  r e s u l t  o f  a n  im p e a c h m e n t in q u iry  a re  J u d g e s  S te p h e n s , I rw in , 
B u s tu d , D u re ll ,  H a n fo rd ,  W rig h t,  E n g lis h , a n d  W in s lo w .368 S e c re ta ry  
o f  W a r  B e lk n a p  re s ig n e d  in c id e n t to  a n  im p e a c h m e n t in v e s tig a tio n ,369 
a s  d id  a  c o l le c to r  o f  c u s to m s .370 F in a lly , a n d  m o s t s ig n if ic a n tly , 
P re s id e n t N ix o n  re s ig n e d  a f te r  r e p e a te d  s ta te m e n ts  th a t  h e  h a d  n o  in ­
te n t io n  o f  so  d o in g , o n c e  i t  a p p e a r e d  th a t  im p e a c h m e n t in  th e  H o u s e  
a n d  c o n v ic tio n  in  th e  S e n a te  w e re  in e v ita b le . A l th o u g h  th e  J u d ic ia ry  
C o m m itte e s  in  th e se  c a se s  e i th e r  h a v e  fo u n d  i t  u n n e c e s sa ry  to  r e p o r t  
to  th e  H o u se  o r  h a v e  r e p o r te d  w ith  a  r e c o m m e n d a tio n  o f  d is c o n tin ­
u a n c e  a f te r  re s ig n a tio n , th e  p o ss ib ility  o f  in c lu d in g  f in d in g s  o r  re so l­
u tio n s  in  su c h  re p o r ts  o f te n  p ro v id e s  a n  e ffe c tiv e  a l te rn a t iv e  to  c o n t in u ­
in g  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s .371
R e s ig n a tio n  n e e d  n o t  r e p re s e n t  th e  d e fe a t  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t 
p ro ce ss  b u t  in s te a d  m a y  b e  ju s t  o n e  a s p e c t o f  i ts  su c c e ss fu l o p e ra tio n .  
A lth o u g h  th e  re s ig n a tio n  o f  a  c o r r u p t  o f f ic e r , ta k e n  a lo n e , d o e s  n o t  fu l­
fill a ll th e  p u rp o se s  o f  im p e a c h m e n t, r e s ig n a tio n  d o e s  a c c o m p lish  
s e v e ra l im p o r ta n t  fu n c tio n s  o f  im p e a c h m e n t w ith o u t  p re c lu d in g  th e  u se  
o f  o th e r  a v a ila b le  m e a n s  to  fu lfill  its  f u r th e r  en d s .
X. Pardon and Impeachment
T h e  p a r d o n  e x te n d e d  M r. N ix o n  b y  P re s id e n t F o r d  ra ise s  f u r th e r  
q u e s tio n s  c o n c e rn in g  b o th  th e  e ffec tiv e n ess  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p r o ­
cess as a  m e a n s  o f  c o n s tra in in g  e x e c u tiv e  p o w e r  a n d  th e  v a l id ity  o f th e  
d e m o c ra tic  p re m ise  th a t  la w  d o e s  in  t r u th  a p p ly  e q u a lly  to  a l l  m e n . 
T h e  q u e s tio n s  a re  p re c ip ita te d ,  in  p a r t ,  b y  c o n fu s io n  c o n c e rn in g  th e  
sc o p e  o f  th e  p re s id e n tia l  p a r d o n  p o w e r , w ith  r e g a rd  to  w h ic h  th e  fo llo w ­
in g  p o in ts  m a y  b e  m a d e  in  re sp e c t to  im p e a c h m e n ts : (1 ) a  p a r d o n  is 
a n  a c t  o f  g ra c e  p r im a r ily  in te n d e d  to  b e  u se d  in  ca ses  w h e re  s tr ic t  a p ­
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368. Judges Stephens in 1818, 3 Hinds’ § 2489, Irwin in 1859, id. § 2500, Busteed 
in 1873, id. § 2512, Durell in 1875, id. § 2509, Hanford in 1912, 6 Cannon’s § 
526, Wright in 1914, id. § 528, English in 1926, id. § 547, and Winslow in 1929, id. 
§ 550, all resigned as a result of the initiation of impeachment proceedings.
369. 3 Hinds’ § 2445.
370. 6 C annon’s § 539 (Chase).
371. In the case of Circuit Court Judge Hanford, who resigned in 1912, the 
House Judiciary Committee, in recommending the discontinuation of the proceeding, 
“declared him to be disqualified for his position, thereby presenting an official pro­
nouncement as to the Judge’s responsibility for misconduct in office.” Id. § 526, at 
745.
p lic a t io n  o f  th e  c r im in a l c o d e  w o u ld  n o t  se rv e  ju s t ic e ;  (2 ) th e  f o u n d in g  
f a th e rs  in te n d e d  to  e x c e p t f ro m  th e  p re s id e n tia l  p a r d o n  p o w e r  th o s e  
c a se s  in v o lv in g  p u b lic  m is c o n d u c t r is in g  to  th e  le v e l o f  im p e a c h a b le  
o ffe n ses  a n d  n o  r e a s o n  is e v id e n t to  d e p a r t  f ro m  su c h  a  p o lic y ; (3 ) 
th e  sc o p e  o f  th e  p a r d o n  p o w e r  is  l im ite d  to  re m itt in g  c r im in a l p u n is h ­
m e n t  b u t  d o es  n o t  b lo t  o u t  th e  o f fe n d e r ’s g u il t ;  a n d  (4 ) th e  p a r d o n  
p o w e r  o u g h t n o t to  b e  e x e rc ise d  to  c irc u m v e n t a  fu ll  in v e s tig a tio n  in to  
th e  m is c o n d u c t o f  p u b lic  o ffic ia ls , b u t  sh o u ld  o n ly  b e  in v o k e d  e i th e r  
a f te r  c o n v ic tio n  to  re m it p u n is h m e n t o r  b e fo re  tr ia l  to  s e c u re  th e  te s t i ­
m o n y  o f a  c o -c o n s p ira to r  in  th e  e x tra o rd in a ry  s i tu a tio n  in  w h ic h  ju s t ic e
T h e  e a r lie s t  s ta te m e n t o f  th e  E n g lish  la w  o f  im p e a c h m e n t w a s  
m a d e  in  th e  th ir te e n th  c e n tu ry  b y  B r a c to n  w h o  s ta te d  w ith  re s p e c t  to
[A] person is not restored except to the king’s peace alone . . . .  For 
the king cannot grant a pardon with injury or damage to others. He 
may give what is his own, that is his protection, . . . but that which 
is another’s he cannot give by his own grace. Likewise a person justly 
and duly outlawed is not restored to anything except to the king’s peace
I n  th e  ca se  o f  im p e a c h m e n t, w h e re  th e  o ffe n se  w a s  d e e m e d  to  b e  
a g a in s t th e  p u b lic  r a th e r  th a n  th e  c ro w n , th e  k in g ’s p re ro g a tiv e  o f  p a r ­
d o n in g  w a s  su b s ta n tia l ly  lim ite d . S to ry , in  h is  C o m m e n ta r ie s  o n  th e  
C o n s ti tu t io n ,  s u m m a riz e d  th e  E n g lis h  la w  o f  p a r d o n  in c id e n t  to  im ­
p e a c h m e n t:  “I n  E n g la n d  . . .  n o  p a r d o n  c a n  b e  p le a d e d  in  b a r  o f  a n  
im p e a c h m e n t. B u t  th e  k in g  m a y , a f te r  c o n v ic tio n  u p o n  a n  im p e a c h ­
m e n t, p a r d o n  th e  o ffe n d e r . H is  p re ro g a tiv e , th e re fo re , c a n n o t  p re v e n t 
th e  d isg ra c e  o f  c o n v ic tio n ; b u t  i t  m a y  a v e r t  i ts  e ffec ts , a n d  r e s to re  th e
T h e  e ffec t o f  a  p a rd o n , th e re fo re , d id  n o t  b lo t  o u t,  m u c h  le ss  p re ­
v e n t, th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  th e  fe lo n ’s g u ilt  b y  t r ia l  a n d  c o n v ic tio n , b u t  
m e re ly  re e s ta b l is h e d  h is  le g a l c a p a c ity  as th a t  o f  a n  in n o c e n t m a n , a n  
im p o r ta n t  m a t te r  u n d e r  E n g lis h  la w  s in c e  c o n v ic tio n  d e s tro y e d  m a n y  
o f  th e  c iv il r ig h ts  o f  th e  o f fe n d e r .374 I n  th e  c a se  o f  a  p u b lic  s e rv a n t 
w h o se  o f fe n se  w a s  a g a in s t th e  p u b lic  h e  p u rp o r te d ly  se rv e d , th e  k in g ’s 
p a r d o n  c o u ld  n o t  o b v ia te  th e  d isg ra c e  o f  c o n v ic tio n  a f te r  im p e a c h m e n t,
372. Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 647, 649 (1915)
373. 2 J. S tory  § 1502, at 336.
374. Williston, supra note 372, at 650.
w h ic h  se rv e d  a  p ro p h y la c t ic  fu n c tio n  in  th e  e f fo r t  to  a c h ie v e  “m in is te ­
r ia l  re sp o n s ib ili ty  a n d  p r im a c y  o v e r  th e  k in g  . . . .” 375 T h e  p re v e n tiv e  
fu n c tio n s  o f th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s  d e m a n d e d  th e  p r o p e r  t im in g  o f  
a  g r a n t  o f  p a rd o n  w h ic h  d id  n o t  o b s tr u c t  fu ll d isc lo su re  o f  w ro n g d o in g .
C o n tra ry  to  th e  E n g lis h  e x p e r ie n c e , A m e r ic a n s  a d o p te d  th e  v ie w  
th a t  so v e re ig n ty  w ith  a l l  i ts  p e rq u is i te s ,  in c lu d in g  th e  p o w e r  to  r e m it  
p u n is h m e n t, r e s te d  f in a lly  w ith  th e  p e o p le . M o rr is ,  in  th e  C o n s ti tu ­
t io n a l  C o n v e n tio n , n o te d  th a t  “ th is  M a g is tr a te  [ th e  P re s id e n t]  is n o t  
th e  K in g  b u t  th e  p r im e  M in is te r .  T h e  p e o p le  a re  th e  K in g .” 376 A s  
a  re su lt ,  th e  th e o re tic a l  f o u n d a t io n  o f  th e  E n g lis h  la w  o f  p a r d o n ,  th a t  
th e  k in g ’s p e a c e  w as  th e  k in g ’s to  e n fo rc e , o r  its  v io la tio n  to  fo rg iv e , 
b e c a m e  in a p p lic a b le  in  th e  A m e r ic a n  s itu a tio n . N e v e rth e le ss , p a r d o n  
p o w e r  w as  d isc u sse d  in  th e  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  d e b a te  as a n  e s se n tia l e le m e n t 
o f  d e m o c ra tic  g o v e rn m e n t. I t  w a s  a rg u e d  b y  J a m e s  I re d e l l  in  th e  
N o r th  C a ro l in a  ra ti fy in g  c o n v e n tio n  th a t  th e  p r o p e r  e x e rc ise  o f  th e  p a r ­
d o n  p o w e r  in  a  r e p u b lic a n  fo rm  o f  g o v e rn m e n t w a s  n o t  to  p r o te c t  fe lo n s  
w ith  p o w e rfu l f r ie n d s , b u t  to  p r o te c t  th e  b o d y  p o li t ic  f ro m  p o ss ib le  in ­
ju s tic e s  th a t  m a y  r e s u l t  f ro m  in f le x ib le  a p p l ic a tio n  o f  th e  la w s .377
I n  th e  c a se  o f  a  p u b lic  s e rv a n t w h o  h a d  c o m m itte d  “h ig h  C r im e s  
a n d  M is d e m e a n o rs ,” I re d e ll ,  w h o  la te r  se rv e d  o n  th e  S u p re m e  C o u r t ,  
a rg u e d  th a t  a  p a rd o n  w o u ld  b e  in a p p ro p r ia te  in  th a t  i t  w o u ld  n o t  se rv e  
ju s tic e :
After [an impeachment] trial thus solemnly conducted, it is not prob­
able that it would happen once in a thousand times that a man actually 
convicted would be entitled to mercy; and if the President had the power 
of pardoning in such a case, this great check upon high officers of state 
would lose much of its influence. It seems, therefore, proper that the 
general power of pardoning should be abridged in this particular 
instance.378
A c c o rd in g ly , th e  p re s id e n tia l  p a r d o n  p o w e r  th a t  w as  in c o rp o r a te d  in to  
th e  C o n s ti tu t io n  e x c e p te d  c a se s  o f  im p e a c h m e n t: “T h e  P re s id e n t  . . . 
s h a ll h a v e  P o w e r  to  g r a n t  R e p rie v e s  a n d  P a r d o n s  f o r  O ffe n se s  a g a in s t  
th e  U n ite d  S ta te s , e x c e p t in  C a se s  o f  Im p e a c h m e n t .”379
J u s t ic e  S to ry , in  a n a ly z in g  th e  h is to r ic a l  c r e a t io n  o f  th e  p a r d o n  
p o w e r , s ta te d  th a t  th e  f ra m e rs  in te n d e d  b y  th e  e x c e p tio n  to  ta k e  “f ro m  
th e  P re s id e n t  e v e ry  te m p ta t io n  to  a b u s e  i t  in  c a se s  o f  p o l i t ic a l  a n d
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375. Firmage, supra note 14, at 686.
376. 2 Records 69.
377. 4 J. E l l i o t t  110-12.
378. Id. at 113-14.
379. U.S. C onst, art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
o ffic ia l o ffe n c e s  b y  p e rso n s  in  th e  p u b lic  se rv ic e .” 380 S to ry  c o n c lu d e d  
th a t
[i]t is of great consequence, that the President should not have the 
power of preventing a thorough investigation of their conduct, or of se­
curing them against the disgrace of a public conviction by impeachment 
if they should deserve it. The Constitution has, therefore, wisely inter­
posed this check upon his power, so that he cannot, by any corrupt 
coalition with favorites, or dependents in high offices, screen them from 
punishment.381
B . E le m e n ts  o f  P a r d o n
A  p a r d o n  h a s  b e e n  d e f in e d  a s  “ th e  p r iv a te ,  th o u g h  o f f ic ia l a c t” 
o f  fo rg iv e n e s s  “b y  th e  e x e c u tiv e  m a g is tr a te  . . . [w h ich ] e x e m p ts  th e  
in d iv id u a l”  w h o  a c c e p ts  th e  p ro f fe r  f ro m  th e  le g a l p u n is h m e n t  n o rm a lly  
a t ta c h e d  to  th e  o f fe n se .382 M u c h  o f  th e  d e b a te  c o n c e rn in g  th e  p re s i­
d e n t ia l  p a rd o n  p o w e r  in v o lv e s  q u e s tio n s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  sc o p e  o f  th e  
p o w e r  a n d  th e  a p p r o p r ia te  tim in g  o f  a  g r a n t  o f  p a rd o n . T h e  S u p re m e  
C o u r t ’s im p re c ise  t r e a tm e n t  o f  th e se  issu es  is  in  p a r t  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  
th e  c o n fu s io n  o v e r  th e  p r e s id e n tia l  p a r d o n  p o w e r .
S u p p o r t  fo r  th e  v iew  th a t  a  p a r d o n  b lo ts  o u t  g u il t  a s  w e ll a s  re m its  
p u n is h m e n t h a s  b e e n  th o u g h t  to  e x is t in  th e  S u p re m e  C o u r t ’s o p in io n  
in  E x  p a r t e  G a r la n d .383 I n  th a t  ca se , th e  p e t i t io n e r  a rg u e d  th a t  th e  
e f fe c t o f  a  p a r d o n  “ is  to  o b l i te r a te  th e  p a s t ,  to  le a v e  n o  t r a c e  o f  th e  
o ffe n se , a n d  to  p la c e  th e  o f fe n d e r  e x a c tly  in  th e  p o s i t io n  w h ic h  h e  
o c c u p ie d  b e fo re  th e  o ffe n se  w as  c o m m itte d , o r  in  w h ic h  h e  w o u ld  h a v e  
b e e n  if  h e  h a d  n o t  c o m m itte d  th e  o f fe n se .” 384 S e em in g ly  a d o p tin g  th e  
p e t i t io n e r ’s re a so n in g , th e  C o u r t  s ta te d  in  d ic ta  t h a t  “a  p a r d o n  re a c h e s  
b o th  th e  p u n is h m e n t p re s c r ib e d  fo r  th e  o ffe n se  a n d  th e  g u il t  o f  th e  
o f fe n d e r ; a n d  w h e n  th e  p a r d o n  is fu ll, i t  re le a se s  th e  p u n is h m e n t a n d  
b lo ts  o u t  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  g u ilt ,  so  th a t  in  th e  ey e  o f  th e  la w  th e  o f fe n d e r  
is in n o c e n t  as if  h a d  n e v e r  c o m m itte d  th e  o f fe n se .” 385 T h e  p re s id e n tia l  
“p a rd o n in g ” p r o c la m a t io n  in  th a t  c a se , h o w e v e r, w a s  “u n d e r  th e  
a m n e s ty  p o w e r  d e le g a te d  b y  C o n g re s s  in  1 8 6 2  a s  w e ll a s  u n d e r  th is  
p a rd o n in g  p o w e r .” 386 T h e  p re c e d e n t ia l  v a lu e  o f  G a r la n d  in  a  s im p le  
p a r d o n  is th e re fo re  s lig h t.
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382. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
383. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
384. Id. at 351.
385. Id. at 380.
386. Freeman, An Historical Justification and Legal Basis for Amnesty Today, 
1971 Law and th e  Social O rder 515, 522.
C o u r ts ,  in  d is t in g u ish in g  b e tw e e n  a m n e s ty  a n d  p a rd o n , h a v e  
s ta te d  th a t  w h e re a s  a m n e s ty  m a y  b lo t  o u t  g u il t  b y  re m o v in g  th e  o ffe n se , 
a  p a r d o n  m e re ly  re m its  p u n is h m e n t. I n  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. B a s s e t ,387 
a m n e s ty  a n d  p a r d o n  w e re  d is t in g u ish e d  o n  th e  g ro u n d  th a t  a  p a r d o n  
d o e s  n o t  e x tin g u ish  g u ilt :
The word “amnesty” is defined thus: “An act of oblivion of past of­
fenses, granted by the government to those who have been guilty of 
any neglect or crime, usually upon condition that they return to their 
duty within a certain period.”
A pardon relieves an offender from the consequences of an offense 
of which he has been convicted, while amnesty obliterates an offense 
before conviction; and in such case, he stands before the law precisely 
as though he had committed no offense.388
T h e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  in  B u r d ic k  v . U n ite d  S ta te s 389 a p p a re n tly  a d o p te d  
th e  sa m e  v iew  th a t  a  p a r d o n  d o e s  n o t  e x tin g u ish  g u il t  n o tw ith s ta n d in g  
th e  d ic ta  in  G a r la n d :
The one [amnesty] overlooks offense; the other [pardon] remits 
punishment. The first is usually addressed to crimes against the sover­
eignty of the State, to political offenses, forgiveness being deemed more 
expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and punishment. The 
second condones infractions of the peace of the State.390
I n  B u r d ic k ,  th e  C o u r t  r e je c te d  th e  v ie w  e x p re sse d  e a r l ie r  b y  J u s t ic e  
F ie ld  th a t  th e  d is t in c t io n  b e tw e e n  a m n e s ty  a n d  p a r d o n  is “ o n e  r a th e r  
o f  p h ilo lo g ic a l in te re s t  th a n  o f  le g a l im p o r ta n c e .” 391 I n  re s p o n s e  to  
F ie ld ’s o p in io n  th a t  a m n e s ty  a n d  p a r d o n  a r e  in d is tin g u ish a b le  a n d  th a t  
b o th  e x tin g u ish  g u ilt ,  th e  C o u r t  s ta te d : “T h is  is so  a s  to  th e ir  u lt im a te  
e ffe c t, b u t  th e re  a re  in c id e n ta l  d if fe re n c e s  o f  im p o r ta n c e .  T h e y  a re  
o f  d if fe re n t  c h a r a c te r  a n d  h a v e  d if fe re n t  p u rp o s e s .” 392 F u r th e rm o re ,  
a  p r o p e r  re a d in g  o f  G a r la n d  d e m o n s tra te s  th e  C o u r t ’s r e c o g n it io n  o f  
g u ilt  a t ta c h e d  to  a  p a r d o n e d  c rim e : “L ite ra lly , o f  c o u rse , a n  e x e c u tiv e  
p a r d o n  c a n n o t  ‘b lo t  o u t  o f  e x is te n c e  g u il t’ o f  o n e  w h o  c o m m itte d  a  
c r im e . A t  m o s t i t  c a n  w ip e  o u t  th e  le g a l c o n s e q u e n c e s  w h ic h  f lo w  f ro m  
a n  a d ju d ic a tio n  o f  g u il t .” 393
I n  s u p p o r t  o f th is  v iew , c o u r ts  h a v e  g e n e ra lly  h e ld  t h a t  th e  a c c e p t­
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387. 5 Utah 131, 13 P. 237 (1887), rev’d  on other grounds, 137 U.S. 496 
(1890).
388. 5 Utah at 133, 13 P. at 239 (citation omitted).
389. 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
390. Id. at 95.
391. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877).
392. 236 U.S. at 94-95.
393. People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 136, 38 N.E.2d 468, 470 
(1964) (applying Garland),
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a n c e  o f  a  p a r d o n  im p lie s  a n  a d m is s io n  o f  g u ilt ,  in  e x c h a n g e  f o r  th e  
re m is s io n  o f  p e n a lt ie s .394
Far from wiping out guilt, the acceptance of an executive pardon may 
imply a confession of guilt. Escape by confession of guilt implied in 
the acceptance of a pardon may be rejected—preferring to be the victim 
of the law rather than its acknowledged transgressor—preferring death 
even to such certain infamy.395
S in ce  a n  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  a  g r a n t  o f  p a r d o n  im p lie s  a  c o n fe s s io n  o f  
g u ilt ,  w h ic h  c a n n o t  b e  b lo t te d  o u t  o f  e x is te n c e  b y  e x e c u tiv e  w h im ,398 
th e  p a r d o n  s h o u ld  lo g ic a lly  fo llo w , n o t  p re c e d e , fo rm a l a d ju d ic a t io n  o f  
th e  o ffe n ses . L u th e r  M a r t in  o f fe re d  a  m o tio n  in  th e  C o n s ti tu t io n a l  
C o n v e n tio n  to  a c c o m p lish  th is  r e s u lt  b y  m a k in g  c o n v ic tio n  a  p re re q u i­
s ite  to  th e  r e c e p tio n  o f  a  p a rd o n . M a d is o n  r e c o rd e d  th a t  M a r t in  m o v e d  
to  “ in s e r t th e  w o rd s , ‘a f te r  c o n v ic tio n ,’ a f te r  th e  w o rd s  ‘re p r ie v e s  a n d  
p a r d o n s .’ ” H o w e v e r , M a r t in  w ith d re w  th e  m o tio n  w h e n  J a m e s  W ilso n  
n o te d  th a t  “p a r d o n  b e fo re  c o n v ic tio n  m ig h t b e  n e c e s sa ry , in  o r d e r  to  
o b ta in  th e  te s tim o n y  o f  a c c o m p lic e s .” 397 T h e  f ra m e rs , th e re fo re , w h ile  
n o t  ex p re ss ly  r e q u ir in g  th a t  c o n v ic tio n  p re c e d e  p a rd o n , h a d  a  n a r r o w  
v iew  as to  th o se  cases  in  w h ic h  a  p a r d o n  c o u ld  le g itim a te ly  b e  in v o k e d  
p r io r  to  c o n v ic tio n . T h a t  n a r ro w  v iew  c le a r ly  d id  n o t  e x te n d  to  th e  
c a se  w h e re  th e  p a r d o n  p o w e r  is u se d  to  p re v e n t a  th o ro u g h  in v e s tig a ­
t io n  a n d  a  f in a l  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  th e  g u il t  o r  in n o c e n c e  o f  p u b lic  o f ­
f ic ia ls  c h a rg e d  w ith  ille g a l m is c o n d u c t in  o ffice . R a th e r ,  th e  im p e a c h ­
m e n t e x c e p tio n  to  th e  p re s id e n tia l  p a r d o n  p o w e r  w a s  a d d e d  as a  c ir ­
c u m s c r ip tio n  to  th a t  p o w e r  in  o rd e r  to  a v o id  th a t  v e ry  p o ss ib ility .398
C . T h e  N ix o n  P a r d o n  a n d  B e y o n d
P re s id e n t F o r d ’s g r a n t  o f  p a r d o n  to  fo rm e r  P re s id e n t N ix o n  m a y  
b e  c r it ic iz e d  o n  se v e ra l g ro u n d s . F irs t ,  h is  ex e rc ise  o f  th e  p a r d o n  
p o w e r  w as in c o n s is te n t w ith  its  u n d e r ly in g  p u rp o s e , th a t  o f  se rv in g  
ju s tic e . P re s id e n t F o rd ,  in  a  n ew s c o n fe re n c e  fo llo w in g  th e  g r a n t  o f  
p a rd o n , a d m it te d  th a t  th e  th ir ty -e ig h t m e m b e r  H o u s e  J u d ic ia ry  C o m ­
m it te e ’s f in a l  u n a n im o u s  r e p o r t  in  f a v o r  o f  im p e a c h m e n t a n d  N ix o n ’s
394. See, e.g., State v. Jacobsen, 348 Mo. 258, 260-61, 152 S.W.2d 1061, 1063 
(1941); Jones v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 70, 73-74, 147 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Crim. App. 
1941); State v. Cullen, 14 Wash. 2d 105, 109, 127 P.2d 257, 259 (1942).
395. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 76, 90-91 (1915).
396. See People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 137-38, 38 N.E.2d 
468, 471 (1941), where the court stated that “[t]he Constitution, which confers upon 
the President the power to pardon, does not confer upon him power to wipe out 
guilt.”
397. 5 J. E l l i o t t  480.
398. See text accompanying note 378 supra.
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a c c e p ta n c e  o f  th e  p a r d o n  c o n s ti tu te  p e rsu a s iv e  e v id e n c e  o f  th e  f o rm e r  
P re s id e n t’s g u il t .399 T h e  p a r d o n ,  fo llo w in g  th e  d is c o n tin u a t io n  o f  th e  
im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g s  u p o n  N ix o n ’s re s ig n a tio n , im p lie s  t h a t  th e  
P re s id e n t’s c o n d u c t  w ill n o t  b e  m e a s u re d  b y  th e  sa m e  s ta n d a r d  o f  ju s ­
tic e  th a t  a p p lie s  to  a l l  o th e r  p e rso n s . C o n f id e n c e  in  o u r  d e m o c ra tic  
sy s tem  o f  ju s t ic e  d e m a n d s  th a t  th e  la w  b e  a p p l ie d  to  a l l  p e rso n s  e q u a lly  
a n d  th a t  p u b lic  o ffic ia ls  n o t  b e  p e rm it te d  to  v io la te  th e  la w s  w ith  
im p u n ity .
S e c o n d , th e  f ra m e rs  in te n d e d , b y  in c lu d in g  th e  im p e a c h m e n t e x ­
c e p tio n  to  p re s id e n tia l p a r d o n in g  p o w e r , to  a v o id  h a v in g  th e  p a r d o n  
u se d  to  o b s tr u c t  a  th o ro u g h  in v e s tig a tio n  a n d  u lt im a te  c o n g re s s io n a l re s ­
o lu tio n  o f  c h a rg e s  o f  o f f ic ia l m is c o n d u c t.  A  p a r d o n  g r a n te d  p r io r  
to  a n y  f in a l  d e te r m in a t io n  o f  th e  e x te n t  o f  p re s id e n tia l m isd e e d s  in  th is  
c a se  g o es  e v e n  f u r th e r  th a n  w o u ld  b e  p e rm it te d  in  E n g lis h  la w  w h e re  
th e  k in g  c o u ld  n o t  in v o k e  h is  p a r d o n  in  th e  ca se  o f  im p e a c h m e n t, b o th  
in  a  c r im in a l  a s  w e ll as a  p o li t ic a l  p ro c e e d in g , u n ti l  a f te r  c o n v ic tio n  a n d  
d isg ra c e . T h e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  f ra m e rs  c o n s c io u s ly  s e p a r a te d  th e  im ­
p e a c h m e n t a n d  th e  c r im in a l p ro c e sse s  in  re c o g n it io n  o f  th e  f a c ts  th a t  
th e  tw o  se rv e d  d if fe re n t  p u rp o s e s  a n d  th a t  re m o v a l f ro m  o ffic e  a lo n e  
w a s  n o t  a n  a d e q u a te  s a n c tio n  fo r  p u b lic  w ro n g d o in g . S in c e  N ix o n  w a s  
n o t  im p e a c h e d  o r  c o n v ic te d  ( th o u g h  b o th  a p p e a re d  in e v ita b le  in  th e  
a b s e n c e  o f re s ig n a tio n ) , F o r d ’s p a r d o n  su g g e sts  th a t  f u tu re  P re s id e n ts  
s u b je c te d  to  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e s s  w ill e s c a p e  c r im in a l  p ro s e c u tio n  
o n  th e  g ro u n d  th a t  th e i r  r e m o v a l f ro m  o ff ic e  h a s  b e e n  p u n is h m e n t 
e n o u g h . T h is  c o n c e p t io n  o f  p u n is h m e n t  w o u ld  se em  to  a s su m e  a  p r o p ­
e r ty  in te re s t  in  p o li t ic a l  o ffic e , a  n o t io n  h a rd ly  c o n s is te n t  w ith  d e m o ­
c ra tic  g o v e rn m e n t. T o  th is  e x te n t,  N ix o n ’s p a r d o n  as p r e c e d e n t  m a y  
e ffe c tiv e ly  n u llify  th e  c la u s e  in  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n  th a t  a n  im p e a c h e d  
o f f ic ia l “ sh a ll n e v e r th e le ss  b e  l ia b le  a n d  s u b je c t to  In d ic tm e n t ,  T r ia l ,  
J u d g m e n t  a n d  P u n is h m e n t, a c c o rd in g  to  L a w .” 400
I n  re sp o n se  to  P re s id e n t  F o r d ’s q u e s tio n a b le  g r a n t  o f  p a r d o n  in  
th is  c a se , se v e ra l s te p s  c o u ld  b e  ta k e n . F ir s t ,  th e  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  v a l id ity  
o f  a  p a rd o n , in c id e n t to  p re s id e n tia l  m is c o n d u c t w h ic h  w o u ld  h a v e  r e ­
su lte d  in  im p e a c h m e n t a n d  c o n v ic tio n  h a d  n o t  th e  a c c u s e d  re s ig n e d , 
c o u ld  b e  c h a lle n g e d  in  th e  c o u r ts .  S u c h  a n  e x e rc ise  o f  th e  p a r d o n  
p o w e r  is fu n d a m e n ta l ly  in c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  im p e a c h m e n t e x c e p t io n  
to  th a t  p o w er. I f  M r . N ix o n  w e re  in d ic te d , h e  w o u ld  b e  c o m p e lle d  
to  ra is e  th e  issu e  o f  th e  v a l id ity  o f  th e  p a r d o n  a s  a n  a f f irm a tiv e  d e fe n se  
to  p ro se c u tio n .
399. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1974, at 22C, col. 1.
400. U.S. Const, art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
S e co n d , C o n g re s s  c o u ld  re su m e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g s  a g a in s t 
M r . N ix o n  fo r  th e  p u rp o s e  o f  a  f in a l  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  th e  e x te n t  o f  
p re s id e n tia l w ro n g d o in g . I t  is re c o g n iz e d , h o w e v e r, th a t  w h a te v e r  th e  
th e o re tic a l  c o r re c tn e s s  o f  su c h  a  p r o c e d u re ,401 C o n g re s s , f o r  its  o w n  
re a so n s , w ill n o t  fo llo w  th is  c o u rse . I n  th e  a l te rn a t iv e , C o n g re s s  c o u ld  
p ro v id e  th e  S p e c ia l P ro s e c u to r  w ith  a  b ro a d e n e d  m a n d a te  to  in c lu d e  
w ith in  h is  f in a l r e p o r t  to  C o n g re s s  a l l  f in d in g s  o n  th e  W a te rg a te  
sc a n d a ls , in c lu d in g  th e  in v o lv e m e n t o f  R ic h a rd  N ix o n .
T h ird ,  th e  g r a n t  o f  p a rd o n  w as  a c c o m p a n ie d  b y  a n  a g re e m e n t w ith  
M r . N ix o n  c o n c e rn in g  th e  h a n d l in g  o f  th e  p a p e rs  a n d  ta p e s  a c c u m ­
u la te d  w h ile  h e  w as  in  th e  W h ite  H o u se . T h e s e  re c o rd s  a re  o f  c r i t ic a l  
im p o r ta n c e  w ith  re s p e c t  to  p e n d in g  c r im in a l c a se s  a n d  a  f in a l  d e te r ­
m in a t io n  o f  th e  fa c ts  o f  e x e c u tiv e  m is c o n d u c t.  A lth o u g h  th e  a g re e ­
m e n t in c lu d e d  a  p ro v is io n  w h e re b y  N ix o n  w o u ld  v o lu n ta r i ly  p ro d u c e  
ite m s  in  re sp o n se  to  c o u r t  s u b p o e n a s , th e  d o c u m e n ts  r e m a in  s u b je c t 
to  a n y  c la im s  o f  p r iv ile g e  h e  m a y  a s se r t, a n d  w h a t  is n o t  m a d e  c le a r  
in  th e  a g re e m e n t is w h e th e r  th e se  d o c u m e n ts , w h ic h  w e re  p re v io u s ly  
c a te g o riz e d  a s  p u b lic  a n d  th e re fo re  n o t  s u b je c t  to  th e  p r iv ile g e  a g a in s t  
s e lf - in c r im in a tio n  a s se r te d  b y  th e  c u s to d ia n  o f  th e  m a te r ia ls ,  a re  n o w  
to  b e  c o n s id e re d  p e r s o n a l  a n d  th e re fo re  su b je c t  to  M r . N ix o n ’s p r iv ile g e  
a g a in s t se lf - in c r im in a tio n . T h e  p a r d o n  d o e s  n o t  m o o t th is  issu e . A l ­
th o u g h  a  fe d e ra l  p a r d o n  p re c lu d e s  th e  u se  o f  th e  p r iv ile g e  a g a in s t  se lf­
in c r im in a t io n  fo r  fe d e ra l  c r im e s , th e  p r iv ile g e  n e v e r th e le s s  c a n  b e  
in v o k e d  w h e re  s ta te  c h a rg e s  m a y  b e  p o s s ib le .402 T h e re fo re ,  i t  w o u ld  
a p p e a r  th a t  M r. N ix o n  m a y  b e  c o m p e lle d  to  te s tify  a n d  to  p ro d u c e  
W h ite  H o u se  p a p e r s  a n d  ta p e s  o n ly  if  h e  is g r a n te d  w itn e ss  im m u n ity  
u n d e r  h is  o w n  a n t ic r im e  s ta tu te  o f  1 9 7 0 .403 A lth o u g h  th e  a g re e m e n t 
c o n c e rn in g  th e  ta p e s  a n d  p a p e r s  g ra n ts  c u s to d y  o f  th e  W h ite  H o u s e  
d o c u m e n ts  to  M r . N ix o n , th e  p u b lic  n a tu re  o f  th e  m a te r ia ls  a n d  th e  
ex p re ss  p ro v is io n s  th a t  th e y  b e  m a d e  a v a ila b le  fo r  c r im in a l p ro c e e d in g s  
m a y  b e  su ff ic ie n t to  o v e rru le  a n y  c la im  o f  p r iv ile g e  la te r  a s s e r te d  b y  
M r . N ix o n .404 C o n g re s s  c o u ld  a n d  sh o u ld  a v o id  th e  issu e , h o w e v e r, 
b y  re q u ir in g  th a t  o w n e rsh ip  o f a ll p re s id e n tia l  p a p e r s  b e  r e ta in e d  b y  
th e  g o v e rn m e n t fo r  p u rp o s e s  o f  p r e s e rv a tio n  a n d  in sp e c tio n .
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401. See notes 360-65 supra and accompanying text.
402. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (holding that one 
jurisdiction may not, absent an immunity provision, compel a witness to give testimony 
which might incriminate him under the laws of another jurisdiction).
403. See Omnibus Criminal Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
404. A public official’s privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to pub­
lic documents or papers in the official’s possession since it would be an intolerable 
burden for the government to be unable to discover what its own doings are. See
1 J. Wigmore, supra note 309, § 2259(c)(1).
T h e  p a r t i c u la r  in te rw o rk in g s  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss , p re s i­
d e n t ia l  re s ig n a tio n , th e  tw e n ty -f if th  a m e n d m e n t, a n d  th e  p a r d o n  p o w e r  
d e m o n s tr a te  o n c e  a g a in  th e  lim its  o f  in s t i tu t io n a l  c o n s tra in ts  u p o n  
h u m a n  d isc re tio n . O u r  g o v e rn m e n t is , a lw a y s  h a s  b e e n ,  a n d  w ill c o n ­
t in u e  to  b e  c o n d u c te d  b y  b o th  la w s  a n d  m e n . T h e  a m b ig u itie s  o f  th e  
p re s id e n tia l  p a r d o n  p o w e r , to g e th e r  w ith  th e  tw e n ty -f if th  a m e n d m e n t,  
h a v e  p e rm it te d  a  P re s id e n t a p p o in te d  b y  h is  p re d e c e s so r  to  th e  V ic e ­
P re s id e n c y  to  p a r d o n  h is  b e n e fa c to r  w h e n  th e  la t te r  f a c e d  p o ss ib le  
c r im in a l  p ro s e c u tio n  fo r  th e  o ffe n ses  w h ic h  d ro v e  h im  f ro m  o ffice . 
T h e  r e s u l t  h a s  b e e n  to  u n d e rm in e  th e  c o n c e p t  o f e q u a l  ju s t ic e  u n d e r  
la w , to  d e la y , if  n o t  fo re c lo se , a  f in a l  d e te r m in a t io n  o f  M r . N ix o n ’s ro le  
in  th e  W a te rg a te  s c a n d a ls , a n d  to  e ro d e  th e  c o n f id e n c e  o f  th e  e le c to ra te  
in  th e  F o r d  a d m in is tra t io n .
A n d  y e t p ro p o s e d  in s t i tu tio n a l  re fo rm s  to  p r o h ib i t  s u c h  a  c o n ­
flu e n c e  o f  f a c to rs  in  th e  f u tu re  a re  a lso  f la w e d . R e p e a l  o f  th e  tw e n ty -  
f if th  a m e n d m e n t c o u ld  r e tu r n  u s  to  a  lin e  o f  su c c e ss io n  to  th e  
p re s id e n c y  w h ic h  h a s  a lre a d y  p ro v e d  itse lf  to  b e  u n a t tr a c t iv e .  B a n n in g  
p re s id e n tia l  p a rd o n s  in  e v e ry  ca se  u n ti l  c o n v ic tio n  a n d  se n te n c in g , as 
o r ig in a lly  p ro p o s e d  b y  L u th e r  M a r t in  a n d  n o w  su g g e s te d  b y  C o n g re s s ­
m a n  J o h n  D e n t ,405 w o u ld  n o t  o n ly  p r e v e n t  th e  a b u s e  o f  d is c re tio n  p re s ­
e n t  in  th e  N ix o n  p a r d o n  b u t  a lso  w o u ld  m a k e  im p o s s ib le  th e  c o m p a s ­
s io n a te  u se  o f su c h  p o w e r  w h e n  th e  h e a l th  o f  th e  re c ip ie n t ,  o r  th e  a d ­
m in is tra t io n  o f  ju s t ic e , m ig h t m a n d a te  su c h  a c tio n . I t  is su g g e s te d  th a t  
in  th is  in s ta n c e , th e  A m e r ic a n  p e n c h a n t  fo r  a n  in s t i tu t io n a l  re sp o n se  
to  ev e ry  p e rc e iv e d  h u m a n  fa il in g  b e  r e s tr a in e d  fo r  th e  p re s e n t.  L e t  
th e  d e c is io n  to  p a r d o n  th e  fo rm e r  P re s id e n t b e  w e ig h e d  b y  th e  
e le c to ra te ,  a f te r  p a s sa g e  o f tim e  h a s  im p ro v e d  o u r  p e rsp e c tiv e  as to  
its  m e rit ,  as w e  w o u ld  d o  w ith  a n y  o th e r  p o li t ic a l  ju d g m e n t o f  s u b s ta n ­
tia l  m a g n itu d e .
X I .  C o n c l u s io n
Any government is free to the people under it (whatever be the 
frame) when the laws rule, and the people are a party to these laws, 
and more than this is tyranny, oligarchy, or confusion. But, lastly, when 
all is said, there is hardly one frame of government in the world so ill 
designed by its first founders, that, in good hands, would not do well 
enough . . . .  Governments, like clocks, go from the motion men give 
them; and as governments are made and moved by men, so by them 
are they ruined too. Wherefore governments rather depend upon men,
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405. H.R.J. Res. 1125, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); cf. ABA Report on Pardons, 
43 U.S.L.W. 2143 (Oct. 18, 1974).
than men upon governments. Let men be good, and the government 
cannot be bad; if it be ill, they will cure it. But if men be bad, let 
the government be never so good. They will endeavor to warp and spoil 
it to their turn.
William Penn406
T h e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss  c a n n o t  p ro p e r ly  b e  e v a lu a te d  a p a r t  
f ro m  its  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  m a tr ix . O f  c o u rse , e x e c u tiv e  w ro n g d o in g  c o u ld  
b e  re m e d ie d  m o re  s im p ly  b y  le g is la tiv e  a c tio n  w ith in  a  sy s tem  in  w h ic h  
th e  le g is la tiv e  b r a n c h  is su p re m e .407 T h is  re c o g n it io n , h o w e v e r, is  
l i t t le  m o re  th a n  ta u to lo g y . I n  a  g o v e rn m e n t in  w h ic h  th e  e x e c u tiv e  
is a  s u b o rd in a te  p a r t  o f  a n d  is re sp o n s ib le  to  th e  le g is la tu re , e x e c u tiv e  
m a la d m in is tr a t io n  is th e  d ir e c t  re sp o n s ib ili ty  o f  a  le g is la tiv e  in s t i tu t io n
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406. Preface to W. Penn, Fram e o f  G overnm ent f o r  Pennsylvania (1682).
407. Members of the Constitutional Convention considered and rejected the notion 
of executive tenure at the pleasure of the legislature. Madison, in objecting to “malad­
ministration” as a term to be joined with treason and bribery as constituting grounds 
for impeachment, noted that “so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during 
pleasure of the Senate.” “High Crimes and Misdemeanors” was then selected from 
English law presumably because it possessed a sufficiently definable content from 
English usage to avoid the spectre of executive tenure at the sufferance of Congress.
2 Records 550. The system which they chose called for an executive electoral man­
date independent of Congress and for a set term of years, to be terminated earlier only 
upon death, resignation, or inability to discharge the duties of the office, U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 1, or upon conviction for the commission of treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors, id. art. II, § 4.
Rejection of the parliamentary model in no way reflects a qualitative judgment 
between the two systems; rather, it is a simple acknowledgement that the substitution 
of a “foreign tradition for an indigenous one” will likely not take root. Merryman in 
his description of the works of Beccaria and other reformers of criminal procedure 
in eighteenth century France, noted the attempts to transplant English criminal pro­
cedure (the jury, oral public procedure in place of secret written procedure, right of 
counsel for the accused, restriction of the judge’s inquisitorial powers) into the 
French civil law tradition:
In the fervor of the French Revolution an attempt was made to abolish 
the criminal procedure of the old regime and substitute an entirely new one 
based on the English model. The failure of the effort to substitute a foreign 
tradition for an indigenous one soon became apparent, and a counterrevolution 
in criminal procedure took place in France. The result is a mixed system, 
composed in part of elements from prerevolutionary times and in part of re­
forms imposed after the Revolution. J. M errym an, The Civil Law Tradition 
137 (1969).
The failure of a transplanted system seems especially likely when it is designed to re­
place the very essence of the infrastructure of the American state, namely, the con­
cept of the separation of powers. While our conclusion does not constitute any criti­
cism of the parliamentary concept, it should be noted that the performance of our 
own Congress gives little reason to be any more sanguine about the prospects for honest 
and efficient government under legislative direction than under the present mix. How­
ever, in view of the historical precedents, it would seem unwise for Congress to adopt 
any of the current Watergate-inspired proposals to change our governmental structure 
in favor of a parliamentary mode. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
p re su m a b ly  e q u ip p e d  to  a c c e p t su c h  a  d u ty . T h e  A m e r ic a n  sy s tem , 
h o w e v e r, h a s  b e e n  b u il t  u p o n  th e  c o n c e p t o f  s e p a ra te , c o o rd in a te  
b ra n c h e s  o f g o v e rn m e n t w ith  th e  p o li t ic a l  b ra n c h e s  e a c h  h a v in g  in d e ­
p e n d e n t  a n d  d ir e c t  e le c to ra l  b a se s . I m p e a c h m e n t  m u s t  u lt im a te ly  b e  
ju d g e d  w ith in  th is  c o n te x t.
W e , th e re fo re , sh o u ld  se ek  to  a n a ly z e , r e fo rm , a n d  u til iz e  th e  im ­
p e a c h m e n t to o l  w ith in  th e  b o u n d s  se t b y  th e  b a s ic  s t r u c tu re  o f  o u r  
sy s tem . C irc u m s c r ib e d  w ith in  th a t  e n v iro n m e n t, se v e ra l o b s e rv a tio n s  
a n d  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  a re  o ffe re d  in  c o n c lu s io n . F ir s t ,  im p e a c h m e n t 
m u s t  b e  s e e n  a s  o n ly  o n e  o f  se v e ra l w e a p o n s  in  o u r  sy s tem  to  c o m b a t  
m in is te r ia l  ab u se . I m p e a c h m e n t  c a n n o t  b e  ju d g e d  as if  i t  a lo n e  m u s t  
b e  a b le  to  d e te r  e x e c u tiv e  a b u s e  a n d  th e n , if  fo u n d  w a n tin g , d is c a rd e d . 
F o r  d e a lin g  w ith  m o s t p ro b le m s , th e re  a re  o th e r  e ffec tiv e  p o li t ic a l  a n d  
so c ia l m e c h a n ism s , w h ic h  in c lu d e , to  n a m e  th e  m o re  o b v io u s : th e  
e le c to ra l  ju d g m e n t, ju d ic ia l  re v ie w  o f  e x e c u tiv e  a d m in is tra t iv e  d e ­
c is io n s , c o n g re s s io n a l c o n tro l  o v e r  le g is la tio n  a n d  th e  p u rse , a  f re e  p re ss  
id e a lly  in  c o n s ta n t  te n s io n  w ith  th e  o b je c ts  o f  its  r e p o r tin g ,  a  p a r ty  
s tru c tu re  su ffic ie n tly  s tro n g  to  a c t  a s  a  c o n s tra in t  u p o n  a rb i t ra ry  p re s ­
id e n tia l  a c tio n , a  W h ite  H o u se  s ta ff  w ith  “ se n io rs  c o m m itte d  to  r e p u b ­
l ic a n  g o v e rn m e n t a n d  th e  ru le  o f  la w  a n d  ju n io rs  su ff ic ie n tly  b e y o n d  
id e n ti ty  c rise s  to  a v o id  s e d u c tio n ,” 408 a  C a b in e t  w ith  a t  le a s t  so m e  
m e m b e rs  p o sse ss in g  a  p o lit ic a l,  b u r e a u c r a t ic ,  o r  p ro fe s s io n a l b a s e  in d e ­
p e n d e n t  o f th e i r  c o n n e c t io n  to  th e  P re s id e n t ,  a n d  a  p ro fe s s io n a l 
b u re a u c ra c y  w ith  a  tr a d i t io n  o f  a d h e re n c e  to  th e  la w  s tro n g  e n o u g h  to  
w ith s ta n d  su b v e rs io n .
S e co n d , th e  p ro c e ss  o f  im p e a c h m e n t m u s t b e  v ie w e d  in  its  
e n tire ty , e n c o m p a ss in g  n o t  o n ly  its  c o n s ti tu t io n a l ,  te x tu a l  c o n te n t  b u t  
a lso  th e  o th e r  a c tio n s  th a t  c u s to m a rily  a c c o m p a n y  it. R e s ig n a tio n  h a s  
b e c o m e  th e  u s u a l  m e a n s  o f  re m o v a l fo llo w in g  th e  in i t ia t io n  o f  im p e a c h ­
m e n t  p ro c e e d in g s ; i t  is  m o re  o f te n  a c c o m p lish e d  th a n  c o n v ic tio n  a n d  
c a n n o t  b e  c o n s id e re d  as e x tra - le g a l o r  a s  e v id e n c e  o f  th e  fa i lu re  o f  th e  
im p e a c h m e n t  sy stem . N o r  a re  c r im in a l  p ro s e c u tio n s  s u b s e q u e n t to  a n  
im p e a c h m e n t to  b e  v ie w e d  as a n  u n r e la te d  o r  p re c lu d e d  p o r t io n  o f  th e  
im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss . A s  th e  c r im in a l sa n c tio n s  w h ic h  c o u ld  b e  
a p p lie d  u n d e r  th e  E n g lish  m o d e l w ere  e x c lu d e d  f ro m  th e  p ro c e s s  o f  
A m e r ic a n  im p e a c h m e n t, th e  p o ss ib ility  o f su b s e q u e n t c r im in a l  p r o ­
se c u tio n  a n d  p u n is h m e n t w as  c a re fu lly  e x c e p te d  f ro m  th e  p ro h ib it io n s  
a g a in s t  d o u b le  je o p a rd y . F u r th e rm o re ,  c e n su re , th o u g h  u s e d  o n ly  
o n c e  a g a in s t  a  P re s id e n t ,409 h a s  b e e n  e m p lo y e d  o f te n  a g a in s t  ju d g e s
408. Firmage, Law and the Indochina War: A Retrospective View, supra note 3, at 
20.
409. Censure has been invoked against a President, Andrew Jackson, by the Senate
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a n d  m e m b e rs  o f  C o n g re s s ,410 a n d  c o u ld  w e ll p la y  a n  im p o r ta n t  ro le  
in  re s tr ic t in g  p re s id e n tia l  c o n d u c t .411 R e fu s a l to  u se  th e se  m e c h a n ­
ism s, a v a ila b le  a lo n g  w ith  o r  a s  p a r t  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e ss , w h e n  
ju s t ic e  w o u ld  w a r ra n t  th e ir  u se , re p re s e n ts  n o t  a  w e a k n e ss  o f  c o n s ti tu ­
t io n a l  s t ru c tu re  b u t  r a th e r  a  fa i lu re  o f  p o li t ic a l  w ill.
W h e n  im p e a c h m e n t is e v a lu a te d  a s  o n ly  o n e  o f  m a n y  in s t i tu tio n s  
o f  c o n s tra in t  u p o n  m in is te r ia l  a b u s e  a n d  w h e n  i t  is  se e n  in  its  la rg e r  
c o n te x t  to  in c lu d e  n o t  o n ly  its  te x tu a l  d e f in i t io n  o f  th e  o ffe n se , t r ia l ,  
c o n v ic tio n , a n d  re m o v a l b u t  a lso  o th e r  in te g ra lly  r e la te d  te x tu a l  m a tte r s  
su c h  as re s ig n a tio n 412 a n d  f u r th e r  c r im in a l  p ro s e c u tio n  a n d  p u n is h ­
m e n t ,418 to g e th e r  w ith  c e n s u re  a s  a n  a l te rn a t iv e  o r  s u p p le m e n ta ry  s a n c ­
tio n , th e  e n t ire  p ro c e ss  seem s a  w o r th y  in s t ru m e n t o f  r e p u b l ic a n  
g o v e rn m e n t.  I ts  p e r fo rm a n c e  in  th e  N ix o n  c a se  h a s  b e e n  n o  e x c e p tio n  
to  th is  ju d g m e n t.  E v e n  so , o u r  e x p e r ie n c e  w ith  th e  im p e a c h m e n t  p r o c ­
ess w h ic h  le d  to  th e  r e s ig n a tio n  o f  f o rm e r -P re s id e n t N ix o n  h a s  r e ­
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for his removal of governmental deposits from the Bank of the United States in an 
effort to cause its failure. Jackson, who had the support of the House, challenged 
the Senate’s authority to censure: “If Congress really meant what the Senate said, 
. . .  let the House impeach him and the Senate try him.” A. Schlesinger, The 
Im perial Presidency 411-12 (1973).
410. “Fifteen House Members have been censured. . . . The Senate has resorted 
to censure on seven occasions.” J. Kirby, Congress and th e  P ublic T ru s t 210 
(1970). In addition, “[o]f the fifty-five federal judges subjected to House Judiciary 
Committee scrutiny, eight were impeached of whom four were convicted, and eight 
were censured.” Borkin, supra note 345, at 204.
411. Arthur Schlesinger examined Jackson’s response and concurred as a matter of 
constitutional principle:
Jackson was plainly right. If a President committed high crimes and misde­
meanors, censure was not enough. The slap-on-the-wrist approach to presiden­
tial delinquency made little sense, constitutional or otherwise. . . . This did 
not mean, of course, that a fainthearted Congress might not censure a lawless 
President and pretend to have done its duty, but unless the terms of the resolu­
tion made it clear why the President was merely censurable and not impeach­
able, the action would be a cop-out and a betrayal of Congress’ constitutional 
responsibility. A. Schlesinger, supra note 409, at 422.
It goes without saying that the Congress is well advised on any account to clearly 
delineate the grounds upon which its decision is made whenever a President is cen­
sured rather than impeached. This, however, in no way implies that the use of cen­
sure is itself an admission of congressional weakness or faintheartedness. If the reso­
lution of censure is drafted articulately, it may function as a “trial balloon” and 
communicate important political sentiments to the President and the electorate alike, 
as well as serve significantly as a notice to the President that he is on a collision 
course with Congress. Even where a President is impeached, Congress could use 
a vote of censure to warn future Presidents what conduct it found objectionable, even 
if not conclusively impeachable, offenses. For example, the defeated article of im­
peachment covering Nixon’s alleged tax irregularities may well have been converted 
into an effective vote of censure.
412. U.S. Const, art. 2, § 1, cl. 6.
413. Id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 7.
v e a le d  so m e  a re a s  o f  n e e d e d  re fo rm . F ir s t ,  th e  fa c t- f in d in g  p o w e rs  
o f C o n g re s s  in  a n  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g  m u s t b e  a f f irm e d  w ith o u t 
a m b ig u ity . T h e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss  is o n e  o f  th o se  r a r e  in s ta n c e s  
in  w h ic h  th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f  p o w e rs  is h e ld  in  a b e y a n c e  w ith  o n e  p a r t i c ­
u la r  b r a n c h  in  th e  a s c e n d a n c y  fo r  a  tim e , in  th e  w o rd s  o f R e p re s e n ­
ta t iv e  B o u d in o t,  im p e a c h m e n t r e p re s e n ts  “ a n  e x c e p tio n  to  [the] p r in ­
c ip le ” 414 o f  s e p a ra tio n  o f  p o w e rs , w ith  C o n g re s s  p o sse sse d  o f  th e  
a u th o r i ty  to  a c q u ir e  th a t  in fo rm a tio n  n e c e s sa ry  a n d  p r o p e r  to  a c c o m ­
p lis h  its  c o n s ti tu t io n a lly  m a n d a te d  ta sk . T h e  s in g le  m o s t im p o r ta n t  f a c t  
w h ic h  r e ta rd e d  th e  im p e a c h m e n t in v e s tig a tio n  o f  P re s id e n t N ix o n  w a s  
h is  r e fu s a l  to  c o m p ly  w ith  c o n g re s s io n a l su b p o e n a s  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  
e x e c u tiv e  p r iv ile g e .415 I t  is  su g g e s ted  th a t  th e  re la t iv e  w e ig h t to  b e  
a c c o rd e d  a  c o n g re s s io n a l d e m a n d  fo r  p e rso n s  a n d  p a p e r s  in  a n  im ­
p e a c h m e n t  p ro c e e d in g  in v e s tig a tin g  th e  a lleg e d  c o m m iss io n  o f  h ig h  
c r im e s  a n d  m is d e m e a n o rs  b y  th e  P re s id e n t ,  w ith  its  c o n s ti tu t io n a l  
fo u n d a tio n ,  is  in c o m p a ra b ly  g re a te r  th a n  th a t  w h ic h  m u s t  n o w  b e  
a c c o rd e d  a  p r o s e c u to r  w ith in  th e  e x e c u tiv e  b r a n c h  in v e s tig a tin g  th e  a l­
le g e d  c o m m iss io n  o f  a  c o n s p ira c y  to  o b s tru c t  ju s t ic e . C o n g re s s  b y  jo in t  
r e s o lu t io n  sh o u ld  e x p re ss  i ts  o p in io n  th a t  fa i lu re  to  c o m p ly  w ith  its  s u b ­
p o e n a s , d u ly  a u th o r iz e d  in  a n  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g , w o u ld  c o n s ti­
tu te  th e  c o m m iss io n  o f  a n  im p e a c h a b le  o ffen se . L e g i t im a tio n  o f  a n  
e x e c u tiv e  re fu sa l to  d o  so  w o u ld  e ffec tiv e ly  c r ip p le  th e  im p e a c h m e n t 
p ro c e ss . T h e  la w  a n n o u n c e d  in  th e  th ir d  a r t ic le  o f  im p e a c h m e n t, s h o rn  
o f  its  p a r t i c u la r  fa c tu a l  a c c u s a tio n s  a g a in s t P re s id e n t N ix o n , sh o u ld  b e  
r a t i f ie d  b y  C o n g re ss . H a v in g  a s se r te d  ju r is d ic t io n  to  issu e  su b p o e n a s , 
C o n g re s s  c o u ld  ju s t if ia b ly  re ly  o n  th e  a s su m p tio n  th a t  th e  S u p re m e  
C o u r t  w o u ld  r e fu s e  to  re v ie w  th e  e x e rc ise  o f  th a t  s u b p o e n a  p o w e r  
w h e n e v e r  i t  is c o n d u c te d  p u r s u a n t  to  a  p r o p e r  a s se r tio n  o f  th e  im p e a c h ­
m e n t p o w e r . C o n s e q u e n tly , C o n g re s s  b y  its  a c tio n s  m u s t f irm ly  
e s ta b lish  th is  p re c e d e n t .  W i th o u t  a d e q u a te  fa c t- f in d in g  p o w e rs  in c i­
d e n t  to  a n  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e e d in g , C o n g re s s , a l re a d y  w e a k e n e d  se r i­
o u s ly  as a  c o o rd in a te  b a la n c e  to  th e  a w e so m e  e x e c u tiv e  b r a n c h ,  w o u ld  
f in d  th e  p o w e r fu l if  c u m b e rso m e  w e a p o n  o f im p e a c h m e n t e ffe c tiv e ly  
sp ik e d . U ltim a te ly , it  c a n  o n ly  b e  C o n g re s s , a  c o o rd in a te  p o l i t ic a l  
b r a n c h ,  w h ic h  e ffe c tiv e ly  c h e c k s  a n d  b a la n c e s  its  p o l i t ic a l  c o lle a g u e  
a n d  n a tu ra l  a d v e rsa ry .
S e c o n d , th e re  is n e e d  to  rev ise  th e  p r o c e d u ra l  ru le s  o f  im p e a c h ­
m e n t a t  a  t im e  w h e n  n o  a c tu a l  c a se  is im p e n d in g  in  C o n g re s s . A n t i ­
q u a te d  e v id e n tia ry  ru le s , w h ic h  d o  n o t  re f le c t  th e  p o li t ic a l  n a tu re  o f
414. 1 A nnals o f Cong., supra note 9.
415. The Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974), 
effectively destroyed the assertion of absolute executive privilege.
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th e  im p e a c h m e n t tr ia l  a n d  w h ic h  a re  v es tig e s  e i th e r  o f  ju d ic ia l  ru le s  
r e le v a n t o n ly  to  tr ia l  b y  ju ry  o r  o f  E n g lish  im p e a c h m e n ts  w h ic h  c a r r ie d  
c r im in a l sa n c tio n s , sh o u ld  b e  r e fo rm u la te d .416 S u c h  r e fo rm  sh o u ld  in ­
c lu d e , a m o n g  o th e r  th in g s , a  p ro v is io n  s ta te d  in  th e  fo rm  o f  a  p o lic y  
d ire c tin g  o p e n  h e a r in g s  d u r in g  a ll b u t  th e  e a r lie s t  s ta g es  o f  th e  im ­
p e a c h m e n t o f  th e  h ig h  o ffic ia ls  o f  th e  s ta te ,  w ith  a  sp e c ia l p ro v is io n  
m a d e  f o r  c o v e ra g e  b y  th e  m a ss  m e d ia , p a r t ic u la r ly  te le v is io n .417 T o  
fu lfill  its  o b je c t  o f  g o v e rn m e n ta l  p ro te c t io n ,  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss  
sh o u ld  b e  a c c o m p lis h e d  w ith  p o p u la r  r a t i f ic a t io n  o f  its  d ire c tio n , p r o g ­
re ss , a n d  c o n c lu s io n . N e i th e r  im p e a c h m e n t a n d  c o n v ic tio n  n o r  e x o n e r­
a t io n  c a n  w ith  g o o d  e f fe c t ta k e  p la c e  u n t i l  a n  e le c to ra l  m a n d a te  is 
e i th e r  e n d e d  o r  re a ff irm e d . P e rc e iv e d  le g itim a c y 418 o f  th e  in c u m b e n t  
a d m in is t ra t io n  o r  its  su c c e sso r  c a n n o t  e x is t w ith o u t  p o p u la r  r a t i f ic a t io n  
o f  th e  re s u lt  o f  th e  im p e a c h m e n t in q u iry ;  th a t  in  tu r n  c a n  o n ly  b e  a c ­
c o m p lish e d  th ro u g h  th e  e le c tro n ic  m e d ia .
T h ir d ,  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  H o u s e  a n d  S e n a te  v o te s  o n  im p e a c h m e n t 
s h o u ld  b e  a l te re d  to  a llo w  a  m o re  a c c u ra te ,  le ss  a m b ig u o u s  m e a n s  o f  
c o m m o n  la w  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  t h e  d e f in i t io n  o f  a n  im p e a c h a b le  o f­
fe n se .419 T h e s e  v o te s  s h o u ld  d is t in g u ish  f in d in g s  o f  f a c t  a n d  la w . A n  
im p e a c h m e n t v o te  sh o u ld  f irs t  c le a r ly  re f le c t w h e th e r  th e  c o n g re s sm e n  
b e lie v e d  th e  r e s p o n d e n t  to  b e  g u ilty  o f  th e  o ffe n se  c h a rg e d  a n d , 
s e c o n d , w h e th e r  i ts  c o m m iss io n  w a s  c o n s id e re d  to  c o n s ti tu te  im p e a c h ­
a b le  c o n d u c t.
B e y o n d  im p ro v in g  th e  im p e a c h m e n t p ro c e ss , m o d e m  C o n g re s se s  
s h o u ld  b e  m o re  a w a re  o f  th e  u se  o f  c e n su re  a s  a  m e a n s , s h o r t  o f  im ­
p e a c h m e n t,  o f  e x p re ss in g  th e i r  d is a p p ro v a l o f  p re s id e n tia l  c o n d u c t.  
T h e r e  is  n o  re a s o n  w h y  C o n g re s s  m a y  n o t  in  c e r ta in  s itu a tio n s  v o te  a  
re s o lu t io n  o f  c e n su re  a g a in s t  a  P re s id e n t .  T h e  C o n g re s s  h is to r ic a lly  
h a s  re s o r te d  to  c e n su re  as a  s a n c tio n  m o re  o f te n  th a n  i t  h a s  v o te d  to  
im p e a c h  a n d  c o n v ic t:  “F if te e n  H o u s e  M e m b e rs  h a v e  b e e n  c e n s u re d  
. . . .  T h e  S e n a te  h a s  r e s o r te d  to  c e n su re  o n  se v en  o c c a s io n s .” 420 I n  
a d d it io n , “ [of] th e  fif ty -f iv e  f e d e ra l  ju d g e s  s u b je c te d  to  H o u se  J u d ic ia ry  
C o m m itte e  s c ru tin y , e ig h t  w e re  im p e a c h e d  o f  w h o m  fo u r  w e re  c o n ­
v ic te d , a n d  e ig h t w e re  c e n s u re d .” 421
F u r th e rm o re ,  w h e re  a  P re s id e n t is im p e a c h e d  a n d  h is  p a t te r n  o f  
c o n d u c t,  in  a d d i t io n  to  im p e a c h a b le  o ffe n ses , in c lu d e s  c o n s ti tu t io n a lly
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416. See section IV, E, accompanying notes 225-31 supra.
417. See section III, G, accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
418. See note 3 supra.
419. See notes 234-36 supra and accompanying text.
420. J. Kirby, supra note 410.
421. Borkin, supra note 345, at 204.
o b je c tio n a b le  a c ts  n o t  n e c e s sa r ily  r is in g  to  th e  le v e l o f  im p e a c h a b i lity , 
th e  C o n g re s s  s h o u ld  v o te  c e n su re  fo r  th o se  a c ts  as w e ll as im p e a c h m e n t  
f o r  th e  c o m m iss io n  o f  h ig h  c r im e s  a n d  m is d e m e a n o rs . I n  su c h  a  ca se , 
th e  s a n c tio n  w o u ld  b e  a im e d  n o t  s im p ly  a g a in s t  th e  a c c u s e d  b u t  
p ro sp e c tiv e ly  in  a n  e f fo r t  to  o u tlin e  th e  p a r a m e te r s  o f  w h a t  C o n g re s s
O liv e r  G o ld s m ith  n o te d  so m e  tim e  ag o : “H o w  sm a ll, o f  a l l  t h a t  
h u m a n  h e a r ts  e n d u re ,  t h a t  p a r t  w h ic h  la w s  o r  k in g s  c a n  c a u se  o r  
c u r e .” 422 H o w e v e r , r e c e n t  e v e n ts  h a v e  d e m o n s tr a te d  h o w  d is p r o p o r ­
t io n a te  is  th e  h a r m  to  th e  p o li t ic a l  f a b r ic  w h ic h  a  k in g  (o r  P re s id e n t)  
c a n  c a u se  w h e n  c o m p a re d  to  th e  a b ili ty  o f  th e  la w  to  c o n ta in  s u c h  h a rm . 
O u r  le g a l in s t itu tio n s  w e re  a b le  to  c o n ta in  th is  h a r m  o n ly  w ith  th e  b e s t  
o f  lu c k . A n  u n lik e ly  c o n c a te n a t io n  o f  e v e n ts— th e  in e p t  b u rg la ry  o f  
th e  D e m o c ra tic  P a r ty  H e a d q u a r te r s ,  th e  lo s t  n o te b o o k  r e v e a lin g  W h ite  
H o u se  in v o lv e m e n t, th e  c h a n c e  d is c lo s u re  o f  th e  p re s id e n t ia l  ta p e  
r e c o rd in g s — sa v e d  o u r  sy s tem  th is  tim e . I n s t i tu t io n s  a re  a t  b e s t  f ra i l  
d e fe n se s  a g a in s t  th e  p ro p e n s it ie s  o f m e n . O u rs  w o rk e d  b e t te r  th a n  
m o s t b u t  m u s t  s till b e  im p ro v e d . T h e  c o m b in a t io n  o f  g o o d  m e n  a n d  
g o o d  la w s  to g e th e r  r e p re s e n t  th e  u l t im a te  sa fe g u a rd  f o r  r e p u b lic a n
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422. T he C om plete P o etica l W orks o f  O liver G oldsm ith  19 (Oxford ed. 1911) 
(“The Traveler,” verse 3).
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X III .  A P P E N D IC E S
A P P E N D IX  A
Judiciary Committee's Impeachment Iinquiry Procedures 
in the N ixon Impeachment
The House Judiciary Committee on May 2, 1974, adopted the following procedural 
rules for the Nixon inquiry:
A. The committee shall receive from committee counsel at a hearing an initial 
presentation consisting of (i) a written statement detailing, in paragraph form, in­
formation believed by the staff to be pertinent to the inquiry, (ii) a general descrip­
tion of the scope and manner of the presentation of evidence, and (iii) a detailed 
presentation of the evidentiary material, other than the testimony of witnesses.
1. Each member of the committee shall receive a copy of (i) the statement of 
information, (ii) the related documents and other evidentiary material, and (iii) an 
index of all testimony, papers, and things that have been obtained by the committee, 
whether or not relied upon in the statement of information.
2. Each paragraph of the statement of information shall be annotated to related 
evidentiary material (e.g., documents, recordings and transcripts thereof, transcripts of 
grand jury or congressional testimony, or affidavits). Where applicable, the annota­
tions will identify witnesses believed by the staff to be sources of additional informa­
tion important to the committee’s understanding of the subject matter of the para­
graph in question.
3. On the commencement of the presentation, each member of the committee 
and full committee staff, majority and minority, as designated by the chairman and 
the ranking minority member, shall be given access to and the opportunity to examine 
all testimony, papers and things that have been obtained by the inquiry staff, whether 
or not relied upon in the statement of information.
4. The President’s counsel shall be furnished a copy of the statement of infor­
mation and related documents and other evidentiary material at the time that those 
materials are furnished to the members and the President and his counsel shall be 
invited to attend and observe the presentation.
B. Following that presentation the committee shall determine whether it desires 
additional evidence, after opportunity for the following has been provided:
1. Any committee member may bring additional evidence to the committee’s 
attention.
2. The President’s counsel shall be invited to respond to the presentation, orally 
or in writing as shall be determined by the committee.
3. Should the President’s counsel wish the committee to receive additional testi­
mony or other evidence, he shall be invited to submit written requests and precise 
summaries of what he would propose to show, and in the case of a witness precisely 
and in detail what it is expected the testimony of the witness would be, if called. 
On the basis of such requests and summaries and of the record then before it, the 
committee shall determine whether the suggested evidence is necessary or desirable to 
a full and fair record in the inquiry, and, if so, whether the summaries shall be ac­
cepted as part of the record or additional testimony or evidence in some other form 
shall be received.
C. If and when witnesses are to be called, the following additional procedures 
shall be applicable to hearings held for that purpose.
1. The President and his counsel shall be invited to attend all hearings, including 
any held in executive session.
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2. Objections relating to the examination of witnesses or to the admissibility of 
testimony and evidence may be raised only by a witness or his counsel, a member of 
the committee, committee counsel or the President’s counsel and shall be ruled upon 
by the chairman or presiding member. Such rulings shall be final, unless overruled by 
a vote of a majority of the members present. In the case of a tie vote, the ruling of 
the chair shall prevail.
3. Committee counsel shall commence the questioning of each witness and may 
also be permitted by the chairman or presiding member to question a witness at any 
point during the appearance of the witness.
4. The President’s counsel may question any witness called before the committee, 
subject to instructions from the chairman or presiding member respecting the time, 
scope and duration of the examination.
D. The committee shall determine, pursuant to the rules of the House, whether 
and to what extent the evidence to be presented shall be received in executive session.
E. Any portion of the hearings open to the public may be covered by television 
broadcast, radio broadcast, still photography, or by any of such methods of coverage 
in accord with the rules of the House and the rules of procedure of the committee 
as amended on November 13, 1973.
F. The chairman shall make public announcement of the date, time, place and 
subject matter of any committee hearing as soon as practicable and in no event less 
than twenty-four hours before the commencement of the hearing.
G. The chairman is authorized to promulgate additional procedures as he deems 
necessary for the fair and efficient conduct of committee hearings held pursuant to H 
Res. 803, provided that the additional procedures are not inconsistent with these pro­
cedures, the rules of the committee, and the rules of the House. Such procedures shall 
govern the conduct of the hearings, unless overruled by a vote of a majority of the mem­
bers present.
H. For purposes of hearings held pursuant to these rules, a quorum shall consist 
of ten members of the committee.
APPENDIX B 
Senate Impeachment Procedure Rules
I. Whensoever the Senate shall receive notice from the House of Representa­
tives that managers are appointed on their part to conduct an impeachment against any 
person and are directed to carry articles of impeachment to the Senate, the Secretary 
of the Senate shall immediately inform the House of Representatives that the Senate 
is ready to receive the managers for the purpose of exhibiting such articles of im­
peachment, agreeably to such notice.
II. When the managers of an impeachment shall be introduced at the bar of the 
Senate and shall signify that they are ready to exhibit articles of impeachment against 
any person, the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct the Sergeant at Arms to 
make proclamation, who shall, after making proclamation, repeat the following words, 
viz: “All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain of imprisonment, while the 
House of Representatives is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States articles of im­
peachment against------------------------------------ after which the articles shall be exhib­
ited, and then the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall inform the managers that the 
Senate will take proper order on the subject of the impeachment, of which due notice 
shall be given to the House of Representatives.
III. Upon such articles being presented to the Senate, the Senate shall, at 1 
o’clock afternoon of the day (Sunday excepted) following such presentation, or sooner 
if ordered by the Senate, proceed to the consideration of such articles, and shall con­
tinue in session from day to day (Sundays excepted) after the trial shall commence 
(unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) until final judgment shall be rendered, and 
so much longer as may, in its judgment, be needful. Before proceeding to the consider­
ation of the articles of impeachment, the Presiding Officer shall administer the oath 
hereinafter provided to the members of the Senate then present and to the other mem­
bers of the Senate as they shall appear, whose duty it shall be to take the same.
IV. When the President of the United States or the Vice President of the United 
States, upon whom the powers and duties of the office of President shall have devolved, 
shall be impeached, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States shall 
preside; and in a case requiring the said Chief Justice to preside notice shall be given 
to him by the Presiding Officer of the Senate of the time and place fixed for the con­
sideration of the articles of impeachment as aforesaid, with a request to attend; and the 
said Chief Justice shall preside over the Senate during the consideration of said articles 
and upon the trial of the person impeached therein.
V. The Presiding Officer shall have power to make and issue, by himself or by 
the Secretary of the Senate, all orders, mandates, writs, and precepts authorized by 
these rules or by the Senate, and to make and enforce such other regulations and orders 
in the premises as the Senate may authorize or provide.
VI. The Senate shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses, to en­
force obedience to its orders, mandates, writs, precepts, and judgments, to preserve or­
der, and to punish in a summary way contempts of and disobedience to, its authority, 
orders, mandates, writs, precepts, or judgments, and to make all lawful orders, rules, 
and regulations which it may deem essential or conducive to the ends of justice. And 
the Sergeant at Arms, under the direction of the Senate, may employ such aid and as­
sistance as may be necessary to enforce, execute, and carry into effect the lawful orders,
VII. The Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary preparations in 
the Senate Chamber, and the Presiding Officer on the trial shall direct all the forms 
of proceedings while the Senate is sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment, and 
all forms during the trial not otherwise specially provided for. And the Presiding Offi­
cer on the trial may rule all questions of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling 
shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless some member of the Senate shall ask 
that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate 
for decision; or he may at his option, in the first instance, submit any such question to 
a vote of the members of the Senate. Upon all such questions the vote shall be without 
a division, unless the yeas and nays be demanded by one-fifth of the members present,
VIII. Upon the presentation of articles of impeachment and the organization of 
the Senate as hereinbefore provided, a writ of summons shall issue to the accused, recit­
ing said articles, and notifying him to appear before the Senate upon a day and at a 
place to be fixed by the Senate and named in such writ, and file his answer to said 
articles of impeachment, and to stand to and abide the orders and judgments of the 
Senate thereon; which writ shall be served by such officer or person as shall be named 
in the precept thereof, such number of days prior to the day fixed for such appearance 
as shall be named in such precept, either by the delivery of an attested copy thereof 
to the person accused, or if that cannot conveniently be done, by leaving such copy at 
the last known place of abode of such person, or at his usual place of business in some 
conspicuous place therein; or if such service shall be, in the judgment of the Senate, 
impracticable, notice to the accused to appear shall be given in such other manner, by 
publication or otherwise, as shall be deemed just; and if the writ aforesaid shall fail to 
service in the manner aforesaid, the proceedings shall not thereby abate, but further 
service may be made in such manner as the Senate shall direct. If the accused, after 
service, shall fail to appear, either in person or by attorney, on the day so fixed there­
for as aforesaid, or, appearing, shall fail to file his answer to such articles of impeach­
ment, the trial shall proceed, nevertheless, as upon a plea of not guilty. If a plea of 
guilty shall be entered, judgment may be entered thereon without further proceedings.
IX. At 12:30 o’clock afternoon of the day appointed for the return of the sum­
mons against the person impeached, the legislative and executive business of the Sen­
ate shall be suspended, and the Secretary of the Senate shall administer an oath to the 
returning officer in the form following, viz: “I , ---------------- ■--------------------, do sol­
emnly swear that the return made by me upon the process issued on the ------day of
------------ , by the Senate of the United States, against------------------------- ■-----------, is
truly made, and that I have performed such service as therein described: So help me 
God.” Which oath shall be entered at large on the records.
X. The person impeached shall then be called to appear and answer the articles 
of impeachment against him. If he appear, or any person for him, the appearance 
shall be recorded, stating particularly if by himself, or by agent or attorney, naming 
the person appearing and the capacity in which he appears. If he do not appear, 
either personally or by agent or attorney, the same shall be recorded.
XI. That in the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the Senate, 
upon the order of the Senate, shall appoint a committee of twelve Senators to receive 
evidence and take testimony at such times and places as the committee may determine, 
and for such purpose the committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to be 
elected by the committee, shall (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) exercise all 
the powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and the Presiding Officer of the 
Senate, respectively, under the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sit­
ting on impeachment trials.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of procedure and practice in the 
Senate when sitting on impeachment trials shall govern the procedure and practice of 
the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall report to the Senate in 
writing a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and 
given before such committee, and such report shall be received by the Senate and the 
evidence so received and the testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and 
purposes, subject to the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and 
materiality as having been received and taken before the Senate, but nothing herein 
shall prevent the Senate from sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open 
Senate, or by order of the Senate having the entire trial in open Senate.
XII. At 12:30 o’clock afternoon of the day appointed for the trial of an im­
peachment, the legislative and executive business of the Senate shall be suspended, and 
the Secretary shall give notice to the House of Representatives that the Senate is ready
to proceed upon the impeachment o f ------------------------------------ , in the Senate Chamber,
which chamber is prepared with accommodations for the reception of the House of 
Representatives.
XIII. The hour of the day at which the Senate shall sit upon the trial of an 
impeachment shall be (unless otherwise ordered) 12 o’clock m.; and when the hour 
for such thing shall arrive, the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall so announce; and 
thereupon the Presiding Officer upon such trial shall cause proclamation to be made, 
and the business of the trial shall proceed. The adjournment of the Senate sitting in 
said trial shall not operate as an adjournment of the Senate; but on such adjournment 
the Senate shall resume the consideration of its legislative and executive business.
XIV. The Secretary of the Senate shall record the proceedings in cases of im­
peachment as in the case of legislative proceedings, and the same shall be reported 
in the same manner as the legislative proceedings of the Senate.
XV. Counsel for the parties shall be admitted to appear and be heard upon an 
impeachment,
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XVI. All motions made by the parties or their counsel shall be addressed to the 
Presiding Officer, and if he, or any Senator, shall require it, they shall be committed
XVII. Witnesses shall be examined by one person on behalf of the party produc­
ing them, and then cross-examined by one person on the other side.
XVIII. If a Senator is called as a witness, he shall be sworn, and give his testi-
XIX. If a Senator wishes a question to be put to a witness, or to offer a motion 
or order (except a motion to adjourn), it shall be reduced to writing, and put by the
XX. At all times while the Senate is sitting upon the trial of an impeachment the 
doors of the Senate shall be kept open, unless the Senate shall direct the doors to be
XXI. All preliminary or interlocutory questions, and all motions, shall be argued 
for not exceeding one hour on each side, unless the Senate shall, by order, extend the
XXII. The case, on each side, shall be opened by one person. The final argu­
ment on the merits may be made by two persons on each side (unless otherwise or­
dered by the Senate upon application for that purpose), and the argument shall be 
opened and closed on the part of the House of Representatives.
XXIII. On the final question whether the impeachment is sustained, the yeas and 
nays shall be taken on each article of impeachment separately; and if the impeachment 
shall not, upon any of the articles presented, be sustained by the votes of two-thirds of 
the members present, a judgment of acquittal shall be entered; but if the person accused 
in such articles of impeachment shall be convicted upon any of said articles by the 
votes of two-thirds of the members present, the Senate shall proceed to pronounce judg­
ment, and a certified copy of such judgment shall be deposited in the office of the
XXIV. All the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, 
which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, subject, however, to the 
operation of Rule VII, except when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in 
that case no member shall speak more than once on one question, and for not more 
than ten minutes on an interlocutory question, and for not more than fifteen minutes 
on the final question, unless by consent of the Senate, to be had without debate; but 
a motion to adjourn may be decided without the yeas and nays, unless they be de­
manded by one-fifth of the members present. The fifteen minutes herein allowed shall 
be for the whole deliberation on the final question, and not to the final question on each
XXV. Witnesses shall be sworn in the following form, viz: “You, ----------------
--------------:— , do swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that the evidence you shall
give in the case now pending between the United States a n d --------------------------------- ,
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth: So help you God.” 
Which oath shall be administered by the Secretary, or any other duly authorized per-
The House Judiciary Committee, subsequent to its investigation of the Nixon 
presidency, voted the following articles of impeachment:
In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon,
in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of 
the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect and defend the Con­
stitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the ad­
ministration of justice, in that:
On June 17, 1972, and prior thereto, agents of the Committee for the Re-election 
of the President:
Committed unlawful entry of the headquarters of the Democratic National Com­
mittee in Washington, District of Columbia, for the purpose of securing political intel­
ligence. Subsequent thereto, Richard M. Nixon, using the powers of his high office, 
engaged personally and through his Subordinates and agents in a course of conduct or 
plan designed to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation of such unlawful entry; 
to cover up, conceal and protect those responsible; and to conceal the existence and 
scope of other unlawful covert activities.
The means used to implement this course of conduct or plan have included one or 
more of the following:
[1]
Making or causing to be made false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized 
investigative officers and employes of the United States.
[2]
Withholding relevant and material evidence or information from lawfully author­
ized investigative officers and employes of the United States.
[3]
Approving, condoning, acquiescing in, and counseling witnesses with respect to the 
giving of false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative officers and 
employes of the United States and false or misleading testimony in duly instituted judi­
cial and Congressional proceedings.
[4]
Interfering or endeavoring to interfere with the conduct of investigations by the 
Department of Justice of the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, and Congressional committees.
[5]
Approving, condoning and acquiescing in the surreptitious payment of substantial 
sums of money for the purpose of obtaining the silence or influencing the testimony of 
witnesses, potential witnesses or individuals who participated in such illegal entry and 
other illegal activities.
[6]
Endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency, an agency of the United 
States.
[7]
Disseminating information received from officers of the Department of Justice of 
the United States to subjects of investigations conducted by lawfully authorized in­
vestigative officers and employes of the United States, for the purpose of aiding and 
assisting such subjects in their attempts to avoid criminal liability.
[8]
Making false or misleading public statements for the purpose of deceiving the peo­
ple of the United States into believing that a thorough and complete investigation had 
been conducted with respect to allegations of misconduct on the part of personnel of 
the executive branch of the United States and personnel of the Committee for the Re­
election of the President, and that there was no involvement of such personnel in such 
misconduct; or
[9]
Endeavoring to cause prospective defendants, and individuals duly tried and con­
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victed, to expect favored treatment and consideration in return for their silence or false 
testimony, or rewarding individuals for their silence or false testimony.
In all of this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as 
President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause 
of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.
Wherefore Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial,
Using the powers of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, 
in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of 
the United States, and to the best of his ability preserve, protect and defend the Con­
stitution of the United States, and in disregard of his constitutional duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed, has repeatedly engaged in conduct violating the 
constitutional rights of citizens, impairing the due and proper administration of justice 
in the conduct of lawful inquiries, of contravening the law of governing agencies of the 
executive branch and the purposes of these agencies.
This conduct has included one or more of the following:
He has, acting personally and through his subordinates and agents, endeavored to 
obtain from the Internal Revenue Service in violation of the constitutional rights of 
citizens, confidential information contained in income tax returns for purposes not au­
thorized by law; and to cause, in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, in­
come tax audits or other income tax investigations to be initiated or conducted in a
He misused the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service and other 
executive personnel in violation or disregard of the constitutional rights of citizens by 
directing or authorizing such agencies or personnel to conduct or continue electronic 
surveillance or other investigations for purposes unrelated to national security, the en­
forcement of laws or any other lawful function of his office.
He did direct, authorize or permit the use of information obtained thereby for pur­
poses unrelated to national security, the enforcement of laws or any other lawful func­
tion of his office. And he did direct the concealment of certain records made by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation of electronic surveillance.
He has, acting personally and through his subordinates and agents, in violation or 
disregard of the constitutional rights of citizens, authorized and permitted to be main­
tained a secret investigative unit within the office of the President, financed in part 
with money derived from campaign contributions, which unlawfully utilized the re­
sources of the Central Intelligence Agency, engaged in covert and unlawful activities, 
and attempted to prejudice the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial.
He has failed to take care that the laws were faithfully executed by failing to act 
when he knew or had reason to know that his close subordinates endeavored to impede 
and frustrate lawful inquiries by duly constituted executive, judicial and legislative en­
tities concerning the unlawful entry into the headquarters of the Democratic National 
Committee and the cover-up thereof and concerning other unlawful activities including 
those relating to the confirmation of Richard Kleindienst as Attorney General of the 
United States, the electronic surveillance of private citizens, the break-in into the 
offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding and the campaign financing practices of the Committee
In disregard of the rule of law he knowingly misused the executive power by inter­
fering with agencies of the executive branch including the Federal Bureau of Investiga­
tion, the Criminal Division and the office of Watergate special prosecution force of the 
Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency, in violation of his duty
In all of this Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as 
President and subversive of constitutional government to the great prejudice of the cause 
of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.
Wherefore, Richard M. Nixon by such conduct warrants impeachment and trial and
In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, 
contrary to his oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States 
and to the best of his ability to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed, has failed without lawful cause or excuse to produce papers and 
things, as directed by duly authorized subpoenas issued by the Committee on the Judi­
ciary of the House of Representatives on April 11, 1974, May 15, 1974, May 30, 
1974, and June 24, 1974, and willfully disobeyed such subpoenas.
The subpoenaed papers and things were deemed necessary by the committee in or­
der to resolve by direct evidence fundamental factual questions relating to Presidential 
direction, knowledge or approval of actions demonstrated by other evidence to be sub­
stantial grounds for impeachment of the President.
In refusing to produce these papers and things Richard M. Nixon, substituting his 
judgment as to what materials were necessary for the inquiry, interposed the powers of 
the Presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of Representatives, thereby 
assuming for himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole 
power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House of Representatives.
In all this, Richard M. Nixon has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as 
President and subversive of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the 
cause of law and justice, and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.
Wherefore, Richard M. Nixon, by such conduct warrants impeachment and trial
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